RAND Urges for Major Chinese Re-Think Amidst Widespread Recognition of China's Awakening
RAND think tank, famous for its influential policy papers which have shaped US-Russian relations, has released an eye-opening call for a change of course on China. This comes by way of the latest Trump-China escalations which, it appears, have greatly worried insiders of the ‘deep state’ system; enough so that for once they have begun swallowing their pride and envisioning a calmer, more placating approach toward China so as not to upset the global status quo too much.
The outline of the paper is here: https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA4107-1.html
And the full, over-100-page-long PDF here: https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RRA4100/RRA4107-1/RAND_RRA4107-1.pdf
Their key findings are that China and the US should strive to achieve a modus vivendiby each accepting the political legitimacy of the other, constraining efforts to undermine each other, at least to a reasonable degree.
Most significantly—and tellingly—RAND prescribes for the US leadership in particular to reject ideas of “absolute victory” over China, as well as to accept the One China Policy and stop provoking China with military-minded visits to Taiwan designed specifically to keep China threatened and on edge.
The paper opens with a long historical digression which contextualizes how rival global powers can coexist, and have done so in the past. They identify even Lenin’s USSR as having a vision of stable relations with the West despite the USSR’s acknowledged pursuit of Marxist revolution. The most recent example they give is the detente between the US and USSR from about 1968 to 1979, where both sides came to realize that unrestricted escalation was dangerous and unaffordable:
In truth, détente emerged in part because both sides in the Cold War came to realize that a totally unregulated and unrestricted contest was unaffordable, and in fact threatened their survival. This realization emerged in more places than Washington and Moscow: Initiatives such as West Germany’s idea of Ostpolitik were grounded in similar insights and sought similar goals.
U.S. and Soviet leaders during the heyday of détente embraced the two core defining aspects of a stable competition: They sought some elements of an agreed status quo, including arms control regimes, and they established personal ties between officials, as well as mechanisms of crisis management, that helped the overall relationship to return to an equilibrium
In a startlingly balanced take, the RAND authors even indirectly defended Brezhnev for his peace-seeking efforts:
Sergei Radchenko agrees that those who saw Brezhnev as trying to fool or trap the United States “entirely misconstrue what he was trying to do. True to his heartfelt commitment to world peace, Brezhnev proclaimed that his goal was nothing short of saving civilization itself or, to be more precise, European civilization.”
In the next long section of the paper, the authors even meticulously go over various internal CPC proclamations and “secret speeches” with a fine-toothed comb, re-interpreting many of the alleged ‘harsh’ statements made by Xi and his compatriots with more nuanced translations of key words, which were previously misconstrued for having threatening or bellicose connotations.
Several of the authors have also translated Chinese terms with more hawkish English alternatives than the original Chinese language sources may imply. We give four examples of such translations and interpretations in this section a reference to using “tools of dictatorship”; the difference between “sharp” and “violent” struggle with the West; the subtle differences in translating Chinese terms into “offensive” in English; and the use of the translation “magic weapon.”
Shockingly, RAND defends the idea of a potentially peaceful China whose leadership is not bent on world domination and imperialism, but rather rightful influence over its spheres.
By highlighting debates about and nuances in interpretation and translation, rather than viewing China’s assertiveness in absolute terms, our analysis suggests it exists on a continuum that is informed by situational, historical, and linguistic contexts. Strategists in China, for example, see their country as an expanding global power that deserves new spheres of influence, but do not view these endeavors as imperialistic or historically unique, and remain at least conceptually wedded to the idea that China will remain a peaceful and legitimate world power.
A key suggestion by the RAND team:
China’s efforts to become more proactive on the international stage and develop a “world-class” military are not necessarily always intended to be offensive in nature.
It’s clear that RAND is trying desperately to make US policymakers abandon their obsolete and blinkered world view centered on the idea that any challenger must by its nature represent the selfsame kind of hegemonic exceptionalism cultivated by the US itself for over a century. The US views the entire world as a threat in the same light that a thief mistrusts all those around him—it is past guilt sublimated into national suspicion and Machiavellian subversiveness.
The US, being the pernicious by-blow of the late British Empire, has inherited all the hawkish trappings of its former parent. RAND here attempts to ween the US political culture away from this perpetually adversarial and hostile approach to foreign diplomacy because, as it has become apparent, the people ‘behind the scenes’ have slowly recognized not that confrontation with China will lead to some kind of global war, but rather the much barer reality that the US simply isn’t what it once was, and does not have the sheer overwhelming capability to bully the world’s foremost ascendant power. Thus, this RAND call to action is not—as they would have us believe—some kind of de-escalatory peacenik measure, but rather a desperate attempt to stave off the US from a historically fatal humiliation and geopolitical defeat at the hands of China.
They go as far as to lay blame on Taiwan and its leaders for provoking the situation, and suggest for the US to assert its leverage to cut Taiwan down to size by reminding its leaders they are mere pawns between great powers, and should not overstep their roles in maintaining the status quo:
Taiwan’s President Lai Ching-te, for example, has made numerous statements that have elicited harsh rhetoric and increased military activities by China. Such activities include asserting that Taiwan is a “sovereign, independent nation”and announcing measures to counter China’s influence and espionage, characterizing it as a “foreign hostile force.” Although the United States is not responsible for and cannot completely control the activities of Taiwan, it provides military support and de facto extended deterrence to Taiwan. Because of this, it has potential leverage over Taiwan to limit its activities that upset the status quo championed by the United States.
There have even been recent rumors of US signaling a secret kind of unspoken deal to move most of TSMC production to the US in advance of ‘greenlighting’ China’s takeover of the island, which would afterwards be useless to the West. Though such fancies are speculative, it would infact represent a kind of fair deal for China, which would gladly lose TSMC to peacefully gain all of Taiwan, because China will most likely overtake chip production, lithography, and attendant fields eventually anyway. Several top analysts on X have speculated on such a deal:
The American administration remains silent regarding the construction of the Shuipiao bridge barges by the Beijing government, which can only serve one purpose: invading Taiwan. I’m not here to debate whether China has the right to reintegrate Taiwan. I want to go beyond that.
In a possible agreement between the US and China, it seems Taiwan’s chip industry would relocate 50% of its operations to the US, and the remaining 50% would stay with China. The problem is that Taiwan has not agreed to this transfer.
It’s likely that some of the industry will be handed over to the US after China’s reintegration, which, given the pace of the barges’ movements, might not be too far off.
Just as the Americans do not oppose activity in Asia, Russia and China remain silent regarding Venezuela. Any country that sent a fleet, started sinking ships, or threatened invasion would already be under international scrutiny.
Instead, there’s silence because China and Russia are also quiet about Venezuela. Likewise, Europeans prefer to avoid problems with the US, knowing that only US engagement in Ukraine can bring some relief.
Now, I’ll mention the US stance of distancing itself from Ukraine. There’s no longer American arms or support for Ukraine under this current US administration. That has been clear since January.
It seems to me this is just a realignment of Monroe Doctrine 2.0.
The US has agreed to share Taiwan’s chip industry with China, leave Ukraine to Russia, and pretend not to see the invasion of Venezuela.
My perception is that we are witnessing this agreement today, and there’s nothing or no one who can do anything about it.
I still don’t understand where Iran, North Korea, Yemen, and others fit into all this.
Now, we await our political analysts’ insights!
In support of the main idea that the US might be shifting away from, rather than toward, confronting China in the inevitable clash of superpowers everyone seems to be awaiting, journalist Aida Chavez claims sources have informed her the CIA is considering shuttering its China mission:
However, she has since updated her article with an official CIA refutation—though it’s left for you to decide whom to trust here:
Update (October 24, 2025): After publication, a CIA spokesperson dismissed the claim that the agency is considering shutting down its China Mission Center as “false, absurd and totally baseless.” The agency did not address other parts of the inquiry, including context on the collapse of U.S. spying operations in China between 2010 and 2012.
Her full Substack piece:
So, why else are the movers and shakers now getting cold feet about the US confronting China? Wall Street Journal’s latest gives us another clue:
The article outlines a new confident China, no longer cowed or swayed by US’s counterfeit brawn under Trump. The article begins:
During his first term, President Trump often frustrated Xi Jinping with his freewheeling mix of threats and bonhomie. This time, the Chinese leader believes he has cracked the code.
Xi has thrown out China’s traditional diplomatic playbook and tailored a new one specifically for Trump, said people close to Chinese policymakers, who describe Xi as appearing confident and emboldened.
It goes on to detail that Xi has decided to use Trump’s own tactics against him, particularly because—according to the authors—China has figured out that Trump admires strength and unpredictability, and to use these traits against him infact disarms him, rather than makes him escalate in fury or retaliation.
But when the Trump administration hits China, Xi has decided to hit back even harder, in a bid to gain leverage over Trump while projecting strength and unpredictability—qualities he believes the U.S. president admires, the people said. The two leaders are set to meet next Thursday in South Korea.
Xi’s strategic evolution takes a page from Trump’s own “maximum pressure” playbook of using the threat of overwhelming economic sanctions to get his way against adversaries and friends alike. According to those familiar with Beijing’s thinking, while China’s reactions to U.S. trade assaults were often proportional in the past, its countermeasures now are designed to be more severe.
By the way, as a brief aside: you’ve got to love the lazy “people said” attribution above. Each year the mainstream corporate press lowers its standards to new bottom-rungs. We’ve gone from undergirding articles with lazily unsourced and made-up ‘anonymous sources’, now to just plain old “people said”. It’s no wonder this latest graph has been making the rounds:
Getting back.
The article goes on to detail the claim that Xi’s new strategy toward the US is one of defiance, and a newfound unapologetic display of Chinese power:
Xi’s new doctrine is that the U.S. must adapt to a reality of Chinese power, these people said. In rare earths, they said, Xi is convinced that China holds an undisputed trump card that allows it to demand substantial U.S. concessions.
This newfound boldness is no doubt in many ways a direct byproduct of Russia’s contagious defiance of the Western hegemonic order vis-a-vis Ukraine. Russia is the catalyst that upended the order and forced it into drastic action to begin with, which has had a ricocheting effect throughout the world given that Russia has forced the West’s hand in revealing all of its sacred cards and ‘last-resort’ economic and geopolitical weapons; and China was watching.
The WSJ article mentions how China’s new policy has been a deliberately pre-calculated strategy to deal with Trump’s second term, after China had felt ‘blindsided’ by Trump’s unpredictability the first time around. Interestingly, this was corroborated by a new Economist piece which delves into some of the same developing dynamics detailed in the WSJ article above:
Most notably in this regard, the Economist piece outlines how China had already long-begun a period of critical self-reflection in preparation for upcoming future trade wars during what China likely understood to be a turning point showdown with the US—read the fascinating recount below:
The article frames the coming showdown on the eve of a momentous meeting between Trump and Xi next week in South Korea—the first meeting between the two powerhouse leaders since Trump took second office. The authors believe in lead-up to this sit-down of heavies it is China that is winning the all-important, globe-spanning trade war:
In fact, China’s confidence reflects a startling fact: it is winning the trade war with America. It has devised forms of economic coercion inspired by, but more effective than, America’s own; it is dissuading third countries from siding with America and it is reinforcing Mr Xi’s standing at home. But victories in trade wars are rarely absolute or permanent. China has to be careful not to press its advantage too far, lest its successes rebound on it.
Hell, they seem to think China is winning so handsomely that it risks going too far by winning too much.
“We just won’t tolerate the US hitting us anymore, and we believe we have the capability to fight back,” says Tu Xinquan of the University of International Business and Economics in Beijing.
It seems the Chinese have finally come of age and recognized their place in the world without the abashed humility they once wore as a kind of shackle. The truth is, the rise of China’s ability to assert itself against the decaying Western hegemonic bloc is a net positive for the whole world: we all need a China shorn of the type of docile servility—or rather, excessive temperance, if you prefer—inculcated into its psyche long ago by the ‘century of humiliation’.
The authors believe that Xi is now driving the dynamic, with Trump for the first time playing catch-up:
More fundamentally, the way the trade war has played out so far is a validation of Mr Xi’s obsession with trying to shore up China’s defence and strengthen its offence against America. “Instead of coming running for negotiations, Xi is the one that is making moves and the United States is struggling to keep up,” says Jon Czin of the Brookings Institution, a think-tank. “It doesn’t feel like Trump is the one in control now, and that is the goal for China. Xi is driving the dynamic.”
More importantly, the article notes that China’s perceived economic and trade-war victories against the US have had a resounding effect on the domestic audience, triggering a wave of patriotism and solidarity. This is in contrast to recent characterizations made by Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent and others—not least of which being Trump himself—that the Chinese economy is crumbling, and the people becoming disillusioned and discontented.
Ren Yi, a pro-government blogger with a sizeable following, captured this spirit in a widely shared article. “Clear-eyed observers know that America has played almost all its cards and is itching to slam them all on the table at once,” he wrote. “But China has only just begun playing its cards and is still reluctant to show them.”
The Economist goes on to ‘nuance’ their China-triumphalism with an old tactic, one virtually every Western publication continues to sophistically employ in the tradition of couching Chinese triumphs with the age-old sour-grapes platitude: “At what cost?”
There is no cost here: China is trouncing the US, and the only one that will incur long-term costs is short-term-focused Trump. The earlier WSJ piece summarized it succinctly:
The ultimate outcome may hinge on a fundamental mismatch in perspective, one that defines the entire U.S.-China relationship.
“Trump’s focus is short-term and political,” said Campbell, the former deputy secretary of state, “while Xi is focused on sustaining long-term competition with the U.S.”
In its concluding paragraph, the Economist hints the same thing—that the only fear for China at this point is too much success—humiliating the US may cause China’s shadow to grow too heavy over other clients and partners:
The second challenge concerns international relations. Seven years ago, China feared being backed into a corner by America. Today, it faces a different problem: how to wield its newfound leverage without making other countries feel cornered and pushing them into America’s arms. That China is grappling with this concern, rather than buckling under an American trade assault, shows how far the balance has shifted. But overconfidence brings dangers of its own.
But as always, in the last line the Economist cannot help themselves—with no words left to mince about China’s ascendant preeminence, they’re left only with their vapid standby: at what cost?
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