The sanctions exemption was extended as a quid pro quo for Hungary incorporating itself into Poland’s US-backed regional integration plans, which necessitates gradually ditching Russian energy.
Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban posted on X that “We secured full, unlimited exemption from sanctions on the TurkStream and Druzhba pipelines, guaranteeing uninterrupted and affordable supply” after meeting with his close friend Trump on Friday. A White House official later told CNN that the exemption is actually only for one year. Many might believe that it’s simply a favor from Trump to Orban to help the latter ahead of April’s next parliamentary elections, but there’s arguably a lot more to it.
For starters, the State Department’s press release noted that Hungary will buy $600 million in US LNG, agreed to supplement Russian nuclear fuel for the Paks I NPP with American in a ~$114 million deal, and signed an MOU to explore building up to 10 Small Modular Reactors with the US worth up to $20 billion. This goes far beyond whatever personal interest Trump might have in Orban’s political future and truly amounts to their relations “reaching new heights” like the press release was headlined.
It’s the confirmed LNG dimension of this apparent quid pro quo and unofficial White House claim of Hungary’s sanctions exemption only lasting a year which hint at larger geostrategic plans. It was assessed here late last month that the EU’s ban on Russian gas imports, which will enter into force on 1 January 2028 for members like Hungary with long-term contracts, will be to Poland’s gain. The rationale is that it can facilitate the flow of US LNG to nearby countries as part of its plans to revive its Great Power status.
Reuters later reported during President Karol Nawrocki’s trip to Slovakia right before Orban’s meeting with Trump that “Poland in talks to import more LNG from U.S. to supply Ukraine, Slovakia”. This could prospectively expand to include Czechia and Hungary, which comprise the other half of the Visegrad Group alongside Poland and Slovakia. On that topic, Nawrocki will soon visit Czechia and finally Hungary, the latter on 3 December for the next Visegrad Summit. He’ll likely discuss energy geopolitics there.
For the time being, Hungary can only receive US LNG from neighboring Croatia’s Krk terminal, but plugging it into Poland’s envisaged pipeline network might be the US’ ultimate goal. It supports the revival of Poland’s Great Power status both in general and especially in the energy sense of having it serve as a regional hub for US LNG. This wouldn’t just concern the Visegrad Group, but also Ukraine as was earlier mentioned and possibly other countries connected to the Polish-led “Three Seas Initiative”.
Poland is the perfect country from the US’ perspective to lead Central Europe after the Ukrainian Conflict ends. It’s the most populous of the EU’s formerly communist members by far, its economy just passed the $1 trillion mark, the regional GDP per capita is catching up to the UK’s, it has NATO’s third-largest army, and it has a history of regional leadership. Poland has also consistently regarded the US as its top ally. These factors make it likely that Trump wants Orban to hitch Hungary’s wagon to Poland’s.
Therefore, he might have given him the (conditionally renewable?) sanctions exemption in exchange for Hungary incorporating itself into Poland’s US-backed regional integration plans, which necessitates gradually ditching Russian energy. Had the exemption not been given, then Orban’s party would stand a greater chance of losing April’s elections, thus possibly leading to his replacement with rival Tisza’s Peter Magyar, who might instead opt out of this plan in order to protect his Germany ally’sregional hegemony.