Well, we all expected it to happen.
The coordinated campaign to accuse Russia of various cross-border violations which began with the Polish ‘drone’ debacle last week has reached new heights. Today, Estonia accused Russian MiG-31s of violating its “airspace” for twelve minutes, as Prime Minister Kristen Michal explains below:
Virtually at the same time, the Polish border guard claimed that Russian jets aggressively buzzed their oil platforms in the Baltic Sea:
While yesterday Russia was accused of flying drones over Polish governmental administrative buildings, though the claimed responsibility later fell on two Belarusian youths:
Zelensky, too, tried his hardest to inflame the situation with more exaggerations:
The events have the telltale signs of a coordinated false flag because, once again, right on cue NATO’s Article Four was invoked for the second time in a week:
Estonia has requested NATO consultations under Article 4 after Russian MiG-31 jets violated its airspace. “Such a breach is completely unacceptable,” Prime Minister Kristen Michal said.
Of course, we can’t say with absolute certainty: maybe Russia really is trying to test NATO “defenses” or merely prod its adversary for a reaction, perhaps even as a message to stop provocations on the Russian border. But it certainly appears to be a concerted information campaign, particularly given the fact that last week’s hoax was already debunked, with Polish authorities themselves admitting the “drone” that was alleged to have hit a Polish house was in fact a Polish-fired anti-air missile from an F-16:
On Monday, the Polish daily newspaper Rzeczpospolita, citing anonymous sources in the army, reported that a Polish AIM-120 AMRAAM air-to-air missile fired from an F-16 fighter jet had fallen on the house. The missile, estimated by military experts to be worth €850,000, had a defect in its guidance system.However, another system that defused the warhead worked perfectly, preventing an explosion. The metal missile punched a hole in the roof and fell into a room on the upper floor. No one was injured in the impact.
Polish senator Marcin Bosacki even admitted it but still blamed Russia, given that Poland would not have had to fire missiles if “Russian” styrofoam drones had not incurred into Polish territory:
For the record, the Russian MOD’s official response was that no MiG-31 deviation occurred, and the planes had flown over international waters.
Now, the latest Estonian and Polish “incidents” are meant to galvanize NATO military support while ratcheting tensions in order to justify some further “concrete” military actions against Russia, even if they are small, so long as they gradually build momentum toward a given inevitability.
For instance, after last week’s incident, further NATO AWACs flights had been posted on the Polish borders with the claimed ‘no fly zone’ while both Poland and the Baltics carried out some performative border stunts with their guards and military troops. This is all part of the slow constrictor plan to funnel events into much-needed eventualities, to culminate in some kind of armed clash with Russia so that the elites pushing war can finally achieve their long-sought-after goal.
Recall, by the way, that we were told Estonia—unlike Poland—would manfully respond to any such Russian provocation with immediate ballistic missile strikes on Moscow:
Apparently, it’s much easier being ‘brave’ on the internet than in real life, where actual consequences exist. Seems Arseland will be reconfiguring his confidence in NATO’s courageousness:
An Estonian Foreign Affairs Committee chairman did however threaten to shoot down the next Russian jet, ‘cleverly’ invoking the infamous ‘17 seconds’ it took Turkey to shoot down a Russian Su-24 in 2015:
Zelensky, in his own way, mocked Poland in the aftermath with the following statement:
Zelensky: If Poland faced a massive attack, it would not be able to save its people. We had 810 drones launched at us and shot down 700. They had 19 — shot down 4. And they didn’t even face missiles.
Well, he does have a point.
The Euro-cabal is forced to resort to such desperate actions because all of their best-laid plans have gone to seed. We spoke recently about how Trump had outwitted Europe with his bluff, and now we see it was indeed a winning gambit because, as it turns out, Europeans were not able to find the solidarity necessary to satisfy Trump’s conditions for further sanctioning Russia:
The EU will not be able to give up Russian energy resources despite pressure from Trump — Politico
▪️For the European Union, meeting these conditions is extremely difficult.
▪️Hungary and Slovakia insist on maintaining access to Russian oil; Budapest and Bratislava are increasing their purchase volumes rather than reducing them.
▪️An even more difficult task is the complete abandonment of Russian oil by all NATO countries, the publication emphasizes.
➖"Turkey, a key ally of the alliance controlling access to the Black Sea, has refused to support Western trade restrictions with Russia. In 2023, Ankara received 41% of its gas and 57% of its oil from Russia. To change the position of Turkish President Erdogan, Trump will have to apply serious pressure, considering the economic crisis and rising energy prices in Turkey itself," the publication writes.
▪️Earlier, Trump stated that he was ready to impose sanctions on Russia only if all NATO countries stopped purchasing Russian oil.
In fact, rather than inaugurating geopolitical triumphs, the ever-scheming Von der Leyen will face two separate no-confidence votes in the next few weeks.
European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen is set to face two separate no-confidence votes at the EU Parliament in early October, Politico reported on Tuesday, citing an internal email from the legislature’s president, Roberta Metsola.
Duma Chairman Volodin summed up his thoughts on the provocations:
While the Eurocrats do everything in their desperate power to shore up Zelensky and Ukraine with psyops and info campaigns, the rest of the world increasingly sees the writing on the wall:
In the plainest language possible, a German military officer confessed to Die Weltthat Ukraine is doomed and stands no chance of winning the kinetic war:
Former German military officer Roland Kater said that Ukraine is not capable of winning the war on the battlefield and its situation is becoming "extremely critical". According to him, Russia has clear superiority both in the air and on the ground.
A difficult situation is developing near Pokrovsk, where more than 100 thousand Russian soldiers are concentrated. The ex-general expects that a major offensive could take place before the start of the rainy season in November.
Now in the past week Russian forces have again been picking up the pace in territorial captures on a number of fronts. Even ever-rabid Sky News has finally admitted “the defense of Pokrovsk may be soon coming to an end”:
The situation there is worsening, says Dr Marina Miron, an expert at the defence studies department at King's College London.
She cited reports that Russian forces are controlling all supply routes and have "created a kill zone" using drones, making it very difficult for Ukraine to resupply its troops there.
They concede that Russia is now utilizing a casualty-averse approach, which is reflected in the various recent statistics showing Russian casualties dipping to long-time lows:
"They don't want to storm the city as it's too difficult and too manpower intensive - assuming a lot of losses." Instead, they are trying to surround it completely, she added.
This reflects a "changed approach", Dr Miron says, with the Russian military appearing to favour slower encirclement operations rather than the high-casualty assault waves with which places like Bakhmut were captured.
Mappers like Suriyak have Russian forces penetrating more sections of the city itself, somewhat contrary to the above statements of no head-on assaults:
However, these are mostly slow trickling operations rather than full-on assaults, though they ultimately achieve the same result of snagging footholds in the city proper.
Just southwest of Pokrovsk, Russian forces have captured territory all around Novopavlovka, slowly squeezing it into another cauldron to rival the others:
All the way west on the Zaporozhye front, Russian forces made this surprise breakthrough out of Plavni into the northern settlement of Primorsk, as well as slightly getting deeper into Stepnogorsk, which they had just recently begun to assault:
One of the largest and most important advances was on the Seversk and Serebriansky line. The Russian MOD announced the complete capture of the long-fought-after Serebriansky forest just north of Seversk over the Seversky Donets river, where the Russian 25th Army was finally able to push Ukrainian ‘defenders’ out after three long years of bitter fighting:
But even bigger was the fact that Russian forces began to storm Yampol, circled in yellow above. Here’s a closer view—the lightly shaded area represents the believed captures, though the exact contours haven’t been totally agreed upon yet:
This is important because the capture of Yampol would put Russian forces mere kilometers from Krasny Lyman, a key city which serves as gateway to Slavyansk:
Just north of there Russian forces were even more successful, capturing most of Shandrygolove, which already cuts key roads from Krasny Lyman in the north:
Farther north, there are competing views on how far Russian troops have gotten into the center of Kupyansk, with some maps showing deep breakthroughs:
Kupyansk has turned so critical that it’s being reported reinforcements, which include the Azov brigade, are being rushed there, which will inevitably weaken other fronts from which they are taken:
- From the Ukranian side, reports that the 3rd Assault Bgd (Azov) is being rushed to Kupyansk...some elements from the Brigade apparently started arriving from September 13
By the way, it is said that the commander of Russian forces in Kupyansk is former Ukrainian officer Sergey Storozhenko, who is going up against former Russian officer Oleksandr Syrsky:
The Russian offensive on Kupyansk in the Kharkov region is commanded by former Ukrainian Armed Forces officer Sergey Storozhenko, who switched to the Russian side back in 2014.
This is stated in a BBC article.
Storozhenko is a native of the Kharkov region. He studied at the intelligence faculty of the Land Forces Institute in Kiev. He then began service in the 36th Coastal Defense Brigade of the Ukrainian Navy, where he rose from company commander to brigade commander. He was also deputy commander of the Ukrainian contingent in Kosovo as part of the KFOR forces.
According to the article, Storozhenko switched to the Russian side after the annexation of Crimea in 2014. According to a BBC source with access to personal data databases, a week after the "referendum" on the Russian status of the peninsula, Storozhenko received a Russian passport. Subsequently, in annexed Crimea, he headed the newly formed 126th Coastal Guard Brigade.
"I think in 2014 he was made an offer he couldn't refuse.
Just another in a long line of examples of the cross-pollination between the Ukrainian and Russian armies, where Ukrainians leading Russians fight against Russians leading Ukrainians. Just weeks ago it was reported how Syrsky recently sent money to Moscow for his ailing father, including a note to the Russian doctor to take good care of him.
A top Ukrainian analyst scoffed at claims that Russian advances had diminished in a writeup that also gives good updates on these fronts from the Ukrainian perspective. He also refutes claims that Russia had suffered massive losses to its manpower potential, professing that it is infact the opposite:
A reduction in the activity of the Russian offensive and slower rates of territory capture should not be misleading.
A few days ago I read stories that “Russia nicely erased its human resource over the summer.”
No, folks. They did not erase it. Quite the opposite — they have increased it.
Those contracts with huge payouts are working and allow the enemy to form new troop formations the size of a division.
The occupier is still conducting strategic regrouping to concentrate on Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia. Also in Kharkiv region.
This has been prolonged in part because of those “West-2025” exercises, after which a large portion of occupation forces moved east and southeast within our country.
October–November will not be “fun”; nor will there be daily advances of 5–15 sq. km. — rather, the tempo may increase.
It is convenient to call every enemy regrouping “they erased their resources,” “they got bogged down in battles,” and so on.
But that will not be true, and the coming months will show that again.
We should expect heavy fighting for Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad, for Konstakhivka and Kupiansk, for Orikhiv and Huliaipole, for Siversk and Lyman, for Novopavlivka and Mezheva.
Some of these fights might move into spring–summer 2026, which the occupiers are already preparing for — they continue to form new units and prepare reserves.
All this is happening while rear support for the front has significantly fallen, and a third of the population still dreams of capitulation for the sake of a “deal.”
Now, Kupiansk.
After the breakthrough through the pipe at Radkivka and the capture of the forest near the village, the enemy gained the ability to accumulate in large numbers.
Through the pipe the enemy advanced more than 10 km. In theory, entry and exit points can be controlled, but it is quite difficult.
Because of the distance from entry to exit, this is fundamentally different from Avdiivka or Sudzha.
By the way, the fact they have started putting barbed wire directly in the pipes now — I would say that is a debatable decision.
There is no better obstacle than a blown-up pipe with concrete barriers set in place that should be mined.
Now the enemy has accumulated sufficiently both in Radkivka and in the forest between it and Kupiansk.
Fighting for Kupiansk itself has now begun. In some places the enemy has managed to establish positions, so it’s probably no longer a question of our clearing the city.
I would already be raising the question about the safety and advisability of keeping our garrison on the left bank of the Oskil.
There we could only have restrained the enemy in Kivsharivka for long months. But the situation has changed now, unfortunately.
👉 Ukrainian Post
It’s interesting he notes the claims of slowing Russian advances. A poster from WWII highlights how misguided such claims can be, wherein allied advances through Axis Italy were once mocked as having a snail’s pace that would reach Berlin by 1952:
Also of note was his mention of a buildup in Zaporozhye. It was noted by several channels that Russian units with a new tac symbol were seen being shipped to the Zaporozhye front, which would indicate some kind of new operation or front being opened:
The enemy anxiously watches columns of the Russian army with a new tactical sign arriving at the Zaporizhzhia front
▪️In the Berdyansk area, columns of Russian Armed Forces trucks with a new tactical sign, previously unseen, have been recorded, write Ukrainian military propagandists.
➖"The Russians continue to transfer additional forces to the Zaporizhzhia direction to strengthen offensive actions."
Another top Ukrainian analyst group writes the following:
The distinction between Russian summer and autumn offensive is academic, considering how the Russians seem to be avoiding a single decisive battle and maintain constant offensive pressure. Their recruitment numbers don't (yet) show signs of this dynamic coming to an end.
While the number of attacks has gone down, the developing situations in the Lyman area and the Dnipropetrovsk border show that Russia is still creating real problems for Ukraine despite an operational pause of sorts. Russia is also poised to increase pressure in Pokrovsk again.
With all this in mind I don't recognize a situation where the Russian offensive potential would be spent for this year. At the same time it's clear that Russia failed to reach clear operational success over the summer campaign season.
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In the meantime, another exchange of bodies has taken place with Russia giving back Ukraine 1,000 and receiving in return merely 24:
18.09.25 Exchange of the deceased
On September 18, another exchange of the bodies of deceased servicemen in the special military operation zone took place between Russia and Ukraine. Ukraine received the bodies of 1,000 deceased soldiers, Russia - 24.
Schedule of the exchange of bodies of the deceased for the years 2023-2025. In total, during this period, Russia handed over 16,850 bodies of deceased Ukrainian servicemen, Ukraine 1,548.
MediaZona likewise indicates a steady decrease in Russian losses this year:
It’s then no wonder that Putin announced that Russia now has over 700,000 troops and growing on the frontline in Ukraine: