Babis’ Win Makes Czechia the EU’s Latest Headache
The results of Czechia’s elections earlier this month represent more than a national reversal. They cement the new right-wing bloc in Europe and deepen the fault lines running through the European Union. Andrej Babis, the billionaire former prime minister, has returned to power on a populist platform that challenges Brussels’ consensus on everything from digital governance and Ukraine to climate policy.
Babis’ ANO movement captured just under 35 percent of the vote on Oct. 3-4, defeating Prime Minister Petr Fiala’s pro-European coalition. Turnout was close to 70 percent, one of the highest in the country’s post-communist history. But while the ANO’s victory was decisive, it is not absolute. The party fell short of a parliamentary majority and must now negotiate with two smaller forces, the anti-immigration party Freedom and Direct Democracy, or SPD, and the Motorists, a mainly single-issue group opposed to climate regulation.
With coalition talks now underway, both want influence in shaping the new government’s agenda. The SPD has called for a referendum on Czechia’s membership in the European Union and NATO, which Babis rejects. The Motorists are expected to press for weaker climate commitments and exemptions from EU emissions targets, while also seeking to challenge EU efforts toward digital regulation. A government that depends on these parties to remain in power could see Czechia pivot away from the pro-European trajectory it has followed since Babis last held the premiership from 2017 to 2021.
The broader implications are significant. In recent years, Czechia had become a regional linchpin. Together with Poland, it served as an anchor of support for Ukraine and a bridge between Brussels and Central Europe. Prague coordinated arms deliveries to Kyiv, advocated for sanctions on Russia and defended the EU’s rule of law mechanisms. That positioning is now likely to shift. Babis’ victory places Prague closer to the illiberal governments of Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban and Slovakian Prime Minister Robert Fico.
The current European context exacerbates the potential implications of this change. In Germany, the far-right Alternative for Germany, or AfD, continues to climb in the polls. France is facing political paralysis due to parliamentary gridlock. And Geert Wilders’ far-right and anti-immigrant Freedom Party dominates Dutch politics ahead of elections that will be held on Oct. 29. Babis’ return strengthens this trend by giving the European right another major voice inside the European Council, where the leaders of EU member states must ratify many policy proposals by consensus.
That momentum is beginning to shape the policy agenda itself. The immediate pressure points are already visible in three areas where EU cohesion looks most exposed: digital governance, Ukraine and the Green Deal.
On the first, Babis inherits responsibility for implementing two landmark EU laws, the Digital Services Act, or DSA, and the Artificial Intelligence Act. Together they form the backbone of the bloc’s digital rulebook and are intended to project European values onto the fast-evolving global tech industry. But to do so, they rely on strong national enforcement. And as of late 2025, Czechia had still not appointed a fully empowered digital services coordinator or established the necessary oversight infrastructure as required by the DSA, leading the European Commission to begin infringement proceedings.
Babis is unlikely to provoke open confrontation, but his government may slow, amend or dilute collective decisions, testing whether the EU’s machinery can function when centrifugal politics dominate.
A government led by the ANO and dependent on the support of the Motorists is unlikely to move quickly to change that. The ANO has warned against “over-regulation” with regard to the bloc’s AI Act, arguing that regulations should be kept to a minimum to support the growth of small businesses. But because the AI Act is meant to apply uniformly across the single market, if one member state enforces the rules selectively, others may follow, fracturing what was meant to be a unified approach to high-risk AI systems in particular.
On Ukraine, Czechia’s previous government was among Kyiv’s strongest backers, sending ammunition, hosting refugees and advocating for the country’s future EU membership. Babis, who campaigned on a “Czechia First” ticket, promised to end the country’s participation in the national ammunition-supply program for Ukraine, a multilateral effort launched in 2024 and coordinated by Prague in response to U.S. delays in sending artillery shells to Ukraine. That proposal appealed to voters tired of the war next door. He also argued that any further military aid to Ukraine should be organized by NATO or the EU collectively rather than bilaterally. The change is subtle but significant, as it would allow Czechia to go from being an active contributor to a passive participant.
If Prague steps back, the pro-Ukraine bloc within the EU will shrink further. Orban already regularly blocks or delays common positions in the European Council, and Fico has suspended state-sponsored military aid. With Babis now echoing their obstructionism, the three could seek to use the Visegrad Group, or V4—comprising Hungary, Czechia, Slovakia and Poland—as a counterweight to Warsaw’s strong pro-Ukraine stance. That will complicate decisions on new funding tranches for Kyiv, as well as long-term reconstruction aid and the sensitive question of accession negotiations.
Climate policy is also likely to become a casualty of Babis’ coalition arithmetic. The ANO has already opposed the EU’s Green Deal and its targets for cutting emissions by 55 percent by 2030. Czechia’s industrial base remains heavily reliant on coal and car manufacturing, and Babis will present himself as a defender of jobs against “unrealistic” EU environmental rules. As their name implies, his potential coalition partners the Motorists will also apply pressure to protect car owners and any phasing-out of combustion engines.
In the leadup to October’s elections, Babis promised to keep Czechia anchored in the EU and NATO, framing his agenda as “reform, not rupture.” In practice, his politics are transactional. He will back Brussels when it serves Czech interests and resist when it does not. That calculation, combined with reliance on far-right partners, makes him an unpredictable force within an EU already struggling to maintain cohesion.
Across Europe, each national election that shifts rightward adds another obstacle to collective decision-making, which as mentioned on many issues requires unanimous consensus in the European Council. That Czechia has now become the latest illustration of this trend is both symptom and catalyst. Though not an EU heavyweight like Germany or France, it has played an outsized regional role. Until now, Prague acted as a hinge between Western Europe and the Visegrad states. With Babis likely to align more closely with Hungary and Slovakia, that stabilizing center will be gone. Additionally, the loss weakens Europe’s internal cohesion just as the global geopolitical environment grows more volatile.
The European Council enters 2026 facing a crowded and contentious agenda that includes midterm budget negotiations and the first full year of implementation for the AI Act. Progress on all these fronts depends on the cooperation of member states that increasingly treat Brussels as one negotiating partner among many, not as the natural center of gravity of European politics.
Babis is unlikely to provoke open confrontation, but his government may slow, amend or dilute collective decisions, testing whether the EU’s machinery can function when centrifugal politics dominate. Europe has survived crises before, but the challenge today is quieter and more corrosive. In its essence it represents a gradual fragmentation of purpose.
The Czech election has shown how swiftly a once-reliable ally can become a source of uncertainty. For policymakers in Brussels and beyond, that is the most urgent lesson of 2025 and a warning about the fragility of the consensus that for now still holds the union together.
Amanda Coakley is a strategic adviser and Europe’s Futures Fellow at the Institute for Human Sciences in Vienna. In 2024 she was named an Aspen U.K. Rising Leaders Fellow. Her monthly WPR column appears on Wednesdays.