When the Gaza ceasefire was reached a few weeks ago, it was met with much fanfare and relief from all sides. Celebrations broke out in the rubble-strewn streets of Gaza City, Israeli hostages and Palestinian prisoners returned to their families, and Donald Trump was lauded for his role in brokering the agreement. There was finally good news after two years of brutal war.
Critically, unlike the ceasefire reached back in January that Israel unilaterally abandoned, the latest truce was part of a comprehensive framework: U.S. President Donald Trump’s 20-point Gaza peace plan, which is largely based on former British Prime Minister Tony Blair’s work to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In addition to ending the fighting, the plan outlines a blueprint to transform the region, with its final points calling for a “credible pathway” to Palestinian self-determination, albeit in vague terms.
The plan is full of elements that are quite sensible. Phase 1, which has by and large been implemented, called for the cessation of fighting, the freeing of Israeli hostages and Palestinian prisoners, and the withdrawal of Israeli forces from parts of Gaza. While these achievements should indeed be celebrated, the subsequent phases of the plan—including the disarming of Hamas, reconstruction of Gaza and eventually Palestinian statehood—are far less likely to succeed.
For starters, even Phase 1 is proving challenging to maintain. Sporadic exchanges of fire have continued during the ceasefire, including a wave of Israeli airstrikes earlier this week that killed more than 100 people in a single day, as the two sides accuse each other violating the terms of the truce.
And last week, far-right lawmakers in Israel voted to advance a plan that would annex the West Bank. While the measure is unlikely to become law, it still provoked the Trump administration’s ire, with Vice President JD Vance labeling it “a very stupid political stunt.” Indeed, the Trump administration has found itself needing to stay in constant communication with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to ensure that he doesn’t sabotage the peace plan and resume a full-frontal assault on Gaza. This is in addition to sending U.S. troops and diplomats to oversee the implementation of the ceasefire.
This should not be surprising given the long history of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Prior to the two-year war that began with the Hamas-led attack in October 2023, Israel had fought a brief war only two years prior, in 2021, that left hundreds dead. Conflict mediation is hard precisely because it is needed in the hardest cases.
Even if the ceasefire does ultimately hold, there is a fundamental problem that could undermine the later phases of the peace plan: vagueness. The plan’s elements might sound fine on paper, but the details are very unclear. Who will serve on the “Board of Peace” that will administer Gaza on an interim basis, besides Trump and Blair, and how will it enforce the peace process? Who will serve on the “technocratic, apolitical Palestinian committee” that will be responsible for day-to-day operations and public service delivery, and how will it be able to carry out its work given the extensive devastation in the territory? How much development aid will be required and who will provide it? On that last point, Israel’s blockade has meant humanitarian aid has not been arriving at the necessary levels for most of the war.
If history is any guide, the signatories to Trump’s plan will likely lack the wherewithal to stay invested for the long haul.
The plan’s vagueness opens the door to what Natan Sachs of the Middle East Institute calls the “yes, but” problem, whereby the parties to the ceasefire deal nominally accept its provisions but add their own qualifications and stipulations that make it unworkable.
This leads directly to another reason that the Gaza peace plan may well never get past Phase 1: commitment problems. Even if the details can be hashed out, who or what will ensure that the sides follow through? If members of Hamas fully disarm, what is to guarantee that Israel won’t seek retribution, now or later? Who will ensure that aid is distributed, or that reconstruction efforts, which will be immense, will be adequately supported?
But commitment problems are not just about the warring parties: Ensuring the plan’s success will require the ongoing involvement of outside parties. As Stephen Walt wrote recently, “The agreement defers all the difficult political issues to some unspecified point in the future… To believe that this plan will succeed, therefore, one must believe that the outside world—and especially the United States—will maintain relentless pressure on Israel to maintain the current agreement”. If history is any guide, the signatories will likely lack the wherewithal to stay invested for the long haul.
Consider the plan’s call for a path to Palestinian statehood. That seems like a promise which is easy to make now, given that there is no functioning government in Gaza, but Netanyahu and most of Israel’s political establishment remain staunchly opposed to a Palestinian state. Even before getting to that point, there are many hurdles involved with making the Palestinian Authority—which currently only governs part of the West Bank and lacks credibility among most Palestinians—the governing entity in Gaza, as envisioned by the plan. Will external actors be willing to actually follow through on their promises when the going gets tough?
Or take the plan’s call for members of Hamas to lay down their arms. What will happen to those who remain committed to the group and its goal of destroying Israel? Will they remain numerous and influential enough to derail the efforts of those who do want to take a constructive path forward? This is why, as with other post-conflict transitions, it will be necessary to give all warring sides a stake in the peace—as difficult as that might be for the other side to accept.
Many Westerners and Israelis analogize the prospective disarmament of Hamas to the elimination of the Nazi party in Germany after World War II, but those circumstances were immensely different. The international community was united in the cause against Nazi Germany, their complete defeat discredited the party, its leader had killed himself rather than face capture and prosecution, and the country was occupied by thousands of allied troops following the war. Again, success requires lasting commitment by the international community.
Sadly, the fate of the Gaza peace plan could well mirror those of other recently celebrated but ultimately unsuccessful peace plans. Ethiopia ended its conflict with Eritrea in 2018, leading Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed to win the Nobel Peace Prize, but this deal led to new and even larger conflicts. More recently, Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo signed a peace agreement in June, but implementation has stalled. Indeed, Congo was one of the seven successes that Trump touted as a credential for a Nobel Peace Prize, but that observers have pointed out did not actually end the conflict.
All of these examples do not bode well for Gaza. The plan is comprehensive on paper, but in practice it will likely suffer the same ill fate as previous attempts to achieve lasting peace in the Middle East.
Paul Poast is an associate professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Chicago and a nonresident fellow at the Chicago Council on Global Affairs.