Re: [Salon] ‘Watershed’: How Saudi-Pakistan defence pact reshapes region’s geopolitics



From 2013

Saudi nuclear weapons 'on order' from Pakistan

  • Published

Saudi Arabia has invested in Pakistani nuclear weapons projects, and believes it could obtain atomic bombs at will, a variety of sources have told BBC Newsnight.

While the kingdom's quest has often been set in the context of countering Iran's atomic programme, it is now possible that the Saudis might be able to deploy such devices more quickly than the Islamic republic.

Earlier this year, a senior Nato decision maker told me that he had seen intelligence reporting that nuclear weapons made in Pakistan on behalf of Saudi Arabia are now sitting ready for delivery.

Last month Amos Yadlin, a former head of Israeli military intelligence, told a conference in Sweden that if Iran got the bomb, "the Saudis will not wait one month. They already paid for the bomb, they will go to Pakistan and bring what they need to bring."

Since 2009, when King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia warned visiting US special envoy to the Middle East Dennis Ross that if Iran crossed the threshold, "we will get nuclear weapons", the kingdom has sent the Americans numerous signals of its intentions.

Gary Samore, until March 2013 President Barack Obama's counter-proliferation adviser, has told Newsnight:

Gary Samore
Image caption,

Gary Samore served as President Barack Obama's WMD tsar

"I do think that the Saudis believe that they have some understanding with Pakistan that, in extremis, they would have claim to acquire nuclear weapons from Pakistan."

The story of Saudi Arabia's project - including the acquisition of missiles capable of delivering nuclear warheads over long ranges - goes back decades.

In the late 1980s they secretly bought dozens of CSS-2 ballistic missiles from China.

These rockets, considered by many experts too inaccurate for use as conventional weapons, were deployed 20 years ago.

This summer experts at defence publishers IHS Jane, external's reported the completion of a new Saudi CSS-2 base with missile launch rails aligned with Israel and Iran.

It has also been clear for many years that Saudi Arabia has given generous financial assistance to Pakistan's defence sector, including, western experts allege, to its missile and nuclear labs.

Visits by the then Saudi defence minister Prince Sultan bin Abdulaziz al Saud to the Pakistani nuclear research centre in 1999 and 2002 underlined the closeness of the defence relationship.

Saudi Arabia’s undisclosed missile siteImage source, IHS Jane’s/DigitalGlobe
Image caption,

Defence and security intelligence provider IHS Jane’s revealed the existence of Saudi Arabia’s third and undisclosed intermediate-range ballistic missile site, approximately 200 km southwest of Riyadh

In its quest for a strategic deterrent against India, Pakistan co-operated closely with China which sold them missiles and provided the design for a nuclear warhead.

The Pakistani scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan , external was accused by western intelligence agencies of selling atomic know-how and uranium enrichment centrifuges to Libya and North Korea.

AQ Khan is also believed to have passed the Chinese nuclear weapon design to those countries. This blueprint was for a device engineered to fit on the CSS-2 missile, i.e the same type sold to Saudi Arabia.

Because of this circumstantial evidence, allegations of a Saudi-Pakistani nuclear deal started to circulate even in the 1990s, but were denied by Saudi officials.

They noted that their country had signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty, external, and called for a nuclear-free Middle East, pointing to Israel's possession of such weapons.

The fact that handing over atom bombs to a foreign government could create huge political difficulties for Pakistan, not least with the World Bank and other donors, added to scepticism about those early claims.

In Eating the Grass, external, his semi-official history of the Pakistani nuclear program, Major General Feroz Hassan Khan wrote that Prince Sultan's visits to Pakistan's atomic labs were not proof of an agreement between the two countries. But he acknowledged, "Saudi Arabia provided generous financial support to Pakistan that enabled the nuclear program to continue."

Whatever understandings did or did not exist between the two countries in the 1990s, it was around 2003 that the kingdom started serious strategic thinking about its changing security environment and the prospect of nuclear proliferation.

A paper leaked that year by senior Saudi officials mapped out three possible responses - to acquire their own nuclear weapons, to enter into an arrangement with another nuclear power to protect the kingdom, or to rely on the establishment of a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East.

It was around the same time, following the US invasion of Iraq, that serious strains in the US/Saudi relationship began to show themselves, says Gary Samore.

The Saudis resented the removal of Saddam Hussein, had long been unhappy about US policy on Israel, and were growing increasingly concerned about the Iranian nuclear program.

In the years that followed, diplomatic chatter about Saudi-Pakistani nuclear cooperation began to increase.

In 2007, the US mission in Riyadh noted they were being asked questions by Pakistani diplomats about US knowledge of "Saudi-Pakistani nuclear cooperation".

The unnamed Pakistanis opined that "it is logical for the Saudis to step in as the physical 'protector'" of the Arab world by seeking nuclear weapons, according to one of the State Department cables posted by Wikileaks, external.

By the end of that decade Saudi princes and officials were giving explicit warnings of their intention to acquire nuclear weapons if Iran did.

Having warned the Americans in private for years, last year Saudi officials in Riyadh escalated it to a public warning, telling a journalist from the Times "it would be completely unacceptable to have Iran with a nuclear capability and not the kingdom".

But were these statements bluster, aimed at forcing a stronger US line on Iran, or were they evidence of a deliberate, long-term plan for a Saudi bomb? Both, is the answer I have received from former key officials.

One senior Pakistani, speaking on background terms, confirmed the broad nature of the deal - probably unwritten - his country had reached with the kingdom and asked rhetorically "what did we think the Saudis were giving us all that money for? It wasn't charity."

Another, a one-time intelligence officer from the same country, said he believed "the Pakistanis certainly maintain a certain number of warheads on the basis that if the Saudis were to ask for them at any given time they would immediately be transferred."

As for the seriousness of the Saudi threat to make good on the deal, Simon Henderson, Director of the Global Gulf and Energy Policy Program at the Washington Institute, external for Near East Policy, told BBC Newsnight "the Saudis speak about Iran and nuclear matters very seriously. They don't bluff on this issue."

Talking to many serving and former officials about this over the past few months, the only real debate I have found is about how exactly the Saudi Arabians would redeem the bargain with Pakistan.

Some think it is a cash-and-carry deal for warheads, the first of those options sketched out by the Saudis back in 2003; others that it is the second, an arrangement under which Pakistani nuclear forces could be deployed in the kingdom.

Gary Samore, considering these questions at the centre of the US intelligence and policy web, at the White House until earlier this year, thinks that what he calls, "the Nato model", is more likely.

However ,"I think just giving Saudi Arabia a handful of nuclear weapons would be a very provocative action", says Gary Samore.

He adds: "I've always thought it was much more likely - the most likely option if Pakistan were to honour any agreement would be for be for Pakistan to send its own forces, its own troops armed with nuclear weapons and with delivery systems to be deployed in Saudi Arabia".

This would give a big political advantage to Pakistan since it would allow them to deny that they had simply handed over the weapons, but implies a dual key system in which they would need to agree in order for 'Saudi Arabian' "nukes" to be launched.

Others I have spoken to think this is not credible, since Saudi Arabia, which regards itself as the leader of the broader Sunni Islamic 'ummah' or community, would want complete control of its nuclear deterrent, particularly at this time of worsening sectarian confrontation with Shia Iran.

Map of Saudi Arabia

And it is Israeli information - that Saudi Arabia is now ready to take delivery of finished warheads for its long-range missiles - that informs some recent US and Nato intelligence reporting. Israel of course shares Saudi Arabia's motive in wanting to worry the US into containing Iran.

Amos Yadlin declined to be interviewed for our BBC Newsnight report, but told me by email that "unlike other potential regional threats, the Saudi one is very credible and imminent."

Even if this view is accurate there are many good reasons for Saudi Arabia to leave its nuclear warheads in Pakistan for the time being.

Doing so allows the kingdom to deny there are any on its soil. It avoids challenging Iran to cross the nuclear threshold in response, and it insulates Pakistan from the international opprobrium of being seen to operate an atomic cash-and-carry.

These assumptions though may not be safe for much longer. The US diplomatic thaw with Iran has touched deep insecurities in Riyadh, which fears that any deal to constrain the Islamic republic's nuclear program would be ineffective.

Earlier this month the Saudi intelligence chief and former ambassador to Washington Prince Bandar announced that the kingdom would be distancing itself more from the US.

While investigating this, I have heard rumours on the diplomatic grapevine, that Pakistan has recently actually delivered Shaheen mobile ballistic missiles to Saudi Arabia, minus warheads.

These reports, still unconfirmed, would suggest an ability to deploy nuclear weapons in the kingdom, and mount them on an effective, modern, missile system more quickly than some analysts had previously imagined.

In Egypt, Saudi Arabia showed itself ready to step in with large-scale backing following the military overthrow of President Mohammed Morsi's government.

There is a message here for Pakistan, of Riyadh being ready to replace US military assistance or World Bank loans, if standing with Saudi Arabia causes a country to lose them.

Newsnight contacted both the Pakistani and Saudi governments. The Pakistan Foreign Ministry has described our story as "speculative, mischievous and baseless".

It adds: "Pakistan is a responsible nuclear weapon state with robust command and control structures and comprehensive export controls."

The Saudi embassy in London has also issued a statement pointing out that the Kingdom is a signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and has worked for a nuclear free Middle East.

But it also points out that the UN's "failure to make the Middle East a nuclear free zone is one of the reasons the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia rejected the offer of a seat on the UN Security Council".

It says the Saudi Foreign Minister has stressed that this lack of international action "has put the region under the threat of a time bomb that cannot easily be defused by manoeuvring around it".

Watch more from Mark Urban on Saudi Arabia on Newsnight on Wednesday 6 November 2013 at 2230 on BBC Two, and then afterwards on the BBC iPlayer and Newsnight website.

  • 6 November 2013
  • comments


  • On Fri, Sep 19, 2025 at 9:35 AM Chas Freeman <cwfresidence@gmail.com> wrote:

    ‘Watershed’: How Saudi-Pakistan defence pact reshapes region’s geopolitics

    The deal reflects the Gulf’s anxieties as US credibility wanes after Israel’s attack on Doha. But it affects India, too.

    Pakistan and Saudi Arabia signed a defence agreement on September 17 in Riyadh [Handout/Pakistan Prime Minister's Office]

    Islamabad, Pakistan – A beaming Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif – welcomed with Saudi F-15 fighter jets, a red carpet, and full royal protocol – joined Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman on Wednesday to sign a “strategic mutual defence agreement” (SMDA).

    Observers say it is a landmark moment in the decades-old alliance between the two nations whose ties stretch back nearly eight decades.

    The signing ceremony at the Royal Court in Al-Yamamah Palace in Riyadh was witnessed by senior officials from Saudi Arabia, the custodian of two of Islam’s holiest sites, alongside representatives from Pakistan, the Muslim world’s only nuclear power.

    The deal comes at a critical moment. Regional politics have been upended by two years of Israeli aggression – including its war on Gaza and strikes on neighbouring states – capped by last week’s Israeli attack on Doha, Qatar’s capital, which borders Saudi Arabia.

    But it also comes amid heightened tensions between India and Pakistan, after a short but intense conflict in May in which they struck each other’s military bases over four days, taking South Asia to the brink of a full-fledged war between nuclear-armed neighbours.

    Pakistan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs said the agreement with Saudi Arabia reflects the “shared commitment” of both nations to strengthen security and promote regional peace, while also pledging to “strengthen joint deterrence against any aggression”.

    “The agreement states that any aggression against either country shall be considered an aggression against both,” the ministry said.

    Asfandyar Mir, a senior fellow at the Washington DC-based Stimson Center, described the pact as a “watershed” for both countries.

    “Pakistan previously maintained mutual defence treaties with the United States during the Cold War, but they crumbled by the ’70s. Even with China, despite extensive defence cooperation, Pakistan lacks a formal mutual defence pact,” Mir told Al Jazeera.

    Muhammad Faisal, a South Asia security researcher at the University of Technology Sydney, said the deal could serve as a template for Pakistan to engage in similar bilateral defence cooperation with the United Arab Emirates and Qatar, two key Gulf partners.

    “In the immediate term, this agreement will consolidate and formalise multi-prong defence cooperation already under way, and new avenues to expand it via joint trainings, defence production and potential expansion of Pakistani troops contingent in Saudi Arabia will be explored,” Faisal said.

    Historic bonds and military cooperation

    Saudi Arabia was one of the first countries to recognise Pakistan after its independence in August 1947. In 1951, the two nations signed a “Treaty of Friendship,” laying the foundation for decades of strategic, political, military, and economic cooperation.

    Over the years, Pakistani armed forces have deployed to the kingdom several times and trained Saudi personnel both in the Gulf and in Pakistan.

    According to official records, Pakistan has trained more than 8,000 Saudis since 1967. An agreement signed in 1982 further cemented this cooperation by ensuring the “deputation of Pakistan Armed Forces personnel and military training” in Saudi Arabia.

    But the latest pact arrives as the Middle East’s geopolitical chessboard is in flux. The fallout from Israel’s war on Gaza and its strikes on regional neighbours has made Gulf states uneasy, many of which still rely heavily on United States security guarantees, even as Washington remains Israel’s closest ally.

    Qatar, attacked by Israel on September 9 for hosting Hamas leaders, serves as the forward headquarters for US Central Command (Centcom).

    As of mid-2025, some 40,000–50,000 US troops are stationed across the Middle East, deployed in large bases and smaller forward sites – at least 19 of them – including Prince Sultan Air Base outside Riyadh.

    While Saudi officials say the deal with Pakistan has been in the works for at least a year, Sahar Khan, an independent security analyst in Washington, DC, said its language will raise eyebrows in the US.

    During its tenure from 2021 to 2025, President Joe Biden’s administration imposed sanctions on seven occasions targeting Pakistani individuals and firms over alleged ballistic missile development. Biden administration officials also publicly raised concerns over the range of missiles Pakistan was building, and whether they could carry nuclear weapons as far as the US.

    “Pakistan already has a credibility problem in Washington, and this agreement won’t reduce it,” Khan told Al Jazeera.

    Khan said that it is in Pakistan’s interest to clarify that its nuclear and missiles programme is India-centric, and while its bilateral relations with Saudi Arabia remain strong, “it will not fight Saudi wars but instead, will only provide relevant support”.

    A region on edge

    Earlier this year, in June, Israel waged a 12-day war with Iran, targeting nuclear facilities as well as senior civilian and military leaders. American bomber jets supported the assault, dropping massive bunker-buster bombs on Fordow, one of Iran’s key nuclear sites.

    Three months later, Israel struck a building in a leafy Doha neighbourhood that is home to embassies, supermarkets and schools, killing at least five Hamas members and one Qatari security official.

    The Doha attack triggered an emergency meeting of Arab and Islamic nations. Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states – Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE – said they would activate a joint defence mechanism.

    Faisal said the Pakistan-Saudi pact should be viewed through the lens of these developments.

    “These events have exacerbated security anxieties of the Gulf states while jeopardising confidence in the US security umbrella as the ultimate shield. As Gulf states look to bolster their security, regional countries such as Pakistan, Egypt and Turkiye emerge as natural partners,” he said.

    Khan, however, said that while the timing of the pact does suggest a link with Israel’s recent attack on Qatar, “such kinds of agreements take months, if not years, to negotiate”.

    Yet, the Stimson Center’s Mir pointed out that the agreement would also test how both Pakistan and Saudi Arabia manage their exposure to the other’s tensions with countries with which they have otherwise cautiously managed relations, or are even friends with.

    “Pakistan now risks entanglement in Saudi Arabia’s regional rivalries, particularly with its neighbour Iran,” he said. “Saudi Arabia has committed itself to Pakistan’s disputes, notably with India, and potentially with the Taliban-led Afghanistan.”

    The Indian question

    The defence deal will also be watched closely in India, Pakistan’s nuclear-armed archrival.

    Relations between India and Pakistan, already at a historic low, plummeted further in April after the Pahalgam attack, in which gunmen killed 26 civilians in Indian-administered Kashmir, for which India blamed Pakistan, which the latter rejected.

    Days later, in May, the two countries fought a four-day skirmish, targeting each other’s military bases with missiles and drones in their most serious escalation in nearly three decades before a ceasefire on May 10 that US President Donald Trump claims he brokered.

    On Thursday, during a weekly news briefing, Indian foreign ministry spokesperson Randhir Jaiswal said that the Indian government was aware of the signing of the pact.

    “We will study the implications of this development for our national security as well as for regional and global stability. The government remains committed to protecting India’s national interests and ensuring comprehensive national security in all domains,” Jaiswal said.

    But this agreement, says Sydney-based Faisal, could rebalance the Pakistan-Saudi relationship, which in recent years has been defined by Saudi financial bailouts for a struggling Pakistani economy, even as Riyadh cultivated closer ties with India.

    “Pakistan’s relative position has improved,” he said, “and new space has opened for expanding the Pak-Saudi cooperation on both bilateral defence and regional security matters.”

    With Pakistan’s economy faltering and increasingly dependent on Saudi aid during the last decade, India had been steadily deepening its own relationship with Riyadh. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi made his third visit to Saudi Arabia in a decade this April.

    Mir said the new pact shows that Saudi Arabia still sees value in its relationship with Pakistan, and that Islamabad is not isolated in its extended neighbourhood – despite Indian attempts to get countries to distance themselves from Pakistan.

    “At precisely the moment when Pakistan is faced with the threat of Indian military action,” he said, “Pakistan has secured a strong collective defence agreement from Saudi Arabia. So, it introduces a lot of complexity to future India-Pakistan dynamics.”

    Pakistan’s nuclear shield over Saudi Arabia?

    Saudi Arabia has long expressed interest in acquiring nuclear technology for civilian use, to diversify from fossil fuels.

    In January, Saudi Energy Minister Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman Al Saud reiterated Riyadh’s readiness to enrich and sell uranium, a key component of nuclear programmes.

    But Saudi Arabia has also repeatedly made clear that it does not seek to pursue nuclear weapons.

    In his 2024 book War, American journalist Bob Woodward recounted a conversation in which Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed reportedly told US Senator Lindsey Graham that Riyadh planned to enrich uranium only for energy purposes.

    When Graham expressed concern about the prospect of a Saudi bomb, Woodward wrote, Salman replied:

    “I don’t need uranium to make a bomb. I will just buy one from Pakistan.”

    Still, Khan, the analyst, said some things were unclear about the ambit of the agreement signed between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia.

    “It is important to note that while Pakistan has made defence pacts before, none of those have led to nuclear assurances or a formation of a ‘nuclear umbrella’. There is nothing in this agreement that indicates a formation of a nuclear umbrella or any extended deterrence,” she said.

    Mir warned that even robust alliances carry risks.

    “The pact will trigger a new alliance politics around what it does or does not cover, deterrence, resource commitment, operational details, among others,” he said. However, he added, that does not diminish the political significance of this pact being struck.

    “It’s a huge development for both countries.”

    Faisal, too, agreed, pointing out that while the deal refers to treating an aggression against one country against both, that is perhaps more of a political statement, rather than an alliance or joint defence commitment, for now.

    “Nonetheless, the political and defence coordination between the two sides will deepen, while strengthening respective military capabilities of both countries,” he said.




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