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A couple of independent developments help explain the lack of resistence.
By: Ekaterina Zolotova
Throughout
history, a certain pattern has emerged in times of war that looks
something like this: A protracted conflict depletes the budget and
resources of a warring country and eventually leads to widespread
discontent among the population as living standards decline and
opposition movements grow. By that logic, there should be mass unrest in
Russia. There is no end in sight to the war in Ukraine, even as enemy
drones damage property and occasionally kill Russian citizens. Talks
with the United States have not just stalled; they have degraded
bilateral relations. More, Moscow has had to alter its tax code to
continue to fund the war, creating larger financial burdens on
businesses and citizens alike.
And yet, after
three and a half years of war, Russia is relatively placid. President
Vladimir Putin’s approval ratings remain high, and there is a noted
uptick in patriotic sentiment in much of the country. Tempting as it may
be to write this off as a symptom of autocratic rule, there are deeper
societal changes underway that explain why Russia is bucking the
historical trend of wartime discontent.
![Support for President Putin in Russia]()
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One of these
changes is taking place within the government itself. In modern Russia,
power has generally been divided into three segments: the rulers
themselves, the systemic opposition, which is represented in government
structures and works with the rulers, and the non-systemic opposition,
which opposes the rulers and is thus excluded entirely from the
decision-making process. Given Russia’s size and population, the Kremlin
has an imperative to consolidate power by establishing regime-friendly
hubs in major cities and far-flung regions. It’s nothing short of a
necessary precondition to forestall protests.
And in theory,
there is plenty of reason to protest. Yes, the war in Ukraine has cost
Russia a lot of money and lives, but even before the conflict, Ukraine
was seen as a fraternal ally, and many Russians considered an invasion
unthinkable. Mass mobilization, early failures and increased
international pressure could have pushed masses to the streets. But they
didn’t. Crucially, there was an insurrection led by Wagner Group chief
Yevgeny Prigozhin, and participants thought to be non-systemic
opposition fled the country or died. Dissatisfaction remains, but for
the most part, it’s passive, muted discontent rather than animated rage.
Generally speaking, Russian citizens aren’t being killed en masse or
forced to live in the streets; they are being forced to endure slower
internet speeds and surrender some of the luxuries they once enjoyed.
(The region of Kursk is an obvious exception.)
![Potential For Protests with Political Demands]()
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![Potential For Protests with Economic Demands]()
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More, Russia has
skillfully reduced the representation of the non-systemic opposition in
power, best exemplified by the most recent elections. From Sept 12-14,
Russians voted for regional governors in 20 areas, determined the
composition of legislative assemblies in 11 regions and formed new city
councils in 25 municipalities. The ruling United Russia party improved
its standing in regional legislative assembly elections, even in several
previously hostile areas in which members of the non-systemic
opposition once served in the Duma. This means that power remains in the
hands of the ruling party and the systemic opposition. Problems that
arise from budgetary constraints, tax payments and central bank policy
have, of course, pitted parts of the establishment against one another.
In fact, there is a growing division
among pro-war and pro-peace factions within the government, though it’s
hardly wide enough to cause any real damage or defection. For the most
part, all institutions, strategically important state-owned companies,
the central bank and the parties represented in power are following a
common course, especially in the realm of foreign policy.
By purging the
non-systemic opposition, the rulers have created an emergent government
more loyal than previous ones, partly by promoting veterans of the war.
At a post-election meeting with the new heads of the country's regions,
Putin announced that officials need to recruit participants in the
"special military operation" into their personnel policies more
actively. He launched the federal “Time of Heroes” development program,
aimed at providing specialized training for veterans and participants in
the Ukraine conflict. Considering that veterans currently hold some of
the highest-paying jobs and enjoy extensive state benefits, the Kremlin
is counting on their loyalty and patriotism.
The second change
underway in Russian society is a growing affinity for national identity
and culture. Though there are certainly state programs meant to promote
this very sentiment, this has been a mostly independent phenomenon. On
VKontakte – Russia’s analogue to Facebook – users are increasingly
posting content related to Russian culture: historical costumes, travel
photos and the like. Russian cultural motifs are increasingly featured
in clothing, accessories, films and music. (A popular folk singer from
the 1990s named Nadezhda Kadysheva is experiencing something of a
renaissance.) Last weekend, I attended an event in which lectures on
Russian folklore were held and traditional goods such as kokoshniks
(traditional headdresses) were sold. The event was not state-sponsored;
if anything, many vendors complained about insufficient funding from a
government ostensibly interested in promoting traditional culture.
On the one hand,
the newfound interest in Russian culture plays into the hands of the
Kremlin. It pits Russian values against Western ones and generally
explains the long and grueling war in Ukraine as a struggle against
NATO. “Family values” often refer to participation in World War II by
ancestors, which adds a sense of reverence to the war in Ukraine. This
spares the government from having to continue to justify war costs
(slated to reach 13 trillion rubles, or $157 billion, by 2028) to a more
dutiful population.
On the other
hand, cultural affinity doesn’t necessarily do much to unite the state
and the people. A desire to share historical traditions isn’t tantamount
to blind obedience to the state, especially if the state is responsible
for the decline in their standard of living. In fact, a majority of the
population favors a negotiated solution. Modern Russia is also
multinational, so Moscow would risk inciting the kind of protests it
wants to avoid if it were to actively promote one culture over another.
All this is to
say there are societal trends in Russia that have created the conditions
for the rulers to maintain power, despite the fact that the financial
necessities of war make their positions inherently vulnerable.
Geopolitically, though, this suggests the war in Ukraine will continue
until Moscow can secure terms that it and its people can live with. |