Drifting from the US: Gulf states look East to explore new security guarantors
The Arab Gulf states have long been a far cry from the battered and hardened Levant; their oil-fuelled enrichment and inheritance of global commerce have strengthened the perception that they are almost untouched by the troubles of the surrounding region.
When Israel struck Qatar’s capital Doha in September, therefore, it surprised many around the globe, but reminded all of the reality that even the Gulf states are not immune to Israel’s expansionist operations, despite their peripheral distance from the occupation and their roles as mediators.
The attack revealed not only the fragility of illusions of safety, but also significantly brought into question the position of Gulf states and other US allies as protected players under American military hegemony. Historic security agreements between Doha and Washington did not prevent the Israelis from firing at Qatar, nor did the literal presence of the Al-Udeid US air base – paid for and upkept largely by the Qataris themselves.
Needless to say, the entire ordeal left Qatar’s neighbours and fellow GCC states understandably concerned about the very real possibility that it could have been them who were struck by Tel Aviv, and that such a potential outcome is still forever on the table.
Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu indicated as much when, after confirming the Doha attack “was a wholly independent Israeli operation” and that it “takes full responsibility”, he also refused to rule out further strikes on Hamas leaders and insisted they would be hit “wherever they are”.
A search for new guarantors
The Israeli attack and the potential that the US had prior knowledge – and possibly even approval – of it has not only sparked a diplomatic crisis, but also a defence crisis and a deeply strategic one. A commonly-felt question throughout the Gulf region now is how could they trust the US and its defence guarantees if they, as major American allies, cannot feel safe from external attacks in their own backyard, even with a US military presence and equipment within their own territories?
Such a question caused Qatar and its prime minister, according to Axios, to tell the Trump administration that Doha considered the attack an “act of betrayal” by Washington, and to notify US Special Envoy Steve Witkoff that Qatar will conduct “a deep evaluation of its security partnership” with the US “and maybe find some other partners”.
It was not the first time the Gulf states had been attacked, after all, as the Iranian strike in June had initially proven. The Israeli strike, however, majorly displayed the US’s lack of any willingness or ability to counter or even prevent that threat.
A series of moves now look to upturn the decades-long non-binding security agreements between the US and the Gulf states, in favour of other security guarantors.
Rhetoric vs. reality: The Doha summit and the Gulf’s limits on confronting Israel
In September, Saudi Arabia signed a mutual defence pact with Pakistan, which, according to the Pakistani prime minister’s office, “states that any aggression against either country shall be considered an aggression against both”.
As the Muslim world’s only nuclear-armed nation, and with one of its largest and strongest armies, the Pakistani military has long been a defence partner for the Arab states over the decades, training their forces and even participating in major defence initiatives. Pakistan’s army and air force also possess significant proven combat experience, including numerous instances of countering fighter jet attacks and incursions by rivals such as India – something which many Arab states and countries in the broader Muslim world have not had to deal with.
Islamabad, then, seems to be the most obvious option for the Gulf states’ new defence guarantor and deterrent.
Although the deal was reportedly the result of years of discussions, and “is not a response to specific countries or specific events but an institutionalisation of long-standing and deep cooperation between our two countries”, according to a Saudi official who spoke to Reuters, it nevertheless came at an opportune time for the region amid the Israeli aggression.
Following Riyadh’s move, it may be in the best interests of New Delhi, Tel Aviv, and perhaps even Tehran to contain the spread of such pacts and ensure that the kingdom’s neighbours do not follow suit.
A pivot to the East?
Regional disputes aside, there is yet another potential guarantor for the Gulf states to consider in light of the US’s increasingly perceived untrustworthiness and unreliability – it goes by the name of China, that emerging geopolitical rival to Washington and a key ally of Pakistan itself.
While the US was scrambling to claim it had no involvement in the Israeli attack on Doha and refrained from even condemning the strikes, China was amongst those who strongly slammed the move and criticised Washington for “playing favourites” in the Middle East with regards to Israel and the Arab states.
Beijing has long been one of the most prominent trading partners of the Gulf states, and with them also being China’s top oil and energy exporters, relations between the two blocs are stable, well established, and have only been on the rise. This has been especially essential for China amid its ongoing tensions and trade war with the US and the European Union, forcing it to pursue greater commercial ties with the Gulf and expand its market there.
So far, however, there has been little indication of any significant defence cooperation between Beijing and any of the Gulf militaries, aside from the increasing Saudi acquisition of Chinese UAVs, missiles, and weapons components. The question now is, could the Gulf states strike a defence agreement with China and its armed forces, or even perhaps be open to hosting a Chinese military base on their soil?
Pakistan’s nuclear gamble: The new great game in the Middle East
Currently, China has only one military base abroad where its armed forces are stationed – in Djibouti, East Africa – but it may well be open, in the near future, to its own version of Al-Udeid in Qatar and other Gulf states, right across from American forces stationed there. Such a scenario would be an extreme manifestation of multipolarity.
That defence collaboration is, however, obstructed by a variety of factors, primarily the question of whether Beijing even desires to be a major security guarantor in West Asia, let alone in any region other than its surrounding backyard. Publicly, the Chinese have displayed themselves as seeking only domination in the financial and trade fields rather than the military.
One of Beijing’s main bargaining chips when it comes to fostering relations and trade ties with much of the Global South is its claim to being averse to colonialism and to being different from the historically traditional imperial foreign policy tactics employed by Western powers. There is every sign that China aims for an expanded energy presence in the Middle East and nuclear cooperation in the Gulf in particular, and for boundless influence over industries and markets, but there are as of yet no signs that it aspires to military hegemony – or even minor defence presence – in the region.
With Pakistan’s pact with Saudi Arabia, its rising role as a security guarantor, and the potential for greater cooperation with that model from other Gulf states, China may decide to adopt a limited but nevertheless important posture in the near future by providing diplomatic and technical support for any such military alliance.
As for the Gulf states themselves, particularly Riyadh and Doha, there is unlikely to be an urgent or drastic breakaway from the US and its defence hegemony in the region, at least for now. They remain largely reliant on Washington’s security guarantees and are still tied to US defence foreign policy moves in the region, but they have been largely shaken by the perceived American complicity or impotence in regards to Israeli threats.
If anything, last month definitively served as a wake-up call for the currently stable Gulf monarchies. For now, they bide their time and search for a set of new security guarantors, and are hedging but not entirely decoupling from the US.
The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.