The question of whether China qualifies as a "Middle Eastern power" reflects a fundamental confusion about what we mean by regional influence in the 21st-century international system. The answer is neither a simple yes nor no, but rather a more nuanced examination of Beijing's strategic interests, capabilities, and the actual limits of its regional projection.
Traditionally, regional powers emerged through geographic proximity and historical entanglement. By this classical definition, China is decidedly not a Middle Eastern power; it is separated from the region by thousands of miles and centuries of limited direct engagement. Yet this geographic argument obscures rather than clarifies Beijing's actual role in Middle Eastern affairs.
China's involvement in the Middle East is fundamentally different from that of the United States, Russia, or even regional powers like Saudi Arabia and Iran. It is primarily economic and strategic rather than ideological or hegemonic. China has significant energy interests—particularly oil and natural gas imports essential to fueling its massive economy. It has invested heavily in regional infrastructure through Belt and Road Initiative projects. It maintains diplomatic relationships with various Middle Eastern states, often without the baggage of colonial history or Cold War alignments that burden Western powers.
However, we should be cautious about overstating China's Middle Eastern influence. Despite its economic clout, China has deliberately avoided the military overcommitments and nation-building ventures that have plagued American strategy in the region. Beijing maintains a single overseas military base in Djibouti—hardly the footprint of a regional hegemon. It has no significant naval presence in the Persian Gulf and shows little appetite for the kind of military interventions that define regional powers.
China's foreign policy in the Middle East remains largely transactional. It pursues its economic interests, supports regional stability to protect those interests, and generally avoids taking sides in regional conflicts—a pragmatism often mistaken for influence. The 2023 brokered agreement between Iran and Saudi Arabia, facilitated by China, was celebrated as a demonstration of Beijing's growing clout. Yet it might be better understood as a reflection of what both regional powers wanted: a way to reduce tensions without external pressure.
Rather than asking whether China is a Middle Eastern power, we should ask: What are China's interests in the Middle East, and how effectively is it pursuing them? The answer suggests China is a consequential external power with significant economic interests but limited appetite for regional dominance. It is one actor among many—a stakeholder, not a hegemon.
This distinction matters for American policymakers who often react to China's Middle Eastern activities as though Beijing were attempting to replicate American regional hegemony. This misreading can lead to unnecessary confrontation and inflated estimates of Chinese ambitions. China is not trying to dominate the Middle East; it is trying to secure energy supplies and market access while protecting its investments and avoiding costly regional entanglements.
The real question for the United States is not whether China is becoming a Middle Eastern power, but whether Washington is willing to accept a multipolar Middle East where American influence is one factor among several, rather than paramount. That is a far more challenging adjustment for policymakers accustomed to post-Cold War unipolarity.