The funeral for Huthi Prime Minister Ahmed al-Rahawi and the other
ministers killed in the Israeli strike on 28 August was held in Sana'a
[photo credit: Al Masrirah]
The immediate Huthi response was swift and predictable. The Chief of Staff promptly swore retaliation
against Israel and reaffirmed an unwavering Huthi commitment to the
Palestinian cause. Demonstrating this intent, attacks on Red Sea
shipping resumed on 1 September with a strike on a tanker
off the Saudi coast proving that the sinking of two ships in July were a
warning of potential capacity. This return to maritime targeting is
expected to continue, disrupting the fragile progress towards recovery
of commercial traffic in the region. Importantly, any potential
shortages in sophisticated guided munitions can be compensated for by
employing simpler yet still effective methods of attack, ensuring their
campaign of disruption remains viable.
Internally the atmosphere of suspicion in Sana’a is expected to
intensify, even among the upper echelons of Ansar Allah. The regime,
already crippled by reduced humanitarian aid, a banking crisis and the
economic repercussions of its US Foreign Terrorist Organisation
designation, is lashing out. As early as 31 August, the movement made a
series of arrests in Sana’a, including 11 staff of UN humanitarian
agencies. This continues a troubling pattern of targeting aid workers.
Consequently, any nascent hopes for the release of personnel detained
earlier, potentially on the occasion of the Prophet’s birthday, have
been seriously jeopardised by the Israeli attacks, which have hardened
the Huthi position.
At the time of writing, reactions to the assassination have been
largely confined to strong condemnations from Iran and members and its
allies within the ‘Axis of Resistance’. In telling contrast to his strong statement on the arrest of UN staff, the UN Special Envoy issued a notably mild statement,
expressing that he was ‘following with great concern’ the developments,
and the civilian casualties, while generically calling for all attacks
to cease.
The most revealing reaction, however, is the deafening silence from
officials within the IRG. This silence, while reflecting very poorly on
an already discredited government, likely masks private satisfaction at
the weakening of their domestic rivals. A respected southern figure,
himself a former Huthi prisoner, warned against public ‘rejoicing’,
stating that ‘history will record disgrace against those who express
happiness at the targeting of Yemenis’ and affirming that aggression
against any Yemeni remains unacceptable despite political differences.
Ultimately, despite the dramatic nature of the event, it does not
constitute a strategic decapitation of the Huthi leadership. The
official Government of Change and Reconciliation in Sana’a is not the
true locus of power over the 70% of Yemenis under Huthi rule. Real
authority rests exclusively with Ansar Allah, emanating from the inner
circle of the ‘Revolution’s Leader’ Abdul Malik al Huthi, and is
exercised through the small, Ansar Allah dominated Supreme Political
Council. The Prime Minister and his colleagues functioned essentially as
administrative clerks, their authority severely circumscribed by direct
instructions from the Huthi leadership and the ever present oversight
of loyalist ‘supervisors’ embedded throughout the civil service.
Therefore, their replacement is a logistical rather than a strategic
matter, unlikely to result in any shift in policy, operational
capability, or the fundamental nature of Huthi rule. The attack, while
tactically successful, fails to alter the core power dynamics and will
likely only provoke a new cycle of violence.
Members can leave comments about this newsletter on the Arab Digest website.