In July, Russia became the first country to formally recognize Taliban rule in Afghanistan. Despite the deep antagonism between the two nations dating back to the bloody Soviet intervention (1979–1989), this rapprochement is rooted in a strategic rationale given the isolation both regimes confront on the international stage.
This important milestone for the Taliban raises some key questions about American strategy in Central Asia. In particular, should Washington seek to counterbalance against Russian and Chinese influence in this dynamic region?
After the Taliban seized power in Kabul in August 2021, precipitating a chaotic but long overdue American departure from the country, Russia responded pragmatically. While withholding formal recognition of the new Taliban government, the Kremlin retained their embassy in Kabul. By October 2021, Moscow was hosting Taliban officials for meetings. In September 2022, Russia signed trade agreements with the new Afghan government that included discounted petroleum, wheat, and gas.
However, on September 5, 2022, ISIS orchestrated a suicide bombing outside the Russian embassy in Kabul, causing the deaths of Russian personnel. This highlights a tension in the Russian-Afghanistan relationship: terrorism and extremism. To Russia, ISIS represents a major threat, not least because Russia has its own large and growing population of Muslims that could prove susceptible to radicalization.
This April, Russia removed the Taliban from its terrorist organization list, allowing the two countries to officially enter into diplomatic talks. A month later, the Afghan commerce minister acknowledged that Russia and China were engaging in bilateral negotiations with the Afghan government, aiming to reduce Afghan reliance on the dollar amid U.S. sanctions.
The Kremlin’s move to formally recognize the Taliban government could serve many Russian interests, including counterterrorism, enhancing regional stability, gaining diplomatic relevance, and pursuing economic engagement. But Moscow must walk a fine line here. It continues to engage with the Taliban as a counterterrorism partner, despite the group’s Islamic ideology and history.
China has not yet formalized its relations with the Taliban, but it too is developing close linkages with Afghanistan, especially since the American departure. Beijing’s interests largely parallel those of Moscow. Those interests include counterterrorism concerns, commercial and infrastructure ambitions, geopolitical influence, and avoiding refugee and drug spillover.
China and Afghanistan share a 57-mile-long border. If Afghanistan once again becomes a hive of terrorist organizations, it could potentially threaten China's internal security. In the past, some Uyghur separatist groups in the restive province of Xinjiang maintained close ties to the Taliban. To China, this is a significant and proximate threat.
On the economic front, China is interested in Afghanistan's natural resources, including rare earth metals, especially copper and lithium. Additionally, Afghanistan's geographical location makes it a valuable addition to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Although Afghanistan is currently not a BRI member, its strategic location could link Central Asia to South Asia. The current development of the Pakistan-China Economic Corridor supports this vision. A stable Afghan government is crucial for controlling and addressing cross-border issues that could also impact the economy of China's western provinces.
Many Americans are worried that Beijing and Moscow are conspiring to fill the strategic vacuum left behind by the 2021 U.S. withdrawal. However, Washington should not be overly concerned by these developments. First, other key regional powers will dilute their influence. Pakistan, Turkey, Iran, and myriad other Islamic states will naturally play important roles in shaping the future of Afghanistan. Second, U.S. interests in the country were never substantial enough to engender a long-term commitment. By contrast, China and Russia are genuine Eurasian powers. As such, these developments correspond to a sound geopolitical and geoeconomic logic.
Finally, neither Beijing nor Moscow has aggressive designs on Afghanistan. Their interests in the country are somewhat peripheral, and both have a clear understanding that Afghans do not wish to be ruled by foreigners. It’s true that they might seek to use their relationships with Kabul in ways that make Washington uncomfortable. President Trump complained back in March about the Chinese “occupying” the formerly American airbase at Bagram. And there is a real danger that more battle-tested Afghan soldiers will end up as mercenaries fighting for the Kremlin in the Russia-Ukraine War.
But such outcomes do not constitute threats to U.S. vital national security interests. America’s tragic involvement in Afghanistan is best left in the past. Frozen funds that belong to the people of Afghanistan, not prior or current Islamic terrorist group members, should be released in order to stabilize the humanitarian situation in the country. In time, after it is clear there is no security threat, the U.S. could even consider diplomatic normalization. Kabul will likely welcome relations with Washington as part of a multi-vector foreign policy to balance those it has with Moscow and Beijing.
Ella Corbett is a recent graduate of the MA program at the Watson School of International and Public Affairs at Brown University and she focuses on Middle Eastern Studies.
Lyle Goldstein is Director of Asia Engagement at Defense Priorities.