[Salon] Pirate's Veto: How the Huthis Forced a Reroute of Global Shipping



Pirate's Veto: How the Huthis Forced a Reroute of Global Shipping

Summary: the nearly two-year long Red Sea shipping crisis has had a major impact on global trade, driving up costs and transit times, and having a spillover effect on maritime activity in the region. With no Gaza ceasefire in sight and multinational naval forces downsizing operations, the attacks are likely to continue, and the area will remain off-limits to Western-flagged ships.

We thank Paul Cochrane for today’s newsletter. Paul is an independent journalist covering the Middle East and Africa. He writes regularly for Money Laundering Bulletin, Fraud Intelligence and other specialised titles. Paul lived in Bilad Al Sham (Cyprus, Palestine and Lebanon) for 24 years, mainly in Beirut. He co-directed We Made Every Living Thing from Water a documentary on the political economy of water in Lebanon.

The Red Sea shipping crisis has largely fallen off the political and media radar over the past year as the number of attacks has declined and the industry has accepted the changed reality to shipping routes as ‘the new normal’, to borrow that popular late Covid pandemic phrase. But the crisis has left a lot of collateral damage in its wake, and there is not expected to be plain sailing through the Red Sea for some time to come, even if the war on Gaza ends.

In response to Israel’s war on Gaza, in November 2023, Yemen’s Huthis started to attack cargo ships, particularly Western-owned or flagged vessels, in the Red Sea. In the first year, more than 100 ships were attacked, causing a 70 percent drop in cargo volumes through the Red Sea, and costing the industry an estimated $175 billion. Cargo ships plying the route between Europe and Asia have had to add up to 31 days to sail around the Cape of Good Hope instead, while the cost of a 40-foot equivalent unit (FEU) container soared from $2,500 to $8,500 at the peak of the attacks in late 2024.

As the attacks increased, shipping to and from Western Europe, North America and Australia through the Suez Canal dropped to zero, while non-Western ships, or those deemed by the Huthis to not be as implicated in the Gaza war, were able to carry on using the route. Shipping from the Black Sea region, carrying wheat, sunflower oil, fertilisers and other key agro-food exports from Ukraine and Russia, have been able to continue, in part because ship owners were already paying a conflict insurance premium (which they do not need to pay twice).

The crisis has been particularly bad for Red Sea ports and the Suez Canal Authority. Annual revenues from the Suez Canal plummeted from $10.3 billion in 2023 to $4 billion in 2024, while the number of ships passing through dropped by half, from over 26,000 in 2023, to 13,213 ships last year. Jordan’s only port, Aqaba, saw a 4 percent drop in container traffic in 2024. But it is Israel’s Red Sea port, in Eilat, across from Aqaba, that has taken the biggest hit. Cargo handling dropped by 90 percent in 2024, receiving just 16 ships, and in July this year, after hemorrhaging money for a year and a half, the port stopped operating.

Saudi Arabia’s ports have been impacted as transhipment traffic avoided the Red Sea – instead plying further south on the Cape of Good Hope route – causing volumes at the King Abdullah Port to drop 82.7 percent in 2024, from just under 3 million Twenty-foot Equivalent Unit (TEU) to 500,000/TEU, and Jeddah slumped by 33.4 percent to 3.7 m/TEU. Local shipping lines have picked up a lot of the slack to ply the Red Sea as larger tonnage ships have avoided the area, and ships have been re-routed to Dammam in the Arabian Gulf, which saw a 42.7 percent uptick in activity, to 3.3 m/TEU in 2024, according to the Saudi Port Authority (Mawani).


The Huthis have repeatedly stated they are committed to continuing their military operations until Israel stops the genocide and siege on Gaza

Maritime security lacking, attacks resume

Moves to improve maritime security in the area were launched by the USA - Operation Prosperity Guardian - in December 2023, while the European Union launched Operation Aspides in February 2024. However, the US operation ended in May this year, following a ceasefire between the US and the Huthis, while the EU mission reportedly has only two or three frigates and some aircraft, providing minimal security given the area needed to be covered.

Despite the dwindling maritime protection, there were no attacks in the first several months of 2025, causing a slight boost in cargo ship activity. The more subdued environment, and the significant loss of revenues, prompted Cairo in May (2025) to offer a 15 percent discount on fees to transit the Suez Canal for ships with a tonnage of at least 130,000 metric tonnes to try to bolster activity.

But in July, two carriers were attacked by Huthi drones and sunk, and four sailors killed. The renewed attacks scotched an expected rebound in Red Sea activity, and prompted container costs to reach $3,560/FEU by early July, around 50 percent more than in late May, according to Freightos, while war risk premiums rose from around 0.3 percent of the value of the ship to 0.7 percent, according to Reuters.

The outlook

The crisis had led to a 10 percent rise in demand for container ships, but as more shipping capacity has been added over the past year, container rates on major Asia-Europe lanes fell in late August by 7 percent to $2,841/FEU, below the pre-crisis rates. ‘This counterintuitive trend strongly suggests that fleet growth is now the dominant factor in the market, outweighing the impact of longer transit time’, noted Israel-based digital freight booking platform Freightos. ‘As we move toward the final quarter of 2025, the Red Sea situation has evolved from an acute crisis to a persistent market reality’.

There is of course significant uncertainty over the future outlook, and how Yemen and Israel will react as tit-for-tat attacks continue, and Israel carries out its ground offence to occupy Gaza City. In late August the Israelis carried out a major air strike on Sanaa, killing 12 out of 16 Huthi ministers, including the prime minister and foreign minister. In response, the Huthis fired a missile at a Liberia-flagged, Israeli-owned tanker ‘Scarlet Ray’ in early September, and two weeks later, the Israelis carried out attacks on Yemen’s Hodeidah port. The attack on the tanker, just 40 nautical miles off the Saudi port of Yanbu, a major export hub for Saudi Aramco, has caused concern in Riyadh about securing key logistical infrastructure.

This crisis is very different from the Horn of Africa piracy crisis that peaked in 2011, and prompted a global maritime security response, being more politically driven than economic. In that sense, it has echoes of the 1973 OPEC oil embargo, but is causing less economic pain, as the embargo caused global oil prices to triple while the impact of this crisis is less evident. Indeed, estimates for 2024 show that the Red Sea crisis added up to 0.7 percentage points to global core goods inflation, while other factors have caused a far higher rise in inflation for many countries.

But even if the Gaza war ends soon, presenting a reason for the Huthis to de-escalate or cease attacks in the Red Sea, analysts expect it will take months before insurance premiums drop and the route can be considered fully open again, while there is still piracy off the Horn of Africa to contend with.

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