Globalist Apparat Sells "Forever War" in Desperate Bid to Take Edge Off Pokrovsk
The new marching orders have again come in from directive-central. The Euro-puppets once more chorus the same coordinated messaging—that the war will now last ‘indefinitely’ and Europe must prepare, and most ominously, that Russia may attack NATO at any moment.
Swedish prime minister Ulf Kristersson kicked things off:
“I firmly believe that Sweden, Estonia, and the entire EU must prepare for Russia’s long-term isolation. This war will not end anything,” said Swedish Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson.
Followed by “Tutti Frutti” Rutte, who again invoked that “long term” confrontation eidolon:
It was followed up by Rutte’s predecessor hacking up the same phlegm of talking points about a ‘forever war’ which, as it so happens, can only be stopped by…funding more war for Ukraine:
In fact, a foggy-looking Fogh was trotted out for a whole press tour of pushing war against Russia. Here he was seen urging for the immediate deployment of NATO troops “behind the frontline” in Ukraine.
“[The Coalition of the Willing] should deploy troops immediately.”
Anders Fogh Rasmussen, Secretary General of NATO from 2009 to 2014, says European troops should be deployed in Ukraine.
The desperate new call-to-arms was finished up by a slew of articles pointing to an alleged imminent Russian attack against NATO—because, you know, a nation mired in a catastrophic “forever war” in Ukraine will logically only want to mire itself even deeper by attacking history’s “most powerful” military alliance directly:
And of course, the entire panicked spectacle has once more been activated for one reason only: the Ukrainian Armed Forces is facing one of its most disastrous PR-related collapses of the entire war, and even Western rags are forced to concede:
These articles brandishing a “major new conquest” or defeat for Ukraine fly directly in the face of phony propaganda meant to lull the public into believing Russia’s “incremental” and “miniscule” advances were insignificant.
Other new Western press releases weave a harrowing tale of Ukraine’s losses in Pokrovsk, which likewise runs counter to claims it is Russia bearing the brunt of the casualties. Canadian CBC outlet quotes a Ukrainian commander in saying that 75% of his men have died in the past month alone:
He goes on to give statistics for how many “passed through” since the start of the city’s siege:
“I’ve been a commander for seven months now,” said Vova. “In that time, about 2,000 guys have passed through my unit. Three-quarters of them are no longer here. It’s only because they have given their lives that we are sitting here now, instead of the Russians.”
It’s no wonder such messages are now appearing on Ukrainian channels:
Even the EuroMaidan press had to admit that the Blackhawk stunt in Pokrovsk was meant to cover the retreats of “decimated” Ukrainian brigades:
The other interesting aspect from the CBC article is the description of the fighting which chimes with what I recently wrote about in the paid piece, this new reality of war we’re seeing.
But Russian soldiers, alone or in pairs, are also walking the streets after sneaking through Ukrainian lines — part of the new reality in a battlefield that is nearly unrecognizable from the more conventional war it resembled two years ago.
‘Nothing resembling a front line anymore’
The article describes Russian troops who “slipped past” Ukrainian defenses in the Dobropillya sector simply “walking around” the city freely.
At the same time, we had this fascinating new description of fighting in Pokrovsk from top Ukrainian analyst Myroshnykov, which further underscores the above:
Hellish swings continue in Pokrovsk.
The city is de facto controlled neither by the enemy nor by us.
Fighting is going on over one huge gray zone.
We have logistics, and so does the enemy. But it depends on specific positions.
Overall, the enemy currently has more than a dozen positions that are surrounded. I won’t comment on the number of our positions in the same state, but there are fewer.
And I am only considering positions where there is a group of more than 3-4 fighters.
I do not count private and apartment buildings where 1-2 occupiers or 1-2 of our infantrymen are holed up.
Because that is everywhere.
In general, the entire area north of the railway is the hardest for the enemy. They are cut off from logistics there, and our fighters are gradually pressing in.
South of the railway, it is harder for our Defenders. But here it is worth noting the very good work of the Air Assault Forces, Special Operations Forces, and assault units, which constantly make corridors and press the occupiers from the flanks.
Pokrovsk in meaning may become the second Bakhmut. But in essence—definitely not.
There was no controlled chaos from both sides in Bakhmut. In Pokrovsk—there is.
The only thing is that in such conditions there is a high risk of friendly fire. And the enemy, moreover, does not hesitate to disguise themselves in civilian clothes or in the Armed Forces uniform.
And considering that there are still about a thousand civilians (if not more) left in Pokrovsk, this further complicates the work of the Defense Forces.
Either way, renowned AFU expert Serhiy “Flash” Beskrestnov reports that a decision has allegedly been made to hold Pokrovsk at all costs because the city’s fall would open up a vast stretch of flatlands for Russia to easily circumvent toward Pavlograd and beyond:
Arestovich—whose high intelligence, though not duplicity, I admire—just explained this very thing in his latest interview; listen closely:
So, where does Pokrovsk stand now?
Latest word is reportedly that the cauldron has been shut—though no one knows quite for certain if that’s true yet:
If this is the case, it would make only the second fully shut cauldron of the war, after Mariupol—and that city doesn’t even count as the AFU had their backs to the natural obstacle of the sea. No one knows quite how many Ukrainians remain in Mirnograd, but some estimate anywhere between 300-1000, though the Russian MOD still maintains that ~10,000 total troops are “surrounded” in both Pokrovsk and Kupyansk combined.
The assault on Mirnograd will begin when the militants from the northern districts of Pokrovsk are finally pushed out by Russian Forces.
The Ukrainian Armed Forces have nowhere to run except to Mirnograd.
After that, the ring will be closed, and the Ukrainian soldiers, whom Zelensky has categorically forbidden to retreat, will have to surrender en masse to survive.
The chance to escape the encirclement is completely lost.
A very smart analysis from a Russian source on the overlooked significance of the Pokrovsk battle’s culmination:
The battle for Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad has far more political than military significance. An important reason for the collapse of Russian-American negotiations on resolving the conflict in Ukraine was Zelensky and his European allies’ ability to convince the Trump administration that the Russian army was exhausted and no longer capable of conducting successful offensive operations. Eventually, Washington seriously believed this and hardened its position, refusing to compromise with Moscow.
The crisis of Ukrainian defense in the Pokrovsko-Mirnograd agglomeration and in Kupyansk, alongside growing problems near Konstantinovka, Lyman, Seversk, and Guliaipole, indicates exactly the opposite. The Ukrainian armed forces are barely holding the front, and a full encirclement near Pokrovsk is quite possible, something that has not happened since Mariupol.
But the real catastrophe for Ukraine’s political leadership will not be a military defeat, but a political one: the image of successfully containing the Russian offensive is falling apart, which could significantly influence the Trump administration and force it to reconsider its approaches to the war in Ukraine (by the way, the failures of the Ukrainian Armed Forces will not impress the Europeans; Brussels bureaucracy and some Euro-leaders will provide Kyiv with feasible support under any circumstances).
Moreover, the events near Pokrovsk and Mirnograd may also crack the existing informational illusion of victory in Ukraine. This is why it is important for the Russian army not only to win the battle but also to create the necessary media framing for the victory. This did not happen in Mariupol: the leadership of the “Azov” regiment was exchanged, and in the end, Kyiv even presented everything that happened as its own success. However, much has changed since then, and most likely, things will be different in Pokrovsk.
Nevertheless, Kiev will still try to create a “picture of success” and, due to objective difficulties in the land front, will rely on air warfare and sabotage activities. We just need to be prepared for this. The drug of “victory” injected into the mass consciousness of Ukrainians is gradually ceasing to work. And it will be followed by the inevitable and rapid acceptance of reality.
As an addendum, Ukrainian People’s Deputy Maryana Bezugla describes how it was that Russian tactics led to the capture of Pokrovsk:
The most impressive advances again came on the Yanchur river line in the Gulyaipole direction. Russian forces finally crashed the Yanchur river in full, taking virtually everything on it western bank and pushing across the plains there:
A closer view shows Uspenovka—and its surrounding area—in particular being taken:
Report:
⚡️⚡️⚡️WARRIORS OF THE “VOSTOK” TROOP GROUP HAVE LIBERATED THE SETTLEMENT OF USPENOVKA IN ZAPORIZHZHIA REGION
Warriors of the 218th Guards Tank Regiment of the 127th Division of the 5th Army of the “Vostok” troop group have completed the battle to liberate Uspenovka - the largest fortified defense point of the Armed Forces of Ukraine on the left bank of the Yanchur River!!!
🔸As a result of heavy fighting, more than 7 square kilometers came under the control of the Primorye troops. More than 1110 buildings were cleared, up to two companies of Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel from the 110th Mechanized Brigade, 7 armored combat vehicles, and 42 units of automotive equipment were destroyed. The northeastern part of the settlement was covered by a natural barrier in the form of the Yanchur River, which seriously complicated the task for the advancing units of the “Vostok” troop group. Despite this, the task was heroically accomplished by the warriors from Primorye.
Uspenovka is the second largest settlement in the Huliaipole district and the largest on the Uspenovka bridgehead, stretching along the river for more than 5.3 km in length and up to 1.5 km in width.
🔸The “Vostok” troop group continues its advance westward, liberating the Zaporizhzhia and Dnipropetrovsk regions.
❗️Congratulations to the Primorye troops of the 218th Guards Tank Regiment on their victory in this tough battle!
‼️🇷🇺 Fighters of the 218th Tank Regiment unfurled flags in the center of Uspenovka, Zaporizhzhia region
▪️The video was recorded at the memorial to the liberator soldiers in the center of the settlement.
▪️ Over the past week, units of the “Vostok” troop group continued to advance deep into the enemy’s defense and completed the liberation of the settlement of Uspenovka in the Zaporizhzhia region, the Ministry of Defense reported in its summary.
▪️Defense Minister A. Belousov congratulated the command and personnel of the 218th Guards Tank Regiment on the successful liberation of the settlement from the enemy.
RVvoenkor
Lastly, the Kupyansk sector again saw heavy advances as Russian forces tore down from the north on the eastern bank, capturing a large swath of it:
As can be seen very little of the city remains to be captured.
The biggest job that remains is to close this cauldron and push the AFU entirely out of the eastern side of the Oskol river once and for all:
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As we write, a massive Kinzhal and Iskander attack has again struck Ukrainian power centers:
Tonight a massive strike with “Kinzhal” missiles was carried out.
Targets hit:
Ukrainian Armed Forces military airfield in Vasylkiv (Kyiv region).
Antonov airfield in Hostomel (Kyiv region).
Zmiivska Thermal Power Plant.
Kremenchuk Hydroelectric Power Plant.
Prydniprovska Thermal Power Plant.
Tavriyska Thermal Power Plant.
The strike is currently continuing with cruise missiles and Geraniums.
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Update on the state of Ukraine’s war production:
Ukrainian Speaker Romanenko said yesterday that all the factories in Ukraine that were capable of producing missiles have been destroyed or are in a state of disrepair.
For example, the Luch Design Bureau produced cruise missiles: “You know what happened to the metro station, don’t you? I won’t tell you where it is, but everyone knows.” All the factories and plants that could produce ballistic missiles have been completely destroyed. This includes Dnepropetrovsk and Pavlograd, where missiles and engines were produced. Everything is being destroyed, even the ruins.
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And an update on the energy situation:
Director of the Research Center Energy Kharchenko urges Kiev residents to prepare for evacuation from the city if electricity is cut off for more than 3 days in winter. If the CHP is turned off, then with an average daily temperature of minus 10°C and below - there are no prospects for the restoration of the heating system.
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November 7th was an anniversary that passed quietly: it was the famed October revolution, or Red October—which actually happened on November 7th; the October date was using Russia’s old style Julian calendar. Here’s a powerful and thought-provoking reflection on the occasion from a Russian source:
November 7th is a date no longer celebrated in Russia, but one that cannot be forgotten either. The October Revolution created a country that still defines Russia’s global positioning. The paradox is that modern Russia lives on the reputational capital of the USSR, but is unwilling to acknowledge this due to the unresolved trauma of the 1980s.
Russia’s significant partners in the world—from Beijing to Caracas, from Pyongyang to Luanda—are a Soviet legacy. Ties were built over decades on the basis of anti-imperialist solidarity and genuine partnership in industrialization. Kim, Xi, Ortega, and Lula work with Moscow not because they are inspired by “traditional values,” but because they remember the Soviet alternative to American hegemony.
Today, official ideology speaks of “conservative values” and “spirituality,” which are exported to a very limited extent and, by and large, have been appropriated by those who are not our friends. A modern secular state cannot become “holier than the Pope” or a Midwestern Protestant pastor.
Russia’s real model is a functioning Soviet-style welfare state. Free healthcare and education, a pension system, maternity capital—the entire social infrastructure is not just preserved, but is being developed. Life expectancy has increased from 65 to 73 years, infant mortality has fallen dramatically, and Moscow is building “the best free healthcare system in the world”—but it attributes this to “effective management” rather than the development of Soviet principles of universal access.
The elites prefer to talk about the “bankruptcy of the Soviet project” while simultaneously investing in Soviet social infrastructure. This is a dichotomy at the level of state ideology: within the country, the Soviet legacy is rebranded as “tradition,” while abroad, we eagerly embrace the Soviet “credit of trust.” To acknowledge the effectiveness of the Soviet model, even in some way, is to return to the traumatic state when it seemed the West had won decisively.
The result: a country with a functioning welfare state model, with a real alternative to the neoliberal dismantling of the welfare state, neither articulates nor “sells” this model.
The crisis of self-evidentness manifests itself in the constant question at all levels: “Why are we doing this?” In the Soviet project, this question was impossible—the answer was embedded in the system of meanings, from school political information to the Politburo. Aid to Angola was a logical continuation of the struggle for the liberation of the oppressed, for global justice.
“Resistance to the West” is not an end, but a means. For the sake of a “more just world”? Okay, but where did this desire for justice come from? To be honest, it was 1917, the Bolsheviks, and 70 years of Soviet history. It was the Soviet period that created the logic of global solidarity with the oppressed.
But acknowledging the Soviet origins of this meaning is impossible, so we have to talk about a “millennial tradition.” Thus, the essentially Soviet style received a new packaging that didn’t entirely suit it. Explanations became phantom, like the pain of a missing tooth. A nagging “why?”
As a result, the external representation functions like an empty box with Soviet labeling—there’s no content, but the capital of recognition holds the entire structure together.
November 7th recalls the revolution that gave Russia global ideological subjectivity. The Empire was a superpower, but the real alternative history to other projects was still the USSR. Modern Russia can neither reject this legacy nor appropriate it. This is the price of trauma—the difficulty in understanding and, consequently, in packaging into a product what exactly works and why it matters to the world.
PS. The USSR created its own internal Orientalism: party leaders of the “national republics” were expected to adopt a distinctive style—exaggerated praise of Moscow, oaths of allegiance, emotional intensity, the artificial flourishes of Leonid Solovyov’s books about Hodja Nasreddin, uncharacteristic of living languages.
Today’s Central Asian leaders are reproducing the same model with Trump that their predecessors used with Brezhnev. Even the language remains the same—yesterday at the White House, most participants sang Trump’s praises in Russian.
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At the same time, tomorrow Russia begins an interesting exhibition on the Red Square called “The City of Living Stories”:
Starting tomorrow and until November 9, Red Square will present “The City of Living Stories,” dedicated to the 84th anniversary of the legendary 1941 military parade.
They, at least, do not change history: they recall it!