While Foreign Forces Compete for Gaza Predominance, Hamas Is Reviving Its Regime
U.S. Vice President JD Vance's departure from Israel – almost immediately followed by Secretary of State Marco Rubio's arrival – and President Donald Trump's insistence on receiving constant updates from the "ground" are clear signs that Washington has shifted into micro-management mode in the Gaza Strip, with Israel reduced to little more than a typist, taking dictation and executing orders accordingly.
This dramatic development is marketed in Israel as "a coordination of positions," but is in fact a dictate fulfilling another of Trump's visions, following the one from last February, when he disseminated a plan for the building of an upscale "Riviera" in the Gaza Strip, saying that the U.S. would "take over" and "own" Gaza.
This is not a single-state takeover. As in Afghanistan and Iraq, Washington has built an international coalition meant to carry the heavy military and economic burden that comes with the implementation of Trump's 20-point plan. But already, as was the case in Afghanistan and Iraq, the first signs of the flawed planning are emerging, possibly ending with similar results. Much has been written already about the salient flaws. An international force, Arab or other, has not been established yet, and there is also no financial plan in place for ensuring its operation.
‘We’re the ones calling the shots here’: Vance, Kushner and Witkoff rattle Israel’s leadership
Turkey, Egypt and perhaps Azerbaijan and the United Arab Emirates have publicly expressed their willingness to participate in such a force, but the devil is in the details. How many soldiers will be required? Who will command this force, an American general or an Egyptian one? Who will be authorized to decide which forces enter the Gaza Strip? Will it be Israel or the U.S.? Israel adamantly opposes the participation of Turkish or Qatari forces and the U.S. understands Israel's objection, but may not embrace it.
These are but the secondary issues, since the essential dispute relates to describing this force's tasks, which also depend on the willingness of these countries to send their soldiers to Gaza. The "International Stabilization Force" as described in Trump's plan, is designed to maintain Gaza's internal security, to act as a counterforce against terror or high-risk threats, to protect infrastructure and humanitarian operations, as well as to train and assist Palestinian police forces that are supposed to enter the enclave. Moreover, the plan calls for all terror infrastructure to be irreversibly destroyed, with demilitarization taking place under international monitoring.
On its face, this is a well-formulated and organized document. However, in contrast to the cease-fire agreement in Lebanon, in which the authority and responsibility for disarming Hezbollah lies with the Lebanese government, nowhere in Trump's plan does it say that the international force in Gaza will be the one disarming Hamas.
Ostensibly, dozens of countries that expressed their support for Trump's plan speak with one voice, all in favor of a cease-fire and the return of hostages. They are all in favor of developing and rebuilding Gaza and of neutralizing Hamas while barring it from any control in Gaza. But already after the first phase of this plan, which has not yet been completed, with some dead hostages still in Gaza, it turns out that in Gaza, a new political geography is emerging, one that could threaten the entire plan, reminiscent of what happened in Afghanistan. Following the first stage of the withdrawal, Israel indeed holds 53 percent of the enclave, but the other 47 percent includes most of Gaza's population, and Hamas is increasingly taking over in that area.
The Lebanese-American researcher and commentator Walid Phares, who was Trump's adviser during his first term, wrote in an article published on the Independent Arabia website, a Saudi news website run jointly with the British "Independent" news website, that Hamas will consolidate its hold in the major towns in the enclave, controlling the economy and media while trying to benefit from every economic project. If Hamas doesn't hand over its weapons in the Western part of the enclave (as he calls the area now under Hamas' control), Israel will arm Palestinian militias in the eastern part of the enclave.
If an international force along with forces from a more moderate and acceptable Palestinian Authority do not enter the Gaza Strip, two militias and two Palestinian authorities will be established, which may cooperate with each other, wrote Phares. His analysis is well-grounded, since Trump's plan says that if Hamas delays or rejects the plan, the arrangement and aid will continue in areas devoid of terror, which are passed from IDF control to that of the international force. The plan thus envisions a possibility of two Gaza Strips arising.
A study published two years ago by the U.S. Army War College summarized in nine pages the failures of the multinational force in Afghanistan. The main problem lay in the faulty definition of the strategic aims of the U.S. in Afghanistan. These were described incoherently and implemented in a random fashion that depended on the nature of the U.S. administration in any given year and on the miliary command responsible for the operation at that time. Was the objective to fight subversive forces? To rebuild the country? To advise and assist in building a democracy? The problem was exacerbated due to the multiplicity of allies, partners and other players (such as non-governmental agencies), which came to Afghanistan with their own agendas and modes of operation.
The developments predicted by Phares will be fertile ground for the implementation of "private" strategic agendas pursued by countries that signed Trump's declaration in Sharm el-Sheikh, including Egypt, Qatar and Turkey, countries which guarantee the plan's implementation, with Israel remaining a bystander. Two weeks ago, Egypt's foreign minister, Badr Abdel Atti, announced that a list of 15 people who would serve in the temporary administrative council had been put together, and that this had been concluded with all the Palestinian factions, including Hamas. Abdel Hatti did not see this as contradicting the determination that Hamas would take no part in administering Gaza, as stated by Turkey and Qatar too while giving their approval to the list.
It is worth noting that Trump himself said that he had no problem with Hamas being "temporarily" responsible for internal security. According to reports in Arab media, Qatar and Turkey are holding discussions with the U.S. administration regarding "amendments" to Trump's plan, ones that would instruct Hamas to lay down its arms but would leave its final disarmament to a later stage. When would this stage be reached? Perhaps when a Palestinian state is established, as demanded by Hamas.
The tug of war in Gaza between what seems like an American-Turkish-Qatari coalition and Israel is but one part of a multi-team tournament. Even among the Arab partners, mainly Egypt, Qatar and Turkey, life isn't rosy. They all have bitter memories which for years have been shaping their relationships and could impact the way they approach Gaza's future. One of the key events that set Egypt's relations with Turkey for twelve years occurred in September 2011, when a large Turkish delegation headed by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan landed in Egypt. He was then Turkey's prime minister, before becoming president three years later. Egypt was then in the throes of a rocky transition between the deposing of President Hosni Mubarak, following the Arab Spring revolution, and the election which gave the presidency to the Muslim Brotherhood's candidate, Mohamed Morsi.
The welcome was appropriately magnificent, with a supportive crowd chanting "Erdoğan, Erdoğan, the shaker of tyrants' seats." For Erdoğan, this was a historic opportunity to consolidate Turkey's hold on Egypt, especially after a period of deep chill that had characterized his relations with President Mubarak, and not just with him.
Israel brands Turkey as a country of the Muslim Brotherhood, but in 2007, Mohamed Morsi published a long and detailed article in which he explained why Turkey, the Justice and Development Party, Erdoğan's party, and Erdoğan himself could not be allies of the Muslim Brotherhood. Not only because Turkey was a NATO member, an organization responsible for the killing of Muslims and Arabs, and not only because it recognized Israel and maintained diplomatic and security relations with it. "The Turkish Justice and Development Party has declared that it approved and was satisfied with Turkey's secular character according to Western interpretation.
Therein lies the great gap between it and our basic goal, aimed at Muslims having a Muslin state, not a religious one defined narrowly as the West understands it," wrote Morsi, adding that "this is also the difference between the Egyptian state, in which the Muslim Brothers live according to a constitution which determines that the state's official religion is Islam and that Sharia laws are the main source of legislation…in contrast to Turkey, in which the constitution determines that it is a secular state," explained Morsi. Turkey's Islam cannot be the Islam of Egypt or of any Muslim state, averred the religious sages of the Brotherhood.
Erdoğan, who believed that during his 2011 visit he could mend the ideological rift between him and the Brotherhood and turn Turkey into a mentor of the new regime, made a fatal mistake when he said in an interview that his wish was "that Egypt would be a secular country that respected all components of Egyptian society… a secular country does not mean that the people are secular. I am not secular and I am the prime minister of a secular country."
The roaring response was swift in arriving. "We welcome Turkey and Erdoğan, as an exceptional leader among the region's leaders, but we do not believe that he or his country can alone lead the region or shape its future," ruled Dr. Essam el-Erian, the deputy leader of the Brotherhood's Freedom and Justice Party. "Arab countries do not need external projects. These should come from within Arab regimes, particularly since after the Arab Spring revolutions, regimes will be democratic," predicted el-Erian, who was arrested after Abdel Fatah el-Sissi deposed Morsi in July 2013 and declared all-out war on the Brotherhood. Erdoğan's diplomatic and economic calculations were dashed in an instant, and a long and bitter account was opened between him and el-Sissi. Erdoğan did not recognize the legitimacy of el-Sissi's regime and placed himself as the defender of the Muslim Brothers, granting activists who managed to flee Egypt a safe haven and even citizenship.
When the diplomatic wheel in the region turned again, and after Erdoğan, at the peak of an economic crisis, realized that his salvation lies with the Gulf states, he rebuilt his relations with Mohamed Bin Salman, the man responsible for the murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi on Turkish soil, with the United Arab Emirates and finally with el-Sissi's Egypt, the man who described the Muslim Brothers (but not Hamas) as a terror organization.
In exchange, Erdoğan imposed strict and onerous limits on the operation of the Brotherhood in Turkey, even extraditing to Egypt some of its activists. But the suspicion between el-Sissi and Erdoğan has not completely dispelled and it would not be a wild guess to determine that el-Sissi, like Israel, is not enthusiastic about the possible presence of Turkish forces in Gaza, and about the extensive foothold Erdoğan obtained for himself in a conflict from which he was excluded for years.
Egypt is worried that the Turkish-Qatari agenda – with these two countries working together on several fronts, from Syria to Libya to Afghanistan – will displace Egypt from its status as a patron of Gaza. As long as Egypt controlled the economic lifelines in the Gaza Strip and thus made Hamas dependent on it, Egypt enjoyed regional diplomatic changes, including in relation to Israel. This status may now move into the hands of Trump's "coalition states," who will dictate to Egypt the limits of its involvement in Gaza and beyond. And as it turned out in Afghanistan and Iraq, when coalition members cannot form a united, binding and feasible strategy, local opposition forces take over.