India and Japan can go from quiet partners to Asia's power couple
Modi's Tokyo visit can help build trust based on collaboration, not aid
Chitrali Parashar is a New Delhi-based associate with The Asia Group, a strategic advisory firm.
When India's Prime Minister Narendra Modi lands in Japan this month for talks with his counterpart, Shigeru Ishiba, the headlines will focus on India's first high-speed rail project, powered by JR East. But the real story is one of a quietly transformative relationship that now must evolve into a driver of trade, technology co-development and global market competitiveness.
Japan's role in India's growth runs deeper than most realize. Since 1958, Tokyo has committed 7.3 trillion yen ($49.6 billion at current exchange rates) in assistance, shaping everything from metro systems to industrial townships. While Japan has struggled to export its high-speed rail technology to major allies such as the U.S. and Australia, India's adoption of the system reflects both strategic trust and the strength of a long-standing infrastructure partnership.
Call it a backstage partnership, one that has delivered results without fanfare, avoiding the political theater often seen in other alliances. In today's geopolitical climate, however, discretion is no longer an advantage. The next phase must build on this legacy to create visible momentum in trade, investment, technology and strategic cooperation in ways that can be felt not only in government press releases but also in corporate boardrooms and public opinion.
Both countries have ample reason to seek a reset. The second Trump administration has been a blunt reminder of how quickly the global economic order can turn. India faces 50% U.S. import tariffs that amount to a trade embargo. It has been labeled a "dead economy" by U.S. President Donald Trump, and it faces unrelenting pressure over its Russian oil imports.
In February, Japan hailed its alliance with the U.S. as having entered a "new golden age." Yet since then, Washington has slapped a steep tariff on its auto exports, a significant plank of its economy, as well as a 15% "reciprocal" tariff on its other exports. Japan is still weighing the risks of landing in the crosshairs of expected Section 232 tariffs on its semiconductors and pharmaceuticals.
The U.S. partnership remains indispensable for both nations, but these shifts make one truth unavoidable: Strategic diversity is essential. Strengthening regional ties and building resilient middle-power coalitions is not optional, it is survival.
That means shifting the India-Japan relationship from one based on aid and infrastructure to one powered by business collaboration, shared technology and joint global competitiveness.
Signs of that pivot are already emerging. The state of Tamil Nadu, home to the largest concentration of Japanese companies in India, recently sent a high-level government delegation to Japan to seek more collaboration in automotive and other manufacturing. In the north, Uttar Pradesh's investment promotion agency is planning to establish a dedicated Japan desk to fast-track proposals and cut red tape. These are the kinds of targeted, investor-focused initiatives other states should replicate, ones that align directly with Japanese corporate priorities.
Momentum is also building in high-end strategic industries. Last year's agreement on Unification Complex Radio Antenna Masts technology was a landmark development: a stealth-enhancing radar system codeveloped by Japan's NEC and India's Bharat Electronics. The deal was only the second ever under Japan's Official Security Assistance program, and the first instance of defense equipment co-production between Japan and India.
It reflects a high degree of strategic trust, with the potential to anchor long-term security cooperation, generate spinoff technologies and create joint export opportunities to trusted third countries.
Similar thinking should shape collaboration in areas such as digital infrastructure, secure undersea cables and smart city technologies, where Japanese engineering and Indian scale can create solutions for markets from Southeast Asia to Africa. Japan's past relocation incentive program -- which allocated nearly $2.2 billion during the COVID-19 pandemic to help companies shift production out of China -- could be revived and focused on India, with sector-specific grants for industries such as automotive, electronics, green energy, industrial automation, medical devices and advanced manufacturing.
Tying these efforts directly to India's Production-Linked Incentive Scheme would make the proposition even more attractive by reducing transition costs, facilitating equipment transfers and supporting the setting up of facilities.
Energy is another area where strategic needs and commercial logic align. Japan is already planning to invest $100 million to $400 million in India's EV industry, partnering with companies such as Lohum Cleantech on battery recycling and recovery of materials. Scaling this up to a full value chain, from critical minerals processing to joint R&D hubs, would help both nations secure supply chains that are currently overexposed to geopolitical shocks.
But the relationship should not be framed solely in terms of supplying India's domestic market. Japanese and Indian companies alike can see the advantage in using Indian production bases for exports to third countries. This "India plus" model, already being promoted by Sibi George, India's ambassador to Japan, and implemented successfully by companies like Suzuki, turns bilateral cooperation into a competitive platform for accessing markets in Africa, the Middle East and Europe.
For this vision to work, policy needs to keep pace. On the Japanese side, renewing and scaling up production relocation grants would send a clear message that India is not just an option but a priority destination for diversification under the China Plus One strategy. On the Indian side, a coordinated national-state approach to Japanese investment would avoid duplication and ensure that investor aftercare matches the quality of the initial pitch.
But business-to-business and government-to-government cooperation cannot thrive without a solid foundation of people-to-people ties. Both sides need industry champions: Japanese business leaders in India who understand local culture and Indian executives in Japan who can bridge gaps in language and business norms. In this context, the recent first regular dispatch of 11 assistant language teachers from India to Japan under the Japan Exchange and Teaching Programme is a welcome step, and such exchanges should be scaled up to deepen mutual understanding.
There is also a question of narrative. For decades, Japan's work in India, from metros to industrial parks, has been delivered quietly, with minimal branding or public awareness. In an age where perception shapes investment flows, this restraint risks underplaying the partnership's value. Success stories need to be told more assertively. Flagship projects, defense coproduction and major investments should be showcased at annual partnership forums like the Raisina Dialogue, alternating between Tokyo and New Delhi, with cultural programs, CEO summits and innovation showcases designed to catch the attention of both markets.
Visibility is not about vanity; it sends a signal to global markets that the two countries are committed to each other's success. It also tells larger powers, including Washington, that middle powers can work together in ways that reinforce, rather than dilute, their strategic autonomy.
Japan has been one of the most consistent and generous partners in India's modern history. But the model of a silent benefactor and grateful recipient belongs to another era. The Modi-Ishiba meeting offers a chance to write a new chapter, one in which quiet cooperation becomes visible ambition, and where business, technology and strategic purpose move in sync.
In a post-Trump world, strategic ties with the U.S. will remain indispensable. Yet the ability of India and Japan to act -- visibly, ambitiously and across multiple domains -- is equally essential. The next chapter should make this partnership impossible to overlook in boardrooms, in markets and in the shifting balance of global power.