SITREP 8/22/25: Peace Talks Unravel and the March Goes On
Another turn of the ceasefire carousel, and more deja vu. Lavrov has again confirmed that Putin and Zelensky can only meet after all the underlying work is first accomplished, in terms of agreeing on the various subordinating issues. In short, it means there will be no such meeting any time soon.
And to complete the touch of deja vu, Trump again gave a two-week notice after which he warned the US could “change its approach” toward ending the conflict.
The only novel thing of interest was Trump’s tweet that appeared to house a subtle threat:
The fact that the tweet came at the same time that Trump was giving his two-week ultimatum and hint of “changing direction” seems to imply that Trump could give Ukraine offensive weapons to “attack” Russia. Of course, that would clash with his claims of “Biden’s war”, given that doubling down with offensive weaponry would certainly solidify the conflict as Trump’s war. But it could just be another in a long line of examples of Trump selectively cherry-picking credit and blame—anything that sounds goodly and powerful notched to his credit, and anything weak and misguided to Biden’s.
As I said in the last report, Trump is essentially playing a game of illusions where the optics themselves are the ends rather than the means:
The desperate and shallow attempts to parallel current half-hearted initiatives to those of hardier times will age badly.
Oddly enough, Bannon summarized things best this week:
The only imperatives that continue to matter are those of the battlefield, which is where we’ll turn straightaway.
Let’s start with the fact that Russia launched another large-scale attack last night, which included cruise and hypersonic missiles of all kinds, and struck many an interesting object.
The most interesting was a factory in Mukachevo, in the Zakarpattia region, reportedly belonging to the American Flextronics corporation.
The factory is said to produce electronic circuit boards, with Ukrainian sources claiming they are exclusively civilian, but Russian ones stating they are involved in the production and assembly of units for various military objects like the Bayraktar and other drones:
Mukachevo, Zakarpattia region.
For the first time in this conflict, strikes reached deep into Zakarpattia, previously considered Kiev’s rear “safe zone.” At least two Kalibr cruise missiles hit the Flex LTD plant, a division of the US-based corporation Flextronics (Flex Ltd.), one of the world’s largest electronics manufacturers.
The Mukachevo site housed production of printed circuit boards, control systems, microprocessor units, and assembly components for military hardware and drones. It was also the hub for adapting Western electronics to Kiev’s weapon systems: Texas Instruments processors, STMicroelectronics microcontrollers, Vicor power modules, and telemetry units for Bayraktar TB2, Warmate, Punisher, and Vampire drones, as well as 90% of all Kiev-produced UAVs.
The destruction of this facility is critical. Explosions devastated cleanrooms, Siemens and Juki SMT lines, and testing stations from Keysight and Rohde & Schwarz. The strike on Mukachevo represents a strategic turning point: Kiev lost its key center for integrating Western electronics into drones and precision weapon systems.
The destruction appeared large-scale:
It is interesting for the fact that we’ve heard recently that Russia is shifting its strike designations from purely military to more civilian-industrial and energy related targets, particularly those with dual-use production lines. Some have posited this suggests Russia has initiated a new ‘phase’ of conflict designed to finish off Ukraine.
Many other plants were hit according to reports, including the SpecOboronMash in Zhitomir, hit by Kinzhals, which produced and repaired parts for armored vehicles, and another Motor Sich plant in Zaporozhye.
Interestingly, two Zircon missiles were claimed by Ukraine to have been used in the strikes.
One Russian report:
Sumy:
A Zircon 3M22 hypersonic missile struck the Military Police headquarters on Lebedinskaya Street, 21. At least 18 were killed and 27 wounded, most of them officers. The use of Zircon highlights the priority of the strike: Kiev forces lost a command structure essential for rotations and disciplinary control, which will inevitably affect troop management.
Granted, Ukraine has also been walloping Russian oil production sites recently, but we all know who wins the “blow-for-blow” battle of attrition when it comes to degrading infrastructure.
Also came the news—referenced by Steve Bannon in the earlier video—that a Russian hacking collective allegedly hacked Ukrainian General Staff databases to reveal 1.7 million KIA and missing soldiers. They posted a handful of documents as proof, with claims that the lists contained all missing and liquidated soldiers:
Many reacted with outright skepticism at the number, and for good reason. It does seem hard to believe, however just as food for thought, recall that it was Zelensky himself who gave Ukraine’s mobilization figures as roughly 30,000 per month in each year of the war thus far:
Just taking 30k multiplied by the 41 months of the war, we get ~1.2 million. But you must add that to the 1m or so that Ukraine was said to have started the war with after the first initial mass call-up of reservists, which added to the already several-hundred-thousand-strong Ukrainian army at the time. With those you get 2.2m, from which we can subtract Ukraine’s current claimed strength of anywhere between 600k - 1m, and get somewhere between 1.2m to 1.6m that are “missing”, which seems to match up with the figures from the Russian hack.
However, recall that even if the AFU has lost 1.4m or so—taking the middle number—those would be irrecoverable losses which includes both KIA and seriously wounded or maimed. Given that the ratio between these is usually 1:1 or a bit higher for the maimed in most wars, we can then assume 700k or so would be killed and another 700k maimed, which is likely closer to the real Ukrainian losses.
However, we must not forget desertions, of which even Ukrainian authorities claim are something north of 200,000+ since the start of the conflict. You can shift it down to 600k killed, 600k maimed, and 200k deserted. Although, keep in mind the desertion figures simply count initial desertions but don’t include the fact that many if not most of those desertions end up being brought back, whether by force or by their own choice. It’s a known phenomenon in the AFU that a huge portion of deserters go AWOL to “take a break” and then return on their own after several weeks or longer.
This news also happens to come a mere couple days after another exchange of bodies took place where Russia again returned 1,000 deceased AFU soldiers, and Ukraine returned 19 Russian ones. Make of that what you will.
Most will continue the cliche about “Russia is advancing so it’s gathering more corpses”, yet oddly enough, each time Ukraine massively advanced, like in the Kursk and Zaporozhye offensives, the body exchanges did not disproportionately favor Ukraine…why is that?
Well, it seems on the Zaporozhye offensive it actually slightly did, but something drastically changed after that.
Now for the frontline updates.
There continues to be back and forth claims on the northern Pokrovsk breakthrough direction. Ukrainian channels claim they are pushing forward while Russian channels deny this and say the opposite, that Russian forces are actually expanding control once more, after the ‘elite’ AFU reinforcements had some initial success.
From a Ukrainian source:
At the moment, according to Suriyak at least, Russian forces have slightly widened their hold near the key settlement of Kucheriv Yar, as shown below, which included the capture of Pankovka, circled in red:
As can be clearly seen, this is slowly creating a mini-cauldron around Shakhove and adjoining settlements.
Ukrainian counterattacks have had some undeniable success on several fronts, pushing Russian “DRG” forces out of Pokrovsk city itself, and elsewhere. This is likely due to the reinforcements sent, which may have well been the reserves that were being prepared for some other ‘surprise breakthrough’ on the Russian border.
But it has undeniably slowed the Russian advance a bit, though not stopped it completely. One Russian source even claims Russians have retaken much of the areas north of Pokrovsk that Ukrainians recaptured, such as some of Vesele:
Druzhkovka direction
Despite the reserves deployed by the Kiev forces and their “victorious” reports, the situation for them remains difficult and uncertain.
Kiev reserves managed to push our units back a little in the Zolotoy Kolodez – Rubezhnoye area. But they didn’t achieve any decisive success, despite all their bragging. In the eastern part of Zolotoy Kolodez, Russian forces regained and are holding their positions, continuing the fight for the village. Moreover, as reported earlier, Russian units have once again secured the southern part of Vesyoloye, having first taken the Viklechnaya gully, and advanced along the Vesyoloye – Zolotoy Kolodez line toward Petrovka.
Southward, the Kiev forces are pressing around Nikanorovka and Oktyabrskoye (Shakhovo), trying to “cut off” the Russian penetration into their defensive lines farther north along the Dorozhnoye – Nikanorovka – Mayak – Shakhovo line.
However, Russian reserves brought into the battle did not allow them to reach this goal. Russian units pushed back the Kiev counterattacks and are gradually regaining lost positions and expanding the corridor.
Heavy clashes continue with growing Russian advantage. The Kiev forces, who tried to break through to Mayak, were driven out of their positions and pushed back north toward Oktyabrskoye (Shakhovo).
Fierce engagements are also ongoing in the Volnoye – Roza Luxemburg (Novoye Shakhovo) area.
As already reported, Russian units expelled the Kiev forces from Pankovka and are fighting in the northern part of Vladimirovka.
Neighboring Russian units are attacking and advancing toward Oktyabrskoye (Shakhovo) and Artyomovka (Sofievka) from the east and northeast, creating a flanking threat for the Kiev forces and forcing them to divert reserves that were meant to eliminate the Russian breakthrough near Kucherov Yar and Vesyoloye.
Apart from that, there were a few small advances on the Velyka Novosilka front that are not worth covering until they accumulate into larger settlement grabs.
The biggest news is that the advance from recently-captured Predtechyne into Konstantinovka city proper has been confirmed by Suriyak and others, with some mappers even having Russian forces geolocated in the first interior blocks of the city itself, although Ukrainian accounts claimed that these early forward scout units were expelled:
Also, some of the area to Konstantinovka’s south was liberated, and as you can see a cauldron has formed between the new Predtechyne salient and the Oleksandro-Shultyne line just below it which will likely be collapsed next, bringing the entire front up much closer to the main city like so:
On the Krasny Lyman front, Russian forces wedged deeper into Zarichne after recently capturing neighboring Torske:
A wider view shows us what the situation now looks like—Russian forces are collapsing the Serebriansky forest area designated by the blue line where Ukrainian forces are retreating:
Meanwhile Seversk continues to be slowly encircled.
A French analyst explains why Trump’s “gift” of Donbass to Russia would be catastrophic to the AFU. You can see his map below which shows how most of Ukraine’s main deep trenchwork and fortification systems would immediately jump to Russia’s “rear”, allowing a bloodless bypass of these systems:
This is why giving away Donbass cannot be an option for Ukraine
Donald Trump will ask Zelensky to give away Donbass in exchange for a ceasefire with Russia. It would mean giving 9 cities and the main fortifications to Russia without a fight.
If hostilities were to restart thereafter, Russia would have nothing but free countryside to pass through, provided that enough time had not elapsed allowing Ukraine to build new fortifications there.
One grim outlook was provided by a Ukrainian drone unit commander in a post that made huge waves:
Transcribed version:
About aerial reconnaissance
In the coming months, aerial reconnaissance as a type of systemic activity may cease to exist.
In the reconnaissance-strike contour of operational-tactical depth, the key word is precisely "reconnaissance." Without visual confirmation of a target, almost no one ever flies out to strike it, and searching for a target with a strike asset is practiced very rarely.
At present, almost along the entire front line, the enemy is deploying a layered line of FPV-interceptors, creating so-called "kill zones," which sometimes extend 15–20 km deep into enemy territory. All reconnaissance aircraft attempting to fly there during the day are very likely to be shot down. For now, they are not systematically shot down at night, but this is only a matter of time. Climbing higher (to 4,000–5,000 meters) also produces no result; the enemy has learned to shoot down there as well. Conducting "sector reconnaissance" in most directions is now impossible.
There are areas on certain axes where, during the daytime, no one even tries to put wings into the sky anymore, understanding that they will be shot down, and this creates a vacuum for enemy maneuvers.
This is the systemic result of the work of the Russian "Rubikon Center for Advanced Drone Technologies" and their mobile fire groups.
Reconnaissance of the forward edge, the line of contact, will remain; it is almost impossible to suppress it.
But operational-tactical level reconnaissance is gradually disappearing and requires a breakthrough revolutionary counter-solution. If none is found, then with the growing mass use of Rubikon in the sectors, and with traditionally poor autumn weather, aerial reconnaissance will cease to be regular.
What might these solutions be? Casual observers mention "mini-EW" on reconnaissance drones, an "evader system" (when, upon detection of an enemy interceptor, the wing sharply performs maneuvers that reduce the chance of being hit), flights at high altitude.
These are crutches, which will be easily countered technologically.
So far there is no solution. And finding that solution is the number one task for manufacturing companies and for many military R&D centers. If no solution is found, in the next spring campaign it will be very difficult for us.
The time for gigantic, expensive reconnaissance aircraft for huge sums is unambiguously over. Depth will be covered by "photowings," Leleka M2, Hory, Vectors, Domakhas, and Shark-D.
Let me remind you that it was precisely we who first came up with the mass use of FPV-interceptors against reconnaissance wings, faced with a huge influx of enemy wings and the lack of sufficient SAM systems to shoot them down.
We will also have to find countermeasures to this. Because there will not be enough drones for everyone.
-Serafym Hordiienko, drone crew commander of the 14th Separate Regiment -
Firstly, he validates something I’ve been harping on for a long time: that this big “FPV” threat everyone talks about relies almost entirely on other slower, larger drones which can be relatively easily taken out.
There are two main important types: the ‘recon’ drone and the signal extender. FPVs cannot function without either one of these. First: because FPVs fly very low and lose their signal fast after line of sight to the controlling unit is cut. Therefore they are required to have a signal booster drone somewhere very high above that can ‘triangulate’ the signal to them.
Second: FPVs don’t have much battery time and are typically not used in ‘free hunt’ mode because they’re optimized to carry as large a warhead and as small a battery as possible, in order to maximize lethality. Letting them loiter around and ‘free hunt’ for targets would quickly drain the battery, therefore they’re almost exclusively used after a recon drone has first scouted out some targets or a general target-rich area for them to feast on. (The exception is fiber-optic drones, but they are not in great enough comparative number to make a dent in this regard, and they still suffer the same battery issue as the fiber only provides signal but not electric charge.)
These signal and recon drones are generally larger, slower Mavic types which can be jammed, taken out, etc., particularly as they’re forced to fly relatively high for their purpose. Russia has now prioritized detecting them with various small and portable radar systems, as well as other methods, and this is what the screed above is decrying.
He believes that if Russia continues to scale up this systematic destruction of Ukrainian secondary UAVs which are essential for FPV function, then soon Russia may effect an entire front-wide negation of Ukrainian FPV and recon drone capabilities. This would allow Russian assault forces free-reign to advance without fear of being detected or hunted, which would wildly swing the conflict in Russia’s favor even more so than at present.
To temper this, I have seen similar recent reports from some Russian units on certain fronts complaining of the same systematic work on the Ukrainian side, where more and more Ukrainian units are utilizing portable Israeli radars to take out Russian recon drones, greatly complicating Russian efforts on those fronts. I’m sure the effort exists and is serious, but it’s likely the Russian one will be scaled at a faster rate due to well-known logistical realities.
On that note, another new look at a Ukrainian supply route near Kramatorsk being adorned with the now-ubiquitous and mandatory anti-drone net tunnels:
Some Russian sources complain that Ukraine has systematized these net tunnels to a greater extent than Russia, and has been covering virtually every road with them, but it’s likely because Ukraine has far more need of it.