[Salon] Why the Trump Tariff Merry-Go-Round Won’t Stop



https://www.wsj.com/opinion/why-the-trump-tariff-merry-go-round-wont-stop-2d1c4bf6
Why the Trump Tariff Merry-Go-Round Won’t Stop
By Ambassador Robert Zoellick - August 13, 2025

Anyone trying to make sense of President Trump’s tariffs is missing the point. The conga line of trade negotiators will keep dancing because Mr. Trump will continue to use tariffs to exert dominance, signal threats and make deals. There won’t be a new end state. Tariff numbers will keep fluctuating, prices for goods and investments will be unreliable, and agreements won’t last. But the damage to America’s economy and strategic interests will persist.

The president has cited various goals for his disorderly deal-making. He wants to cut bilateral trade deficits, open foreign markets, protect favored U.S. industries and restore manufacturing. He also wants to raise revenue and in some instances simply punish others for a perceived offense. His administration leaps from one rationalization to another to justify the boss’s most recent whim. But Mr. Trump won’t be pinned down. He believes uncertainty adds to his power and wants the freedom to bully others depending on what has his attention. 

Consider the president’s dismissive treatment of the most important trade pact from his first term—the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement, which renegotiated the North American Free Trade Agreement. Canada and Mexico, our closest trading and investment partners, can’t rely on Mr. Trump’s deal.

As a former reality TV star, the president enjoys signing papers and waving them before cameras. He likes announcing concessions and deals. He revels in the appearance of winning and moving on to the next episode. The rest of his government scrambles to discover the terms of the deals, sorting through the exceptions and side bargains—before the merry-go-round spins again. Enforcement will depend on Mr. Trump’s attention span and his latest fancy.

During America’s first 140 years, Congress wrote bills that set tariffs on individual items. This legislation was the big business of politics, defining parties and their campaigns. The high point of this system (or the low point, depending on your perspective) was the Tariff Act of 1930, or Smoot-Hawley, which raised the average U.S. tariff to 59%, making the Great Depression even worse.

Four years later, President Franklin D. Roosevelt persuaded Congress to pass the Reciprocal Tariff Agreements Act, which delegated authority to the executive to negotiate lower tariffs. Under that act, presidents were supposed to account for the larger national interest in opening markets, superseding Congress’s penchant to protect local producers. FDR and his next 12 successors used extensions and adaptations of this authority to lower barriers and establish rules to boost the U.S. and global economies.

Then Presidents Trump and Biden arrived, embracing protectionism and breaking with 80 years of open trade. Mr. Trump’s overreach of delegated congressional authority has led to a dramatic turn for America and the world.

After World War II, the U.S. viewed economic and security policies as complementary. When America’s allies and partners succeeded, they added markets for U.S. producers, lowered costs for consumers and companies, expanded growth, and enhanced America’s security. During these years, presidents took advantage of the attractive power of the country’s flourishing economy and society while keeping America on the competitive edge.

By contrast, Mr. Trump relies on coercive power. He views economics as a zero-sum contest for a fixed pie of resources and wealth to be divided up through his deals. Ironically, the interdependence of America’s allies enables Mr. Trump to menace them more than possible foes. He is pummeling friends Washington will need for military, intelligence and technological cooperation. In contrast, he has been cautious with China, which made a plan to hit back effectively, especially through controlling exports of vital minerals.

Mr. Trump’s trade policies and uncertainty will impose costs over time. Prices will increase. Washington will misallocate resources to less-competitive sectors. Productivity will slide. Other countries will be less willing to rely on American policies and companies. The costs might be offset for a time by other aspects of the U.S. economy, such as investments in artificial intelligence, data centers and energy. But America will be dissipating economic power, resilience and competitiveness. Brexit offers a rough analogy. The U.K.’s withdrawal from the European Union didn’t plunge the British economy into a nose dive, but over the years costs related to the shift have ground down the economy.

Americans will rediscover that the rest of the world keeps turning even if Washington tries to apply the brakes. New patterns of trade and investment will bypass Mr. Trump’s jumble of protectionism. China and others will seek to set the standards and build the networks of the future.

Mr. Trump’s tariffs and chaotic trade policy will yield a mishmash—not an international system led by a more powerful and attractive America.



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