The Trump administration's approach to Venezuela presents a textbook case of how ideological posturing can undermine strategic interests, particularly when it comes to the larger geopolitical competition with China.
While Washington has spent the better part of a decade applying maximum pressure on the Maduro regime—through sanctions, diplomatic isolation, and threats of military intervention—Beijing has quietly positioned itself as Venezuela's lifeline, deepening its economic and strategic foothold in America's backyard.
The Trump administration's Venezuela policy, inherited and largely continued by the Biden administration, reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of both Venezuelan domestic dynamics and regional geopolitics. The assumption that economic pressure alone would precipitate regime change has proven not only wrong but counterproductive. Rather than weakening President Maduro's grip on power, sanctions have created a dependency relationship that has driven Caracas deeper into Beijing's orbit.
This outcome was entirely predictable. When you corner a regime and cut off its traditional economic lifelines, it will inevitably seek alternative partners. China, with its policy of non-interference in domestic affairs and its appetite for energy resources, presented itself as the obvious alternative. The result has been a strategic windfall for Beijing at Washington's expense.
While American policymakers engaged in theatrical denunciations of the Maduro government, China pursued a more sophisticated long-term strategy. Beijing's approach has been characterized by what we might call "authoritarian pragmatism"—providing economic support, investment, and diplomatic cover without demanding political reforms or regime change. This has allowed China to:
Secure access to Venezuela's vast oil reserves through loan-for-oil agreements
Establish a significant economic presence in the Western Hemisphere
Demonstrate to other Latin American nations that China offers an alternative to U.S. hegemony
Create a strategic asset that could potentially complicate U.S. military planning in a broader conflict
The Chinese have essentially turned American sanctions into a competitive advantage, offering themselves as the indispensable partner that Venezuela cannot afford to alienate.
The Venezuela case illuminates a broader problem with American foreign policy: the tendency to prioritize moral satisfaction over strategic calculation. By making Venezuela policy primarily about promoting democracy and human rights, rather than managing great power competition, Washington has handed Beijing a strategic victory in what should be America's sphere of influence.
This approach reflects a dangerous disconnect between means and ends. If the ultimate goal is to contain Chinese influence in the Western Hemisphere, then the current policy has been not merely unsuccessful but actively counterproductive. A more realistic approach would recognize that:
Regime change is not a viable policy tool in the current international environment, particularly when alternative great powers are willing to provide support to targeted regimes.
Economic interdependence matters more than ideology in determining long-term strategic relationships. China's willingness to engage economically with Venezuela has proven more valuable than American moral condemnation.
Regional stability serves American interests better than ideological purity, particularly when instability creates opportunities for strategic competitors.
A more strategic approach to Venezuela would prioritize American interests over ideological preferences. This might involve:
Selective engagement with the Maduro government on issues of mutual concern, particularly counternarcotics and regional stability
Economic competition with China rather than wholesale sanctions that cede the field to Beijing
Multilateral coordination with regional partners who share American concerns about Chinese influence, even if they don't share American views on Venezuelan governance
Such an approach would require acknowledging uncomfortable realities about both Venezuelan politics and American leverage. But it would also position the United States to compete more effectively with China for influence in Latin America, rather than allowing Beijing to position itself as the defender of sovereignty against American imperialism.
The lesson of Venezuela is clear: in an era of great power competition, ideological foreign policy is a luxury America can no longer afford. The choice is not between supporting democracy and accommodating authoritarianism, but between strategic thinking and strategic abdication. So far, we have chosen the latter, and China has been the beneficiary.