Iraq’s 2025 Elections
Summary: in Iraq’s fragmented political landscape vote buying, cynicism and opportunism jostle with cautious hope as voters go to the polls today to elect a new parliament.
We thank Renad Mansour for today’s newsletter a shortened version of an analysis he wrote for Chatham House where he is Senior Research Fellow with the Middle East and North Africa Programme and Director of the Iraq Initiative. Renad is a regular contributor to the Arab Digest podcast and newsletter. His latest podcast Iraq: challenges and opportunities is available here and you will find the full version of his Chatham House report here.
Iraq’s parliamentary elections, happening today, arrive at a critical juncture in the country’s fragile newfound stability. However, beyond the campaign posters displayed across the country, the election will not feature widespread public participation or serve as a referendum on Iraq’s political system. Instead, it offers a chance for the country’s political elites to renegotiate their control over the nation’s wealth, influence, and legitimacy.
![]()
Iraq's 2025 elections will see 31 alliances, 38 political parties, and 75 independent candidates compete for office
With the winners of the last election, the Sadrist Movement, boycotting this time, the landscape is mainly shaped by actors within the Shia Coordination Framework (SCF) – including the State of Law, Sadiqoon (linked to Asaib Ahl al-Haq), and the Badr Organisation. Alongside them are the two major Kurdish parties, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), as well as three main Sunni blocs: Taqadum, Siyada, and Azm. Together, these forces dominate Iraq’s fragmented political landscape, treating the upcoming vote as a strategic prelude to the post-election bargaining that will determine the next government’s composition. In Iraq’s political system, where no single faction can govern alone, each parliamentary seat serves as a lever, or a bargaining chip, that can be traded for ministries, contracts, and senior appointments.
The political stakes in Iraqi elections are therefore significant. Influence over ministries translates directly into access to Iraq’s vast oil revenues, lucrative procurement deals, and public-sector jobs. Elections, far from being ideological contests or policy debates, have become investment opportunities for influence. Large sums are circulating through campaign operations, patronage networks, and informal mechanisms of voter manipulation, from the buying and selling of voter cards to the diversion of public funds for political ends. In this environment, political money is not merely an electoral resource but a central pillar of Iraq’s governance model: it sustains loyalty, underwrites local patronage systems, and secures parliamentary seats that can later be exchanged for positions of power in the senior civil service.
This dynamic explains why, despite widespread public apathy, Iraq’s political class is approaching the 2025 elections with intensity. For most citizens, elections have long ceased to represent meaningful change. For the elite, however, they are a carefully regulated contest for control over the instruments of the state. It is this paradox that defines Iraq’s political order today: elections reinforce a fragile equilibrium, where rival factions compete ferociously within boundaries they all ultimately agree to preserve.
![]()
Turnout in Iraq’s previous parliamentary elections [source: International IDEA; IFES]
Yet this equilibrium is inherently brittle. Parliamentary seats are only one form of leverage; others are found in the threat or actual use of violence. The last government formation process illustrated this clearly. As negotiations stalled, armed factions resorted to street mobilisation, protests, and even drone attacks to secure their share of influence. Violence, in this sense, operates as another bargaining tool within Iraq’s political economy. The system endures because all major players have more to lose from its collapse than from its continuation.
The deeper problem, however, lies in the steady erosion of popular legitimacy. Each election cycle has seen declining voter turnout, especially among younger Iraqis who feel excluded from the state’s patronage-driven politics. For them, elections merely reproduce the same faces, the same compromises, and the same distribution of spoils. This time, without the Sadrists’ participation, large segments of Iraq’s Shia urban poor will remain outside the electoral process. Should the SCF and its allies overreach in consolidating power, they risk provoking a backlash that could fracture the post-election equilibrium and reignite widespread anger.
In short, the 2025 elections matter profoundly to those inside the system and almost not at all to those outside it. They will not redefine Iraq’s political order, but they will determine which networks dominate its machinery for the next four years. Every ministry, directorship, and public contract will be shaped by the electoral arithmetic that emerges from this vote.
Still, the elections come at a time of unusual calm for Iraq. Unlike many of its neighbours – Iran, Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, and Palestine – Iraq is not currently mired in war, mass protest, or regional confrontation. The government under Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani has emphasised inward-looking development, service delivery, and cautious diplomatic hedging. This inward focus, coupled with stable oil revenues and reduced foreign interference, has produced a rare moment of equilibrium. Iraq’s ruling elite, for all their rivalries, share an interest in preserving this managed stability.
If the elections proceed smoothly and the post-vote negotiations yield another broad-based coalition, Iraq will likely enter another cycle of controlled competition within the system. But if the results are contested, or if one faction seeks to dominate beyond what others consider acceptable, even a temporary disruption could unsettle the delicate balance that underpins Iraq’s current stability. The stakes, then, are paradoxically high for an election that promises little change.
Members can leave comments about this newsletter on the Arab Digest website.