[Salon] Accountability for War Crimes in Gaza: Where We Are




The global struggle to hold Israel accountable for war crimes in Gaza represents a critical test for international justice. At stake is not only the enforcement of laws prohibiting genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity, but also the credibility and survival of the very institutions tasked with upholding them. The principal international proceedings against Israel currently include cases at the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the International Court of Justice (ICJ), in addition to universal jurisdiction actions in national courts. Many governments have imposed sanctions on Israel, including arms embargoes, and have severed diplomatic ties with the Israeli government, resulting in its increasing global isolation. Collectively, the tools of law, diplomacy, and economic pressure offer a powerful and peaceful means to confront one of the most entrenched systems of impunity in the modern world.

The International Criminal Court

The ICC’s involvement in Palestine stretches back more than a decade, but took a decisive turn in 2024, just over a year into Israel’s genocidal war in Gaza. On November 21, 2024, the Court issued arrest warrants for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and former minister of defense Minister Yoav Gallant, charging them with starvation, deliberate attacks on civilians, murder, and persecution in Gaza, as well as now-deceased Hamas official Mohamed Deif for attacks on civilians.

These warrants stemmed from a formal investigation into violations of the Rome Statute, the treaty establishing the ICC, that then-prosecutor Fatou Bensouda opened in 2021, following an examination initiated in 2015, with jurisdiction for crimes committed in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (OPT) since June 13, 2014. Civil society groups had advocated for years to urge the Palestinian Authority (PA) to accede to the Rome Statute, which the State of Palestine finally did on January 2, 2015, and then to refer the situation in Palestine to the ICC, which it finally did on May 22, 2018. In response, Israel and the United States punished the PA and its officials with political and economic reprisals. When Karim Khan replaced Bensouda as the court’s prosecutor in 2021, many expected that he would avoid pursuing the investigation in Palestine but the genocide in Gaza apparently compelled him to take action.

In one of its first decisions, the court’s Pre-Trial Chamber ruled that it does have jurisdiction over the territory of the State of Palestine in light of its membership in the court, as well as jurisdiction over nationals of the State of Palestine. The court also confirmed its jurisdiction over crimes committed in the OPT, which means that it has jurisdiction over anyone committing crimes there even if they are citizens of states that are not members of the court, as provided in Article 12 of the Rome Statute. Accordingly, although Israel and the United States are not members of the court, their nationals are subject to the court’s jurisdiction for crimes they commit in Palestine.

US and Israeli nationals are subject to the court’s jurisdiction for crimes they commit in Palestine.

Israel and the United States have retaliated against the court with attacks, sanctions, and pressure campaigns aimed at delegitimizing the court and punishing countries, organizations, and individuals who support its work. President Donald Trump in his first term sanctioned former prosecutor Bensouda, her staff, and their families, and after returning to office in 2025 sanctioned Prosecutor Khan and four judges. Khan has now taken leave from the court amid sexual harassment allegations, casting uncertainty over the court’s future leadership. Meanwhile, Israel issued a ban against five civil society organizations— DAWN, Al-Haq Europe, Law for Palestine, the Hind Rajab Foundation, and Lawyers for Palestinian Rights—and 50 of their staff for supporting the court’s prosecution of Israelis.

Following the opening of Bensouda’s investigation, organizations began submitting evidence to the ICC on Israeli violations, but rarely, if ever, identifying perpetrators. This dynamic shifted in December 2023 with DAWN’s first submission to the court, naming 40 Israeli commanders who had a role in attacks on civilians, starvation, and blocking aid. In October 2024, the Hind Rajab Foundation, a new organization seeking accountability against Israeli perpetrators, filed a historic submission accusing 1,000 Israeli soldiers of crimes in Gaza, often relying on the soldiers’ social media posts documenting their crimes.

DAWN has also targeted US officials for aiding and abetting Israel’s atrocities.  In January 2025, DAWN submitted a 172-page communication to the ICC urging it to indict former President Joe Biden, former secretary of state Antony Blinken and former secretary of defense Lloyd Austin for aiding and abetting Israeli crimes by providing essential military, political, and public support to Israel. DAWN reported that “this support included at least $17.9 billion in weapons transfers, intelligence sharing, targeting assistance, diplomatic protection and official endorsement of Israeli crimes, despite knowledge of how such support had and would substantially enable grave abuses.”

Despite reports that additional ICC warrants may be forthcoming, the Court has since announced that it will no longer make such warrants public. Following a successful 2025 Israeli appeal of the court’s decision on jurisdiction, the matter remains under the court’s review but the court refused to rescind the arrest warrants and suspend its investigation pending the appeal.

The International Court of Justice

In parallel, the ICJ has had two cases against Israel for genocide and illegal occupation. A 2023 case initiated by South Africa accuses Israel of violating the Genocide Convention in Gaza. Several other countries joined or supported the case (including, in order of recency, Brazil, Belize, Cuba, Ireland, Belize, the Maldives, Chile, Turkey, Spain, Mexico, Libya, and Colombia). In January 2024, the ICJ issued provisional measures ordering Israel to prevent genocidal acts and to ensure humanitarian aid to Gaza. In March and May 2024, it issued additional measures, all of which Israel ignored. In April 2025, Israel secured a six-month delay to January 12, 2026, asking for more time to present its rebuttal.

The Court’s second intervention came after the UN General Assembly (UNGA) requested an opinion on the legality of Israel’s occupation and evidence that it was committing apartheid. In its July 19, 2024, opinion, the ICJ determined that Israel’s occupation of Palestine is illegal; that its policies constitute apartheid under the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination; and that it must cease its settlement activities, withdraw its settlers, and provide full reparations to Palestinians. It also reaffirmed the Palestinian right to self-determination, noting that member states are legally bound to recognize Israel’s presence in the OPT as unlawful, not aid Israel in maintaining it, and cooperate to end it.

The ICJ determined that Israel’s occupation of Palestine is illegal and that its policies constitute apartheid.

In response, on September 18, 2024, the UNGA issued two resolutions affirming the opinion, giving Israel a one-year deadline to comply and ordering it to comply with the ICJ’s orders in the genocide case. The resolutions further called on states to fulfill their obligations under the ICJ opinion and to sanction individuals responsible for maintaining the illegal Israeli occupation. Finally, the resolutions established the “High-Level International Conference for the Peaceful Settlement of the Question of Palestine and the Implementation of the Two-State Solution” that was scheduled to take place from June 17-20, 2025,  but was subsequently postponed following Israel’s attacks on Iran, to July 28 and 29, 2025. The conference resulted in the issuance of the “New York Declaration” proposing a 15-month pathway to statehood for Palestine under the PA’s control, urging states to recognize Palestine, and calling for a ceasefire and disarming Hamas, but failed to take any concrete actions to sanction Israel.

Litigation in National Courts

There has also been a surge in efforts to pursue justice through universal jurisdiction laws in national legal systems. Although complaints have been filed in at least a dozen countries, to date none have resulted in charges or prosecutions.

Two investigations remain outstanding. In October 2024, Belgian prosecutors announced a probe into a Belgian-Israeli citizen in the Israel Defense Forces’ (IDF) “Refaim” Sniper unit for crimes in Gaza. The entire 21-person unit—including three Americans, two French, a German, an Italian, and a Belgian national—are reportedly under investigation. (In July 2025, Belgian authorities briefly detained and interrogated two visiting Israeli soldiers for their role in war crimes, but subsequently referred them to the ICC.) In Canada, the police have launched a “structural” investigation into Canadian citizens who served in the IDF as part of Canada’s Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Program.

Although no indictments have yet been issued, the proceedings are having an effect by restricting the travel of Israeli soldiers and by signaling intolerance for their impunity. The IDF advised a group of soldiers who served in Gaza against traveling abroad due to fears of legal action against them. In at least eight cases, Israeli authorities ordered soldiers who had traveled to countries such as Cyprus, Slovenia, and the Netherlands to leave after legal filings were initiated against them.

Legal Challenges to Arms Transfers

Civil society organizations have sued in national courts around the world to enforce domestic laws prohibiting weapons transfers to abusive states or where the weapons may be used unlawfully. US courts have barred many of these cases under the “political question” doctrine, in which courts defer to the executive branch for matters related to foreign policy. This doctrine was the basis for a California court’s rejection of a case charging the US government with breaching the Genocide Convention, as well as the Alien Tort Claims Act and Torture Prevention Act, by providing weapons to Israel.

A 2024 US lawsuit organized by DAWN on behalf of Palestinian and Palestinian-American plaintiffs adopts a novel approach, challenging the Department of State’s refusal to enforce the Leahy Law, a provision of the Foreign Assistance Act that prohibits security assistance to abusive foreign units. To avoid the political question doctrine, the case narrowly targets the failure to enforce the Leahy Law as an arbitrary and capricious violation under the Administrative Procedure Act. The case is scheduled to proceed later this year.

Legal challenges to arms transfers have also emerged elsewhere. Global Legal Action Network and Al-Haq sued the UK government for exporting F-35 jet components to Israel assembled by a consortium of states. The United Kingdom had exempted the jet parts from its suspension of arms to Israel, claiming that it would disrupt the international supply chain and harm national interests. This case followed a successful effort in the Netherlands, where the Hague Court of Appeal ordered the Dutch government to halt F-35 parts exports to Israel over concerns they could be used in IHL violations. Unfortunately, in June 2025, the British court ruled against the plaintiffs, agreeing with the government’s defense and stating that it was not up to the judiciary to assess arms export policies.

Several challenges to German arms exports have failed as well, with German courts finding procedural and technical grounds to reject the claims. Nicaragua has sought to block German exports in a claim brought at the ICJ under the Genocide Convention, “in so far as this aid is used or could be used to commit or to facilitate serious violations of the Genocide Convention, IHL or other peremptory norms of general international law.” Though the court declined to issue any provisional orders to halt the sale, the case remains pending.

Arms Embargoes, Trade Sanctions, and Diplomatic Suspensions

An unprecedented number of governments have successfully imposed partial or total arms embargoes on Israel, typically citing domestic laws prohibiting weapons transfers to human rights violators.

The most significant of such arms embargoes is Germany’s decision in July 2025 to suspend all weapons exports to Israel in the wake of Netanyahu’s declared plan to invade and reoccupy all of Gaza; Germany has been a major arms supplier to the country, accounting for 30 percent of Israel’s weapons imports between 2019 and 2023.  In 2024, Germany had already suspended new licenses for “war weapons” but not for “regular” weapons. Spain, Italy, Belgium, Japan, Canada, Italy, and the Netherlands—also with previously significant arms exports to Israel—have also suspended licenses for arms exports to Israel since 2024. In July 2025, at an emergency meeting in Bogota of the Hague Group, formed in 2024 to support international legal actions for Palestine, 12 states—Bolivia, Colombia, Cuba, Indonesia, Iraq, Libya, Malaysia, Namibia, Nicaragua, Oman, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, and South Africa—also announced a total embargo on weapons to Israel.

The most significant of such arms embargoes is Germany’s decision to suspend all weapons exports to Israel.

Countries with partial export suspensions have focused on “offensive” weapons, citing the risk of their use to harm civilians, but permitting “defensive” weapons exports. The United Kingdom partially suspended 30 of 250 arms export licenses to Israel in 2024, finding a “clear risk” that the items could be used to violate IHL in Gaza but exempting the jet components. France suspended offensive weapons in 2024, but justified continued sales of defensive weaponry, such as parts for the Iron Dome. (A 2025 report documented continued French offensive arms exports to Israel despite the pledge to ban such weapons.) France also banned Israeli defense firms, including Elbit, Rafael and IAI, from advertising their weapons at the June 2024 Eurosatory Exhibition and the 2025 Paris Air Show. Even the United States, which supplied 69 percent of Israel’s arms imports between 2019-2023, imposed a partial embargo on Israel. Although it increased its military support to Israel to $17.9 billion following the start of the Gaza war, the Biden administration temporarily suspended 500-pound heavy bombs and Mk-84 2,000-pound bombs; Trump revoked the suspension.

More significantly, many states, including 12 states of the Bogota Hague Group meeting, have banned national flagged ships from carrying weapons to Israel, or any ships with military equipment headed for Israel from docking at their harbors. The 12 states also pledged to terminate any public contracts or funds that support Israel’s occupation, citing the ICJ’s advisory opinion.

At least 11 states—including Bolivia, Honduras, Colombia, Belize, Chile, Nicaragua, South Africa, Chad, Bahrain, Turkey, and Jordan—have severed or suspended diplomatic ties with Israel since the Gaza War. Many of them have recalled their ambassadors or diplomatic staff, citing Israel’s repeated violations of IHL. On July 15, 2025, the European Union threatened but eventually declined to suspend its Association Agreement with Israel or to take other sanctions against Israel.

Sanctions against Individuals for West Bank Violence

Sanctions against individual Israeli perpetrators in the West Bank have recently emerged as a new vehicle for accountability. In 2024, the Biden administration became the first to sanction Israeli settlers and settlement entities, but President Trump canceled the sanctions program in one of his first moves upon returning to office. DAWN submitted sanctions nominations against five of the sanctioned settlers, one of whom is currently attempting to take legal action against the organization.

Several other countries, including Australia, Canada, Norway and the United Kingdom, have now imposed sanctions on Israeli settlers and officials, including Ministers Itamar Ben-Gvir and Bezalel Smotrich. The designations of Israeli ministers are a significant political signal, marking an overdue recognition that settler violence is systemic and government-backed.

 Conclusion: The Tools of Accountability

Taken collectively, these actions have done nothing to halt Israel’s relentless genocide in Gaza and efforts to annex the West Bank, which the Israeli Knesset voted to support on July 23, 2025. The cowardice of the vast majority of the international community, alongside the principal role of the US government in aiding and abetting these crimes, remains the central problem.

Nevertheless, the momentum is clear. The global architecture of impunity for Israel is beginning to crack, and Israel finds itself increasingly isolated. The question is now whether more countries will use the existing tools for accountability to bring Israel’s genocide and illegal occupation to an end.

The views expressed in this publication are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the position of Arab Center Washington DC, its staff, or its Board of Directors. 

Sarah Leah Whitson is the executive director of Democracy for the Arab World Now (DAWN). This paper expands on the author’s remarks at the Arab Center Washington DC’s June 2025 conference, A Historic Juncture: Israel’s Destruction of Gaza and the Palestinian Future.




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