Sudan crisis: Can the Quad forge a sustainable peace?
As Sudan's devastating war grinds on, a new diplomatic push is taking shape that promises a fresh roadmap to end the conflict. But behind the statements and high-level meetings lies a crucial question: can this truly bring peace to a fractured nation?
After what many observers described as "limp and lacklustre" diplomacy, the so-called Quad - comprising the US, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and the UAE - recently unveiled a coordinated roadmap aimed at ending Sudan's catastrophic war.
The critical question facing diplomats and Sudanese civilian politicians is whether this initiative represents a genuine turning point, or if it is merely the latest in a series of failed diplomatic exercises.
The Quad's peace push, announced last month, represents a significant elevation of US engagement. This shift is driven by two key factors. Firstly, Massad Boulos, a special adviser to US President Donald Trump's administration, has taken an interest in Sudan, declaring it a "priority" and seemingly keen to rack up diplomatic successes.
Secondly, Abu Dhabi, Cairo and Riyadh have actively lobbied Washington to weigh in, reflecting their growing discomfort with the quagmire created by the war.
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The joint statement from the Quad outlines a roadmap: an initial three-month humanitarian truce to allow for rapid aid delivery, followed by a permanent ceasefire, and concluding with a nine-month transitional period leading to "an independent, civilian-led government with broad-based legitimacy and accountability".
The timing of this initiative reflects strategic calculations. Prospects for a truce improved after the Sudanese army retook Khartoum in March, eliminating a major obstacle to a ceasefire. Furthermore, the war has become a harmful stalemate for regional powers: Egypt and Saudi Arabia, given their geographic proximity, view it as directly threatening their national security.
Fundamental paradox
The UAE, while having a wider buffer, incurs a cost by being linked to such a high-intensity conflict. Additionally, intra-Arab tensions over Sudan have boiled over into other forums, such as the Arab League, even derailing a London conference on Sudan this year and threatening to undermine regional diplomacy on other pressing files.
But the Quad's composition is a fundamental paradox. Egypt has firmly backed the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), reflecting Cairo's preference for what it considers to be a legitimate government, along with concerns about instability along its southern border.
Conversely, the UAE has been continuously accused of supporting the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). While Saudi Arabia has tried to maintain neutrality, it has increasingly aligned with the SAF, which Riyadh views as Sudan's sole remaining state institution.
This dynamic, with Quad states having been on opposing sides of the war, creates legitimate doubts about their collective commitment to an impartial peace process - and whether the current configuration is more likely to secure a quick-fix solution focused on wealth and power-sharing, rather than a comprehensive agreement.
Despite the diplomatic fanfare, the Quad faces immediate and formidable headwinds. Within weeks of the joint statement, the situation on the battlefield had arguably worsened, with fighting raging across multiple fronts.
General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, the Sudanese army chief, initially rejected the Quad's roadmap, but later moved to conditional acceptance, while the RSF continues its bloody campaign to secure El Fasher, the capital of North Darfur.
The humanitarian situation remains dire, particularly in El Fasher, where more than 260,000 civilians - including 130,000 children - remain trapped by an RSF siege. Satellite imagery analysed by Yale's Humanitarian Research Lab shows the RSF has constructed a massive earthen berm encircling the city, creating what researchers describe as a "kill box".
At the same time, the war's dynamics have moved beyond a simple binary struggle, devolving into a multipolar conflict with dozens of armed groups, militias and regional actors holding sway across Sudan's fractured landscape.
Stakeholders marginalised
Compounding this, the warring parties are constructing parallel governing structures. The RSF and its allied Tasis coalition announced the formation of a parallel governmentthis summer in Darfur, a move the African Union Peace and Security Council has explicitly condemned and refused to recognise.
On the other side, the SAF has appointed a new prime minister in Port Sudan. This competition in statecraft converts battlefield gains into claims for administrative legitimacy, taxation and revenue control, making any future reunification politically and economically costly.
A significant criticism of the Quad initiative concerns the marginalisation of key stakeholders. A planned meeting in July, which was later postponed due to tensions between Egypt and UAE, notably excluded the African Union (AU) and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the regional bloc historically mandated to mediate conflicts in East Africa.
This raises questions about the viability of any agreement produced without robust African mediation and local ownership involving Sudanese stakeholders. The approach has also systematically marginalised civilian actors, including political parties, civil society groups and social movements.
While parts of these groups are polarised, any peace process that does not centrally involve these forces is doomed to fail, as the military has never produced a stable government in Sudan's history.
The Quad's plan has been described as "calendar peace", which converts complex political choices into calendar milestones, but risks structural fragility if deadlines are not matched with enforceable mechanics and meaningful inclusion.
Burhan's visit to Cairo this month marked a notable diplomatic shift, with many observers interpreting the trip as the SAF's first overt commitment to the Quad. Yet Burhan's statements before, and also immediately after, the Cairo visit paint a more complex picture.
In the city of Atbara, just days after his visit to Cairo, Burhan adopted an uncompromising position: "Any party, whether the Quad or others, that wants to negotiate with us on what is right for Sudan and the Sudanese, and ends this war in a way that restores Sudan's dignity, unity and prevents any possibility of another rebellion, we are ready to cooperate with them," he said.
By stressing these conditions, Burhan simultaneously reassured Islamist and pro-army networks that no concessions would be made to the RSF or foreign powers, even as he projected diplomatic flexibility abroad.
Narrow window for peace
The Quad now faces several formidable obstacles that previous initiatives have failed to overcome. Both warring parties remain entrenched in the belief that they can achieve military victory. The army recently regained momentum, retaking Khartoum and parts of Kordofan, while the RSF maintains control over most of Darfur and has declared a parallel government.
The Quad's most immediate challenge is the lack of a direct commitment from the SAF and RSF, as both sides are still pursuing a military victory.
During the second day of the Washington Quad talks, heavy fighting erupted in El-Fashir, as the RSF launched major assaults using drones and artillery and claimed to have seized the Sudanese army's Sixth Infantry Division headquarters, although the SAF has not confirmed the city's full loss.
The escalation coincided with the Quad's indirect negotiations, underlining the tension between diplomatic engagement and military escalation. Quad members reportedly agreed to form a Joint Operational Committee to coordinate peace efforts, humanitarian access and the monitoring of external interference - though details suggest the committee is still in the formation phase, with implementation pending.
This development could have its ramifications on Sudan's peace and stability.
For any chance of success, the Quad must evolve from a narrow power-brokering alliance into a genuinely inclusive platform. This means formally integrating the AU and IGAD, engaging civil society and women's groups sidelined in elite negotiations, and pressuring all external backers to cease fuelling the war economy.
As one analysis notes, the Quad must convert public pledges into enforceable mechanics: impartial monitors with operational guarantees, independent interdiction of external supplies, and credible accountability commitments. Without this translation, another round of high-level diplomacy will leave Sudan buried under agreements that paper over conflict, rather than resolve it.
Islamist factions, however, are unlikely to welcome this prospect. Their professed support for the army seems less an endorsement of Sudan's legitimate military institution, than a calculated embrace of the war itself - a conflict they regard as their remaining path to reclaiming power.
The Quad represents the most significant diplomatic initiative on Sudan in more than a year, bringing together external powers with the greatest leverage over the warring parties. Its success or failure will likely determine whether Sudan descends further into fragmentation and famine, or begins the long journey towards recovery.
The coming days will reveal whether the Quad can translate its September roadmap into meaningful progress on the ground, or whether it will become the latest entry in Sudan's long chronology of failed peace initiatives.
The path to peace remains fragile, but not impossible. In the end, the Quad can only open the door; it is the Sudanese who must choose to walk through it - together.
The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Eye.