A Druze in Suwayda, southern Syria, standing on the Syrian flag and asking Israel to occupy them [photo credit: @AsaadHannaa]
Birth of the National Guard
With this rise of rejection of the new Syrian state under President
Ahmad al-Sharaa has come the consolidation of over 35 Druze armed
factions into a 'National Guard’, announced on 23 August and endorsed by
Hikmat al-Hajari, one of the community’s three most senior spiritual
leaders in Syria (mashaykh al-‘aql). Meanwhile, the 'Supreme Legal
Committee’, announced on 6 August and also endorsed by Hajari, now
functions as the civilian wing of a de facto Druze autonomous zone
across central, southern and eastern Suwayda. The northern and western
countryside remain under control of pro-government forces.
Government supporters have cast Hajari as the villain — a criminal,
“traitor,” and collaborator with Israel bent on carving out his own
fiefdom. Yet his harder line was not dominant before the government’s
July attempt to impose control over the province by force, in which at
least 2,000 Druze were killed. Until then, Damascus had found
pragmatists within mainstream Druze factions willing to negotiate. Liwa
al-Jabal, a powerful Druze group that coordinated with the Ministry of
Defence, had previously seen Hajari as obstructionist in his insistence
on constitutional decentralisation and secularism as preconditions for
talks with the government. A spokesman told Syria in Transition that
only 20 percent of factions stood with him. After the July violence,
however, Liwa al-Jabal swung behind Hajari and joined the National
Guard.
Even earlier atrocities, including the coastal massacres in March and
violations against Druze in Damascus suburbs in April and May, had not
ended engagement with Damascus. The July campaign, however, marked by
massacres, kidnappings, and desecration of Druze shrines, shifted
perceptions. Hajari’s scepticism toward the government suddenly seemed
vindicated. Those still sympathetic to Damascus — notably Layth
al-Balous and Sulayman Abd al-Baqi, whose support the government had
counted on — are now publicly reviled by many Druze as traitors and live
outside Suwayda. Others, such as former Rijal al-Karama leader Yahya
al-Hajjar, have faced sharp internal criticism for initially welcoming
government forces. One source in the Rijal al-Karama militia described a
“strong incitement campaign” that had forced Yahya’s replacement with
Mazid Khadaj, who now backs Hajari’s National Guard. The sense of
existential threat has pushed the Druze toward closing and cleaning
their ranks.
Regime remnants
Some pro-government voices claim the National Guard is a “regime
remnant” project that exposes Hajari’s malice. In reality, matters are
more complex. Some former regime officers have indeed joined, among them
Jihad al-Ghoutani, a Fourth Division brigadier general who was promoted
to the rank in 2019. But their rallying to Hajari does not reflect
Assadist influence so much as personal adaptation to a post-Assad
reality. They have decided that their own interests and that of their
community are best served by supporting Hajari — who has attracted
support from Druze across political backgrounds.
Their inclusion nonetheless raises questions about accountability and
the nature of the Hajari coalition, such as whether allegations of past
war crimes should be ignored simply because these men bring military
expertise to now defend “their community.” Supporters of Hajari's
coalition argue that Damascus itself works with figures accused of war
crimes. In Syria, consistent and principled accountability remains
elusive. Continuity runs through every camp, and none is morally
untainted. Years of war and a predatory war economy have brutalised
society and shaped its leaders. The only key difference between the
government and the Druze are their respective narratives. When the
Sharaa government integrates regime remnants, they are portrayed as
serving the “greater good” of the state — regardless of how inclusive or
just that state may be. When Druze factions do the same, albeit on a
smaller scale, they are denounced as traitors. As long as there is no
serious transitional justice process — which only the government can
credibly initiate — selectively invoking accountability should be read
for what it is: a rhetorical device to suppress unwelcome voices.
Patch, not polity
The National Guard and its civilian wing were born out of crisis and,
like other de facto security forces and autonomous administrations that
have emerged during the Syrian war, are interim entities: placeholders
until the conflict over the state’s future is resolved. A truly
independent Druze polity could not survive on its own, as many Druze are
well aware. The earlier mentioned source in Rijal al-Karama cautioned
that calls for an Israel-backed Druze state would be a “great mistake”,
adding that “there is no place for us except within the Syrian and Arab
embrace.”
If Israel secures Washington’s backing to expand its presence in the
south while Damascus fails to chart a credible path toward
reconciliation, the Druze are likely to continue to choose options,
including ad hoc and interim measures, that best guarantee their
immediate survival. In Syria, interim solutions have a way of becoming
entrenched.
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