Desperate Euro-Elites Suggest Boots-on-Ground Even "Before Ceasefire"
The news surrounding the Ukrainian conflict has been slow owing to a kind of ‘planning’ doldrums phase where all sides have retreated to strategize on the next novel idea on how to politically out-maneuver the other. That is because the entire ‘ceasefire’ charade has in fact turned into nothing more than political posturing given that all the involved sides are much too far apart to tangibly come together in any significant way. So in absence of that, only the political side remains as potential harvest for some kind of advantageous position.
Europe has been again retreading the ‘security guarantees’ and ‘boots-on-ground’ red herrings, but this is old, beaten laundry with too much mileage on it to come to any real use anymore. That doesn’t stop them from trying, though—Le Monde, for instance, proposes a novel idea: that European troops should be injected into Ukraine before the signing of a ceasefire not after, in order to “pressure” Putin into that very truce:
‘Research fellow’ at the French Institute of International Relations—an establishment cutout—Elie Tenenbaum makes the argument that talking about a potential European “peacekeeping force” has the effect of hardening Putin to continue the conflict, so as to not have NATO troops on his border—a reasonably competent assessment.
However, this prospect remains completely out of the question for the Kremlin, one of whose primary motivations was to prevent any Western troops from entering an area it considers its own. Worse still, the more the Europeans show their willingness to deploy forces after a ceasefire, the less Vladimir Putin will be inclined to sign it.
But then Mr. Tenenbaum jumps the shark. Rather than following the clear logic of his own novel inspiration, he reaches the conclusion that the only way to make this work is to then insert the troops right away, rather than waiting for Putin’s approval:
The solution to this problem is not technical, but logical, and again requires a reversal of the chronology: security forces must be deployed before, not after, a ceasefire. Forced to accept a European presence or pay the price of a costly and uncertain confrontation with the West, Russia will be more inclined to sign an agreement than it would be without such a demonstration.
So, Mr. Tenenbaum believes launching WWIII would be just the recipe for getting Putin into “negotiations”. He probably should have listened to Lukashenko’s recent interview before penning his dross; Lukashenko recounted how he warned Trump on the phone to not pressure Putin, precisely because Putin is not susceptible to making decisions under duress:
It should also be noted that Tenenbaum’s article makes an interesting distinction—that as a generality, any force deployed to Ukraine would not be a “peacekeeping” force in the classical sense of troops who merely patrol a line of contact. Instead, it would be an offensive deterrence force capable of “advancing on a possible breach in the front line”:
This would not be a neutral peacekeeping and interposition force on the line of contact, but rather a reassurance and deterrence operation. Such a plan is ambitious, but far from beyond the reach of Europeans…
This coalition is based on four pillars…and a "land demonstration" involving a few mobile brigades capable of advancing on a possible breach in the front line, which is over 1,000 kilometers long and would remain held by the Ukrainian army, as is the case today.
As most know, “peacekeepers” are usually distinct from real offensive combat brigades and heavy armor units capable of waging real warfare. Peacekeepers by contrast are usually lightly armed and meant only to act as “security guards” and sentries. It’s clear that Russia and NATO disagree on what type of force would be appropriate for this occasion, particularly given that Russia has backed proposals for Chinese involvement in this regard.
Also interesting is his mention of critical “shipping lanes” and ports needing protection by this reassurance force, which clearly implies using NATO navies to protect Odessa. Western analysts are increasingly urgent about Odessa falling into Russian hands, given recent Russian breakthroughs on the battlefield.
A recent Telegraph piece highlighted this, marking Odessa as absolutely existential for Ukraine’s survival:
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Getting back to the ‘maneuvering’ phase of the ‘negotiations’ games, Trump has now stated that after his new two-week deadline is up, he may impose sanctions, tariffs, or “do nothing at all”:
The Europeans continue scrambling in circles like rousted chickens with no clear idea of a way forward. Many European elites are beginning to grasp the reality of the situation: the impotence of Europe, the stark delusions of grandeur that allowed European elites to think they could push around global giants.
In a speech at the annual Rimini meeting, ex-ECB honcho Mario Draghi raked the EU over the coals, declaring its delusions of geopolitical power as a dead dream born of the misguided idea that economic power can automatically grant you geopolitical power:
“For years, the European Union believed that its economic size, with 450 million consumers, would bring with it geopolitical power and influence in international trade relations. This year will be remembered as the year in which this illusion evaporated.”
The more the Eurocrats screech and squawk in their aimless charade, the more powerless they look, and the more credibility they lose in the eyes of their own populace. Yet it is with their ‘iron assurance’ that Zelensky now continues to maintain his fanatically maximalist approach, bluffing his way toward catastrophe for Ukraine: in a new ‘Ukrainian Independence Day’ statement, Zelensky even promised to return both Crimea and Donbass to a “reunited” Ukraine. Europe is writing a check for Zelensky that it will not be able to cash.
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Trump was also asked about the major Russian strikes that blew away the American factory in western Ukraine:
Remember when there were claims Rheinmetall and other major Western arms manufacturers were going to create all kinds of advanced weapons factories in western Ukraine that Russia would “not dare touch”? How naive did one have to be to actually believe that?
Humorously enough, Lavrov was likewise grilled by NBC about this ‘provocative’ act:
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In other news, Ukrainian public figure and drone weapons expert Berlinska made huge waves with another grim deduction surrounding Russia’s now legendary Rubicon drone unit:
Recall in a recent report we shared the prediction that Russian anti-drone tech would soon lead to the collapse of Ukrainian drone capabilities, if left unchecked. The latest stark reminder tells us that Rubicon’s expertise is being scaled throughout the army at large and will soon snowball disastrously for Ukraine if the prescribed emergency measures are not taken.
Another Ukrainian figure, a sniper from the 59th Separate Assault Brigade, lamented Russia’s recent ‘unexpected’ gains, likewise chalking them up to Rubicon’s success. Recall the discussion in a recent report here about Russia’s new strategy of disrupting Ukrainian reconnaissance capabilities, and the widespread cascading effect that has on the AFU—read the underlined below:
Similarly, head of the Azov National Guard Bohdan Krotevych again gave a dour assessment of the situation:
He states two important things: First, that Ukraine essentially doesn’t have real ‘reserves’ and all the recent reinforcements sent to put out fires were taken from other fronts.
And the much more important thing: he correctly states that manpower is not actually Ukraine’s main issue. If you gave Ukraine a magical 100,000 new men, he says that the situation would revert to the exact same precipice it’s now on within several weeks. Why? Because, he astutely points out, Ukraine already had such manpower before, and it lost it all for a reason. There’s much left unsaid, but of course most understand that the war began with a Ukrainian manpower advantage—why did it gradually slide to such a disadvantage? The answer is simple: Russian capabilities are simply greater, therefore no matter how much manpower Ukraine regenerates, it will continue to lose without something radical or drastic taking place.
On that note, a last interesting tidbit. In a new interview with RBC-Ukraine, Commander-in-Chief Syrsky said something quite amazing. After first claiming that in Bakhmut, Ukraine lost men at a favorable 1:7 ratio against Russia—i.e. 7 Wagner KIA per 1 Ukrainian KIA, he goes on to state that even in the Kursk offensive, Ukraine managed a 1:5 kill ratio against the Russian defenders:
The reason this statement is so amazing is that it reveals from the lips of the highest military authority of Ukraine that a favorable KIA ratio on the offensive is quite possible. Most pro-UA commentators claim Russians are delusional for believing that Russia achieves a favorable ratio against Ukraine despite being on the offensive for the majority of the war. Yet here we have the war hero Syrsky himself admitting this is a normal thing for offensive operations. It puts pro-UA analysts in a bit of a bind, either Syrsky is lying, or Russian claims are not as “preposterous” as they’re made out to be.
Of course, this is rhetorical: the astute readers of this blog certainly know the real answer.
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We’ll hold off the full front updates until next time, due to the fact that there is a particularly foggy information blackout at the moment about a few key positions due to both Ukraine and Russia utilizing ambiguous skeleton-crew tactics to capture advanced positions in each other’s “rears” which are not suitable for consolidation. We need a few more days for things to clear up and become validated.
Also, Ukraine has increasingly been using the tactic of “announcing” the capture or clearance of settlements that Russia had never actually even taken, in order to scribble in some phantom ‘victories’ for morale, which includes several settlements around the north-Pokrovsk salient.
But as a general comment, on the now critical Pokrovsk front, some reports state that Syrsky is urgently pulling more units from other sectors to put out fires here:
According to incoming information, the containment of the Russian strike north of Pokrovsk and the stabilization of the front are going so off plan that Syrsky is urgently withdrawing several more battalions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces from the Sumy direction.
Just yesterday, the following were removed from there: the 3rd battalion of the 156th mechanized brigade, the 1st and 3rd battalions of the 33rd separate mechanized brigade, as well as the 2nd battalion of the 425th separate assault battalion "Skala" along with support units.
Official state mapper of the AFU, Deepstate has made some elucidating general comments on the ongoing operations as well:
Deepstate
"The enemy continues to build on their success, taking advantage of earlier advances and problems that have arisen in this area. Mainly small infantry groups operate, infiltrating deep into the territory, constantly pressuring the positions of Ukrainian fighters and looking for any opportunity to consolidate. There are cases when the positions of the Armed Forces of Ukraine exist only in reports, and then the enemy suddenly appears in the rear — at the positions of drone operators or already electronic warfare units and other detachments."The most difficult situation now is in the forest on the northern bank of the Seversky Donets River, where the Russians threaten to block the road near Dronovka, "which will create unfavorable consequences for the positions there."
"Therefore, there is hope that they will be withdrawn in time so they do not end up surrounded," writes pbalik.
The Russian Armed Forces are trying to completely push the Armed Forces of Ukraine out of the Serebryansky forestry and end the long-standing history of battles for it.
Our forces are also putting pressure in the direction of Yampol and have already appeared near the Yampol–Zarechnoye road.
"In Zarechnoye itself, the situation is also unfavorable for Ukrainian fighters, as the enemy is gradually moving into the settlement past the positions, and it is becoming increasingly difficult to drive them out."
A Rossiya-1 report on the successful Russian LPR 4th Brigade operations in Alexander-Shultino on the southeast Konstantinovka front:
A Financial Times correspondent for Ukraine touches on something I myself have been noticing and writing about here—that recent Russian advances have come at fewer losses:
How’s that for flying in the face of the common narrative?
The full report from the Ukrainian outlet quoted above is here.
Here’s the chart they compiled:
On the map below, we took data on the occupied territories from DeepState, and data on Russian losses from the daily reports of the Ukrainian General Staff. "Losses" refers to the dead and wounded.
The reality is likely far worse for Ukraine, because the Russian “losses” figures above are taken from official AFU General Staff reports, with their wildly exaggerated claims of daily Russian casualties.
Another Ukrainian analysis came up with this, showing Russian troop losses on a downward trajectory starting from December or so of last year:
If I’m understanding the above chart, it appears more accurate given that losses appear to be measured in intervals of about 11 days, which would put the given troop losses (numbers on left Y axis, vs. “equipment” losses on the right side) at about 1000 / 11, or 90 per day. The peak was claimed to have been nearly 1800, which would be 163 per day.
Leafing through the comments sections under these various posts, many Ukrainians appear in agreement that the reason for this has been a change in Russian tactics much discussed recently. This includes the accurate Russian hammering of Ukrainian positions with improved Fab glide bombs and skeleton-crew advancement of small units under drone cover to reduce losses, as well as successful motorcycle ‘seep’ tactics. And of course, the aforementioned improvement in Russian “area denial” via Ukrainian ISR shutdown seen in Rubicon’s targeting of Ukrainian radars, aerial repeater and recon assets, etc.
In short, this is the Russian military becoming a well-oiled machine and adapting to efficiently fight its enemy. But don’t confuse the word ‘efficient’ with ‘perfect’, because Russian losses are still high, all things considered. If you reduce your losses from 150 or 200 KIA per day to 100, that’s a great achievement, but it still means 3,000+ dead and perhaps another 3,000+ maimed per month, with a good chance the numbers are even higher than that. One supposes it still beats the 3,600 losses per day the US estimated it would suffer in a war with Russia:
By the way, isn’t it interesting how the West appeared to tell the truth about Russian losses before the desperate need to cover for Ukraine’s collapse required the shaping of the narrative? Back in July 2022 the US estimated 15,000 Russian losses after exactly 5 months of war:
This would put it at 3,000 per month, or exactly 100 per day. Now, to keep hope alive that Ukraine can somehow weather the storm, they needed to rig the narrative into a laughable 1,000 - 1,500 per day in order to make it seem like Russia is just on the brink of losing, and only a few more billions in aid, and a few more weapons packages for Ukraine will seal the deal.
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Last couple items:
Lavrov finally demystifies the issue of Putin meeting with Zelensky. He states that a meeting can theoretically happen with Zelensky treated as ‘de facto’ leader of Ukraine. However, the issue of his illegitimacy would ultimately have to be resolved for any real agreement to be signed:
On a more humorous note, Lavrov was asked about his CCCP shirt and whether it was a secret ‘signal’ for the reemergence of the USSR:
You can view the full hour-long NBC interview with Lavrov here.
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And finally, the Russian unit which trolled everyone by assaulting Mala Tokmachka in the Zaporozhye region in a captured M113 sporting an American flag on the heels of the Alaska summit has released a new video after Western publications accused them of carrying out a phony “A.I.” stunt: