Gaza changes the traditional balances in Europe, but who can stop the war?
From London to Madrid, Berlin to Dublin, hundreds of thousands are marching week after week demanding a cease-fire, recognition of Palestine, and accountability for Israeli actions. These are not fringe protests; they are reshaping political discourse and, in some capitals, bending the machinery of government. It’s a sound that refuses to fade, echoing in parliamentary halls and party headquarters, forcing leaders to answer questions they once managed to avoid. For decades, Europe’s stance on the Israeli–Palestinian conflict was defined by caution. Historical ties, loyalty to Washington, and strong economic and security relations with Israel kept Palestinian statehood largely off the European political agenda. Recognition, when it came, was limited to a small handful of states symbolic gestures that left the broader EU position unchanged. Now, the war in Gaza is rewriting that script. The central question is no longer whether Europe sympathises with the plight of Palestinians. It is whether that sympathy can and will be transformed into concrete policy capable of influencing the course of the war.
In many ways, Europe today stands where Latin America once stood in 2008–2009. Back then, the war on Gaza ignited massive street protests from Buenos Aires to Caracas. Leftist governments were already in power, their rhetoric steeped in anti-imperialism. The protests didn’t just align with their ideology, they amplified it, creating a rare harmony between rulers and the ruled. In a matter of months, a cascade of countries formally recognised the State of Palestine. It was a diplomatic wave rooted in three forces converging: a war that mobilised the streets, governments willing to act, and a political climate less beholden to Washington. Europe has the same forces today. The war in Gaza has mobilised the streets in unprecedented numbers. Political forces sympathetic to the Palestinian cause from Podemos in Spain to La France Insoumise in France are gaining influence. But the third factor, independence from US influence, remains uncertain.
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A historic shift in recognition
Globally, over three-quarters of UN member states recognise Palestine. In Asia and Latin America, that share exceeds 90 per cent; in Africa, it is closer to 96 per cent. Europe, by contrast, has been slow to follow suit. Until 2023, only seven EU states had recognised Palestine six doing so in 1988 as part of a Soviet bloc decision during the Cold War, and Sweden breaking the mold in 2014 as the first Western European state to act. Momentum has accelerated in the past year. In May–June 2024, Ireland, Spain, and Slovenia joined the list, along with Norway from outside the EU. France and Malta have pledged recognition at the UN General Assembly in September 2025, while the UK has announced its intention to do so under conditions tied to a cease-fire and renewed commitment by Israel to political solution. Canada, Australia, and San Marino have also indicated plans to formalise recognition before year’s end. Other EU members including Portugal, Luxembourg, Belgium, Finland, Lithuania, and even Germany are actively debating the move. This shift is not occurring in a vacuum. It is closely linked to a surge in public sympathy for Palestinians, documented across multiple opinion polls, and amplified by constant media exposure to the humanitarian catastrophe in Gaza.
Public opinion and political impact
Recent surveys reveal a marked change in public sentiment. In United Kingdom, A July 2025 YouGov poll found 45 per cent support for recognising Palestinian statehood versus only 14 per cent opposed. Sympathy for Palestinians stood at 37 per cent, more than double that for Israel (15 per cent). In Germany, a July Forsa survey showed just over half of Germans favor recognition, with support peaking among Die Linke, the left voters (85 per cent) and Greens (66 per cent). In Spain, July 2024 polling recorded 34 per cent sympathy for Palestinians the highest among major European states compared to 14 per cent for Israel. In Ireland, a 2024 national poll revealed 71 per cent believe Palestinians live under an Israeli apartheid system, with strong support from Sinn Féin and People Before Profit for legislative action like the Occupied Territories Bill. In Italy, Mid-2024 YouGov data indicated 28 per cent sympathy for Palestinians versus only 7 per cent for Israel, reinforced by mass protests in Rome in June 2025 drawing nearly 300,000 people. In Western Europe Overall, in six countries surveyed, only 6–16 per cent believe Israel’s Gaza response has been proportionate, with pro-Israel sympathy at historic lows of 7–18 per cent.
From polls to party politics
The protests have intersected with a broader political shift. Left-wing and center-left parties often more critical of Israeli policy and more supportive of Palestinian rights are gaining traction. This shift in public mood is filtering directly into parliamentary politics. In Austria, the Gaza List party emerged from protest networks to contest seats as a symbolic and political statement. In the UK, divisions within Labour over Gaza policy have fueled internal dissent and boosted pro-Palestinian caucuses and independents. In France, La France Insoumise (LFI) leveraged its outspoken stance on Gaza to gain support in working-class, largely Muslim suburbs. In Germany, voter frustration with centrist coalitions has pushed some toward Die Linke and emerging left alliances. In Spain, public sympathy has strengthened PSOE and its partner Sumar in defending their recognition policy. In Ireland, Sinn Féin and People Before Profit have turned popular backing into concrete legislative pushes. In Italy, the Partito Democratico (PD) and allied progressive lists have used mass mobilisation to regain relevance in foreign policy debates. The pattern is clear, sustained public mobilisation, reflected in polling data, is altering coalition dynamics and empowering parties that explicitly advocate a cease-fire, Palestinian self-determination, and a two-state solution. Europe’s political scene is shifting. Left-wing parties such as Spain’s Podemos, Ireland’s Sinn Féin, France’s La France Insoumise, and Germany’s Die Linke have amplified calls for accountability over Israel’s conduct in GazaPolls reveal a growing European majority in favor of a ceasefire, challenging the long-standing alignment with Washington’s Middle East stance.
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This echoes an earlier wave of political transformation in Latin America. A decade ago, during Israel’s 2008–2009 war on Gaza, a group of leftist and nationalist governments across Latin America, known as the “pink tide,” swept into power. Leaders from Brazil, Bolivia, Venezuela, Ecuador, and Argentina not only condemned Israel’s actions but also recognised Palestinian statehood. In both cases Latin America then, Europe now public outrage over Gaza energised progressive movements, reshaping domestic politics and influencing foreign policy.
From symbolism to consequences, Europe’s escalating response
Europe’s reaction to Gaza now spans multiple fronts. As military measures, Germany suspended all arms exports that could be used in Gaza, Slovenia imposed a full arms embargo on Israel, and Spain and Belgium canceled specific military cooperation agreements. In addition, France, UK, and Canada have warned of future military restrictions if escalation continues. As an economic and trade measures, Spain and Belgium are pressing for a review of the EU–Israel Association Agreement, which grants Israel preferential trade terms. While the European Commission has proposed suspending Israel’s participation in the Horizon Europe research program worth hundreds of millions in grants, the measure has yet to secure member-state consensus. In the Netherlands, most major universities have suspended academic collaborations and exchange programs with Israeli institutions. On the other hand, the Dutch government supports pausing joint EU research projects with Israel, in line with Horizon Europe suspension proposals. There were also targeted European sanctions against Israeli officials, for example, Slovenia and the Netherlands have barred Israeli ministers Itamar Ben-Gvir and Bezalel Smotrich from entry, citing genocidal rhetoric and incitement to violence. Also France, UK, and Canada have left open the option of targeted sanctions against Israeli officials if humanitarian access is blocked or hostilities escalate
Transatlantic strains: Economic pressures and political unease
A third factor driving Europe’s recalibration is its increasingly strained relationship with Washington. The friction predates Gaza. It sharpened under the Trump administration, whose erratic foreign policy, trade disputes, and readiness to pressure allies left many European leaders wary of over-dependence on the US. The Latin American precedent offers a simple truth: the power to act on Palestine came only when governments combined public pressure with the freedom to defy Washington.
Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, tensions have deepened. The strains in Transatlantic relations have sharpened in recent years, not only over security policy but also in the economic sphere. For many in Brussels, the war in Ukraine crystallised an uncomfortable imbalance. Europe has shouldered the bulk of the war’s economic fallout, while Washington has reaped strategic, material, and financial rewards. By severing decades-long energy ties with Russia in line with US-led sanctions, EU member states were forced into an abrupt and costly pivot to American liquefied natural gas.
According to European Commission figures, LNG imports from the United States have surged to record highs, often at prices far exceeding pre-war Russian contracts a shift that bolstered US energy exporters while straining European industry and household budgets. These tensions deepened with the signing of a new US–EU trade arrangement that Brussels insiders have described as “politically driven” rather than purely economic. The deal imposes a 15 per cent tariff on most European exports to the United States higher than the historical average of roughly 1.2 per cent and includes headline commitments for the EU to purchase $750 billion worth of US energy and channel $600 billion in investments into the American economy over the coming years. The numbers convey an image of long-term dependency, one that critics warn could harden US leverage over Europe’s energy markets and investment flows. Actual US energy sales to the EU in recent years have hovered closer to $200 billion annually and the result is signaling Europe’s deepened reliance on American suppliers. The European Parliament’s trade committee has voiced concerns that such arrangements erode the EU’s bargaining position, lock in unfavorable tariff structures, and risk sidelining European energy diversification efforts.
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Overlaying these trade dynamics are long-standing frictions within NATO. Washington has pushed for European allies to raise their defence spending contributions effectively shifting an additional five per cent of the Alliance’s financial burden onto EU states while retaining decisive control over strategic planning. Procurement rules, too, have drawn quiet resentment in European capitals: NATO’s standards have in practice steered members toward purchasing US-made weapons systems, reinforcing industrial dependence on American defense contractors. For a growing bloc of European policymakers, this pattern war-induced economic losses, asymmetrical trade terms, and constrained defence autonomy points to an urgent need for recalibration.
A call for strategic autonomy
Under Donald Trump, Washington’s erratic foreign policy from trade wars to the casual alienation of allies, left many in Europe questioning the reliability of the Transatlantic bond. Some of the continent’s most influential leaders, from Paris to Berlin, have begun speaking more openly about “strategic sovereignty” and the dangers of overreliance on Washington. Public opinion appears to be shifting in parallel, with polls in several EU countries showing stronger support for policies that prioritise European interests, even at the risk of diverging from US policy lines. Taken together, these pressures from wartime economic fallout to asymmetric trade terms and constrained defence sovereignty have revived an old debate in European political circles: should the continent’s security and prosperity remain so tightly bound to Washington’s strategic orbit. This tension is no longer whispered in diplomatic backrooms. French President Emmanuel Macron speaks of “strategic autonomy.” In Berlin, senior officials warn of the dangers of locking Europe’s economy and defense into US supply chains. The lesson from Latin America is instructive: only when governments combined domestic political will with reduced US leverage did they make bold pro-Palestinian decisions.
A test of principles
The wave of recognition commitments — alongside the first concrete sanctions and embargoes marks a decisive break from decades of near-total alignment with Washington’s approach. Yet this transformation is still fragile. The translation of public pressure into binding policy remains uneven, and the gap between bold rhetoric and enforceable measures is wide. What is emerging, however, is a clear political cost for inaction a cost that will rise as long as the war drags on and the humanitarian toll mounts. The continent possesses the industrial capacity, economic leverage, and diplomatic reach to influence the trajectory of the war and perhaps reset the balance of power in ways that favor international law over impunity. Europe has long claimed to champion human rights, the rule of law, and multilateralism. Gaza is now the litmus test for whether these ideals hold under real-world political and economic pressure. If Europe can align its values with decisive action, it may not only shape the outcome in Gaza but also reinforce its own credibility as a global actor capable of independent, principled leadership. If it cannot, the gap between its rhetoric and reality will grow and so will the costs, both moral and political.
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