India's muddled diplomacy rings hollow
Modi's bid for 'strategic autonomy' looks fragile under Trump's erratic second term
Imran Khalid is a Karachi-based geostrategic analyst and freelance writer.
In the annals of South Asian diplomacy, few months have been as geopolitically dense, and narratively absurd, as the summer of 2025.
A fleeting war between India and Pakistan, sparked by killings in Kashmir and doused by a ceasefire that U.S. President Donald Trump touts as his personal triumph, has upended the region's fault lines. India, bruised and indignant, finds itself estranged from Washington. Pakistan, improbably, is basking in the glow of American praise and Chinese largesse. Trump has framed the ceasefire as a personal diplomatic success, even proudly claiming he "prevented a nuclear war through trade." While the claim is dramatic, it reflects the precarious nature of regional stability and the growing role of economic statecraft in South Asian geopolitics.
For decades, Washington's South Asia playbook rested on a delicate balance: strategic intimacy with India, transactional engagement with Pakistan, and a studied ambiguity on Kashmir. Trump, in his second term, has shredded that script. His decision to impose phased tariffs -- peaking at 50% -- was ostensibly a rebuke of New Delhi's $68.7 billion trade with Russia -- as well as its import of cheap Russian oil. But the timing, coming weeks after India's retaliatory strikes on Pakistan (Operation Sindoor), suggests a deeper recalibration: with palpable tilt toward Islamabad.
The fallout has been swift for New Delhi. The rupee has tumbled and foreign direct investment has shown signs of softening, and India's self-styled leadership of the Global South looks increasingly hollow. Prime Minister Narendra Modi's government insists the May ceasefire was a bilateral achievement, rejecting Trump's mediation claims to preserve its "strategic autonomy." But the optics tell a different story. Pakistan's diplomatic stock has risen sharply. Trump's $397 million allocation for Pakistan's F-16 fleet, his high-profile White House meeting with Pakistan's army chief, and his preferential tariff rate for Islamabad (just 19%) have left New Delhi fuming -- and flailing.
Caught between a capricious Washington and an assertive Beijing, India is recalibrating. National Security Advisor Ajit Doval's Moscow visit and External Affairs Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar's trip to Russia in August signal some sort of renewed interest in the Russia-China-India (RCI) trilateral format. Modi's attendance at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi's quiet diplomacy in New Delhi hint at a thaw with Beijing. But therein lies the rub: Any rapprochement with China comes with a precondition -- friendship with Pakistan. For Modi, whose domestic base thrives on anti-Pakistan rhetoric, that's a bridge too far.
The strategic contours of the global order are shifting. The China-Russia framework -- marketed as one of mutual respect and "win-win" development -- is increasingly challenging the West's security-centric model. With 151 countries now participating in China's Belt and Road Initiative and a growing share of the Global South aligning with infrastructure-led growth, India's positioning within the Global North appears increasingly out of step with prevailing trends. Beijing and Moscow are offering capital, connectivity and diplomatic parity -- tools that resonate more with emerging economies than the conditionality often associated with Western engagement.
By contrast, the U.S. approach remains rooted in containment. Since former President Barack Obama's administration -- and more assertively post-2017 -- Washington has pursued a security-first posture toward Beijing, underpinned by a network of over 300 military installations across the Western Pacific. Even close allies such as Japan and South Korea have adopted hedging strategies, balancing defense cooperation on China against economic interdependence. ASEAN, too, has leaned toward pragmatic neutrality, prioritizing trade and regional stability over bloc politics. In Africa, China's economic footprint now decisively eclipses both Western and Russian influence, underscoring the appeal of development-first diplomacy.
India's dilemma is thus not merely tactical -- it is existential. Should it double down on the Quad, despite Trump's unpredictability and the erosion of mutual trust? Or should it pivot toward a multipolar framework, engaging Moscow and Beijing while preserving its strategic autonomy? The answer, for now, is muddled. Modi's multi-vector approach -- Make in India 2.0, European Union trade talks, BIMSTEC (Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation) revival -- suggests a hedging strategy. But hedging, by definition, lacks conviction.
The domestic constraints are formidable. Any overture to China risks backlash over border disputes and fears of strategic encirclement via Pakistan. Overreliance on Russia, meanwhile, could alienate Western investors and complicate India's tech ambitions. The ghost of Galwan (a 2020 border clash with China) still haunts public memory, and Modi's nationalist base remains wary of Beijing's intentions.
Yet the costs of inertia are rising. Trump's erratic diplomacy has accelerated the very multipolarity he claims to oppose. By alienating India, he has created space for China to deepen its influence. The Quad, once touted as a bulwark against Chinese strategic intent, now looks brittle. India's pivot to Russia and the EU could weaken U.S. credibility in the Indo-Pacific, while Pakistan's postwar glow -- buoyed by Chinese investment and American praise -- may enable a more balanced foreign policy.
For Islamabad, the challenge will be to sustain this diplomatic finesse amid economic fragility and political churn. For New Delhi, the task is more complex: to transform adversity into a catalyst for a more self-reliant, multipolar-oriented India. This requires not just economic resilience but diplomatic agility -- a willingness to engage without capitulating, to lead without alienating.
As Modi eyes the 2029 general election, the stakes are high. The foreign policy choices made today will shape India's trajectory for decades. Will it remain tethered to a declining Western order, or will it chart a course that reflects the emerging realities of a new global order? The answer, like much else in South Asia, may hinge less on grand strategy than on shifting circumstance -- and on the ability to turn crisis into opportunity.