[Salon] Back to Iran sanctions (II)




Back to Iran sanctions (II)

Germany, France and Great Britain are weakening their influence on future Iran negotiations with the re-enforce of the Iran sanctions. Tehran relies on business with non-Western states – Russia, China, Turkey.

07

OCT

2025

The Snapback

Germany, France and Great Britain had on 28. The so-called Snapback was triggered in August - a mechanism that automatically reinstates the UN sanctions against Iran from the time before the adoption of the nuclear agreement in 2015. The three Western European states justified their move by the fact that Tehran had not fully taken into account its three main demands. The first was that Iran should once again allow the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to inspect. However, Tehran had initiated appropriate measures. In addition, Berlin, Paris and London demanded that Iran disclose where its supplies of enriched uranium were located, and also immediately start new negotiations with the USA. 1] Observers pointed out that the former would probably trigger new Israeli bombings; the Trump administration had no interest in the latter. At the weekend, a commentator admitted to the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung: "If only the law of the strongest applies to Washington, why should one see a sense in negotiating something with the USA and making an advance payment for it?"[ 2] The USA would have "with its bombs on Iranian nuclear plants ... shown which concept they think is more promising".

No will to diplomacy

Shortly before the re-entry into force of the sanctions on 27. In September (New York time), China and Russia had made a last attempt to obtain a deadline extension of half a year. However, a corresponding resolution was rejected in the UN Security Council with a majority of nine out of 15 votes; the USA, five European states (France, Great Britain, Denmark, Greece, Slovenia) and three other states that are under heavy US pressure (Panama, Sierra Leone, Somalia), rejected a postponement until spring 2026. 3] China's Deputy Ambassador to the United Nations, Geng Shuang, expressed "deep regret" and reiterated that "the only viable option" for resolving the conflict over the Iranian nuclear program was negotiations and diplomacy. Geng pointed out "the ongoing conflict in Gaza and the unrest in the Middle East as a whole" and stated that "a collapse [of diplomacy] in Iranian nuclear affairs could trigger a new regional security crisis"; but this does not serve "the common interests of the international community". 4] It was not possible to change the three Western European states.

Demonstrate power without having power

Observers classify the move as a grandiose attempt to demonstrate power without actually having power. "The Europeans" had "never made their contribution to the lifting of the sanctions" that should have "enjoyed" Iran as a "fruit" of the nuclear agreement concluded in 2015, stated, for example, the mentioned commentator in the FAZ: They had "not been able" to "protect their internationally operating companies from the secondary penalties that threatened them by the USA if they traded with the Iranians". 5] Proudly announced attempts to establish effective protection mechanisms against US secondary sanctions failed (german-foreign-policy.com reported [6]). Trade with Iran therefore remained low; in the case of Germany, it was 1.5 billion euros in 2024, slightly more than trade with Iceland (1.4 billion euros), slightly less than that with Liechtenstein (1.7 billion euros). In this respect, there was no relevant economic exchange anyway, which could now be "smothered" by the sanctions, the FAZ continued; "that Tehran sees itself ... under pressure and therefore now makes concessions", "not even those" who now put the sanctions back into effect hoped for this.

Europe's importance is shrinking

Quite the contrary: deprived of any realistic opportunity for constructive agreements with the Western states, Tehran is in principle debating its cooperation with the IAEA. As Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi announced on Sunday, Iran now considers a recent agreement with the IAEA on future cooperation to be "no longer relevant". 7] A fundamental decision on whether and - if so - how to continue to cooperate with the institution will be taken and announced shortly. Hardliners in Tehran, who demand a withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in view of the fruitlessness of any cooperation with the West, are now only slowed down by the indication that China also clearly rejects Iran's nuclear weapons. Tehran will be even more dependent on Beijing in the future than before. The three states of Western Europe would, despite all the adversities, play "a much smaller role" in this, Araghchi said: By triggering the snapback, they would have "almost completely eliminated the justification for negotiations with them". 8] Accordingly, Tehran has recalled its ambassadors from Berlin, Paris and London for consultations. Nothing is yet known about their reshipment.

Parallel realities

For Tehran, the question of the extent to which other states adhere to the reinstated sanctions is considered decisive. From an Iranian point of view, the snapback is invalid and therefore ineffective: Because the US has de facto undermined the nuclear agreement by its exit in 2018, parts of it cannot be reactivated, it is said. At the beginning of September, Iran, Russia and China expressed their view in a joint letter to the UN Security Council that under these circumstances the European states do not have the right to have the sanctions revived on their own. 9] Russia's UN ambassador Vasyily Nebensja reiterated on 1. October, from the Russian point of view there was no snapback; one apparently lives "in two parallel realities". 10] If this view allows business with Iran to continue, several reports published in the USA in recent days show that this is practically possible despite the already existing US sanctions: According to this, a complex barter system allows the settlement of billion-dollar Chinese-Iranian trade and service transactions without the USA being able to prevent this. 11]

The end of Western dominance

Iran is also seeking to secure its trade with other countries. For example, Iranian Defense Minister Aziz Nasirzadeh spent several days in Ankara last week to negotiate a deepening of bilateral military and arms relations. 12] Details were not known. If Iran succeeds in stabilizing its international trade despite the sanctions - which according to the Western view have been reinstated - then this would be a further step on the way to dissolving the previous dominance of the Western powers.

[1] S. to return to the Iran sanctions.

[2] Stephan Löwenstein: Europe's dull sword. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 04.10.2025.

[3], [4] Iran recalls envoys to UK, France and Germany after China-backed UN resolution fails. scmp.com 27.09.2025.

[5] Stephan Löwenstein: Europe's dull sword. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 04.10.2025.

[6] S. to this Before Failure.

[7], [8] Elis Gjevori: Iran says nuclear cooperation with IAEA 'no longer relevant'. aljazeera.com 05.10.2025.

[9] How far will China, Russia go in shielding Iran from UN sanctions? al-monitor.com 09/30/2025.

[10] Russia does not recognize return of UN sanctions on Iran. reuters.com 01.10.2025.

[11] Laurence Norman, James T. Areddy: How China Secretly Pays Iran for Oil and Avoids U.S. Sanctions. wsj.com 05.10.2025. Chinese Cars for Iranian Copper: How Sanctions Revived Barter Trade. bloomberg.com 06.10.2025.

[12] Ezgi Akin: Iran defense chief visits Turkey to boost military ties: What to know. al-monitor.com 01.10.2025.



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