Parading China’s Nuclear Arsenal Out of the Shadows
Photo: SERGEY BOBYLEV/POOL/AFP/Getty Images
The world knows that China is modernizing and drastically expanding the size of its nuclear arsenal. But China has never admitted it—at least until yesterday.
On September 3, 2025, China held a parade to celebrate the 80th anniversary of its victory against Japan. For the past five years, China has been engaging in its largest nuclear buildup ever, more than doubling the size of its arsenal from 300 weapons in 2020 to an estimated 600 nuclear weapons in 2025. The U.S. Department of Defense estimates that China will have over 1,000 nuclear weapons by 2030. China’s Victory Day parade revealed five nuclear capabilities that can all reach the continental United States.
As part of this build-up, China constructed vast intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) silo fields in Western China to house nuclear weapons that can range to the continental United States. China has repeatedly denied this, spreading disinformation with bot networks that refuted the existence of these silo fields. These bots claimed that the silo fields were instead wind farms. China’s Victory Parade not only put these nuclear capabilities on full display for the first time but also gave some indications as to where they will fit in China’s strategic arsenal and doctrine.
China Drops Its First ALBM (and Nuclear Triad)
The air leg of China’s nuclear force has been a subject of speculation since its first nuclear test of an improvised nuclear device at the Lop Nur test site in 1964. A declassified National Intelligence Estimate from 1965, just one year after that inaugural test, noted that China has TU-16 bombers capable of “carrying a bulky nuclear weapon.” Despite this early assessment, China never fielded an air-delivered nuclear weapon for these bombers, leaving the existence of a true air leg in doubt for decades. It was not until 2019 that China publicly revealed the H-6N strategic bomber, capable of carrying an air-launched ballistic missile (ALBM), providing the first hint that China’s air leg was finally a reality.
The Victory Day parade was the first time China had publicly acknowledged and displayed a full nuclear triad. China’s ALBM is named JingLei-1 (JL-1), making it somewhat confusing as “JL” has long been the designation of the JuLang submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) series. The JL-1 ALBM is delivered on the H6-N nuclear-capable long-range strategic bomber.
Photo: VCG/VCG via Getty Images
On the sea leg, China displayed the JL-3 SLBM for the first time in public. The 2025 Department of Defense China Military Power Report notes that the JL-3 is an extended-range variant of the previously disclosed JL-2, with a possible range of over 5,400 nautical miles. This means that the JL-3 can reach the continental United States from the littoral waters of China. China’s six operational JIN-class ballistic missile submarines can carry up to 12 JL-2 and JL-2 SLBMs.
Photo: Zhang Lei/VCG via Getty Images
China’s land leg has always been the bedrock of Chinese nuclear deterrence, which was reinforced by the Victory Day parade. China has historically operated nuclear-armed road mobile intermediate-range and intercontinental-range ballistic missiles. These missiles are launched from transporter erector launcher (TEL) vehicles. At the military parade, China showcased three land-based ICBM capabilities: the DongFeng 61 (DF-61), the DongFeng 31BJ (DF-31BJ), and the DongFeng 5C (DF-5C).
Photo: Qilai Shen/Bloomberg via Getty Images
Very little is known about the DF-61. Images of the parade reveal that the DF-61 is a road-mobile ICBM launched from a 16-wheeled TEL. The DF-31 is a solid-fueled ICBM. The China Military Power Report previously noted that the DF-31 was a road mobile system. At the Victory Day Parade, the PRC showcased a new silo-based variant, the DF-31BJ. The DF-5C is a liquid-fueled ICBM capable of delivering heavy multi-megaton warheads against targets in the continental United States. The U.S. Department of Defense has previously acknowledged that other variants of the DF-5 are capable of carrying multiple nuclear warheads through a technology called multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles.
What is striking about these capabilities is that China only publicly displayed nuclear capabilities that can reach the continental United States. Notably, China did not reveal its shorter-range nuclear systems, such as the nuclear variant of the DongFeng-26 (DF-26), which may be an intermediate-range ballistic missile. Nor did it display the DF-27, which was tested in 2023 and is believed to have been deployed in 2024. China also highlighted several advanced conventional weapons systems, including the hypersonic DongFeng-17 (DF-17) medium-range ballistic missile and YingJi-21 (YJ-21) hypersonic anti-ship ballistic missile.
Xi’s Messages
China’s Victory Day parade sends several key messages to domestic and international audiences. Domestically, China has paved the way for public acknowledgement of its nuclear modernization by academics and strategists. For the past five years, China has largely shielded its domestic audience from the extent of its nuclear modernization. China has denied or obfuscated its modernization plans in domestic and international fora. By publicly acknowledging these capabilities, Chinese academics and thought leaders can now openly discuss the strategic implications of these capabilities without fear of retribution. This will allow for a more robust internal debate about China’s evolving nuclear doctrine, policies, deterrence strategy, and how these new systems fit into a geopolitical landscape.
Internationally, China’s display of ICBM-range nuclear capabilities could be read as a signal that its nuclear arsenal is intended to deter the United States from getting involved in a potential Taiwan conflict. Furthermore, the presence of Russian President Vladimir Putin and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un at the military parade sends a clear message that an axis of U.S. adversaries is forming, and that nuclear deterrence is a core component of that axis’s attempts to challenge the U.S.-led global order. The unveiling of several nuclear capabilities that can target the United States sends a clear signal to the United States that China’s nuclear arsenal is no longer a small, survivable force but instead a robust and diversified deterrent capable of holding the U.S. homeland at risk. The parade messaging was further refined by the capabilities that China chose not to display. By choosing not to include their shorter-range systems, such as the DF-27, China is sending a clear signal that its nuclear arsenal is intended to deter the United States from getting involved in a potential conflict in its region, such as over Taiwan. China wants to convey that the People’s Liberation Army can seize Taiwan using conventional means and does not want to resort to nuclear use.
The U.S. Is Losing the Arms Race
The most significant takeaway from China’s recent Victory Day parade is that China is expanding its strategic arsenal quantitatively and qualitatively. This mirrors a similar expansion of Russia’s strategic arsenal over the past decade, particularly in dual-capable intermediate-range systems. China’s parade is particularly notable as it suggests an intent to continue expanding- it showcased a lot of nuclear platforms for only a 600-warhead arsenal. China will likely have to restart fissile material production with its new fast breeder reactors in the coming years to continue to expand its weapons stockpile. If this is the start of an arms race, it is clearly starting in Moscow and Beijing.
Conversely, the United States is losing the nuclear arms race. The United States is just not embarking on a long-delayed nuclear modernization program and will have to replace and update all three legs of its nuclear triad simultaneously. Progress is going slowly for Washington because of delays, lack of funding, and lack of political prioritization, such as in the Sentinel program. While Washington is moving slowly, China and Russia are building up their arsenals at an astounding pace. This is no longer a theoretical competition—it is an active contest.
A direct comparison of the U.S. arsenal highlights this delivery system imbalance. The United States triad currently consists of a land-based ICBM (the Minuteman III), the sea-based SLBM (the Trident II), and two air-delivered weapons (the B-61 and the LRSO). In contrast, China just displayed five new nuclear weapons delivery systems for an arsenal of only 600 weapons. The United States still has significantly more nuclear weapons than China, but U.S. platforms lack diversification. Ultimately, the parade serves as a wake-up call and demonstrates that China is pulling its nuclear arsenal out of the shadows to challenge the foundations of U.S. strategic superiority.
In response to China’s military parade and the rapid expansion of its strategic arsenal, the United States should take two important steps. First and foremost, it should roll out a new nuclear strategy that reflects this strategic environment and the expansion of China’s nuclear arsenal. Numerous officials in the first Trump and Biden administrations pointed to the urgency of this mission. Additionally, the United States should keep the door open for arms control and risk reduction dialogues with China. The best option for avoiding an arms race would be for China to engage the United States in arms control similar to what the Soviet Union did in the 1970s as it expanded its ballistic missile capabilities. Thus far, Beijing has consistently rejected U.S. overtures. China has claimed that it could not engage in arms control because its arsenal was opaque. But the parade provides some new transparency and could provide an opportunity for pressure not only from Washington, but also from the wider international community to bring Beijing to the table. This parade presents a strategic challenge not only for the United States but also for the wider international community that wants to reduce risks of an arms race, escalation, and potential nuclear use.
Joseph Rodgers is deputy director and fellow with the Project on Nuclear Issues in the Defense and Security Department at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. Heather Williams is the director of the Project on Nuclear Issues and a senior fellow in the Defense and Security Department at CSIS.