U.S.-Israeli Relations Are Undergoing a Profound Shift
By Amb. Daniel C. Kurtzer and Aaron David Miller
Trump has leverage over Netanyahu, and unlike his predecessors, he is not afraid to use it.
Published on November 13, 2025
Two unprecedented, quite extraordinary developments suggest that U.S.-Israeli relations are undergoing a fundamental and potentially irreversible change.
First, U.S. President Donald Trump’s recent pressure on Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to accept his twenty-point plan has made clear that the U.S. president, not the Israeli prime minister, is determining the scope and depth of the bilateral relationship for the foreseeable future. It also indicates the president’s ability and willingness to deploy U.S. leverage, which exploits Netanyahu’s increasing dependence on Trump’s support for his reelection prospects. So far, the American president is getting his way with Netanyahu.
Second, overreach in pursuing Israeli military objectives in Gaza and Israel’s annexation policies in the West Bank have created fissures within the traditionally supportive pro-Israel American community that might not heal easily. The implications of these changes are significant, and they may outlast Netanyahu—especially if, as expected in the wake of the October 7 attacks, Israeli politics continues to shift rightward.
U.S. presidents have played Israeli politics before with mixed success. The two of us had ringside seats when President George H.W. Bush denied then-Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir billions in loan guarantees and then provided them to Shamir’s successor, Yitzhak Rabin. Several years later, President Bill Clinton hosted Prime Minister Shimon Peres at the White House just two months before the election contest with Netanyahu. The visit did not help, as Peres lost the election.
But none of this even begins to rival Trump’s recent interventions in support of Netanyahu. Twice in as many months, Trump has all but called for the Israeli legal system to cancel Netanyahu’s trial and drop the corruption charges against him. During his visit to the region to conclude the Gaza ceasefire, Trump interrupted his prepared speech in the Israeli Knesset to call on Israeli President Isaac Herzog to pardon Netanyahu. More recently, Trump told an interviewer that he might try to help Netanyahu deal with his legal problems. And Trump has now sent a formal letter to Herzog asking that Netanyahu be pardoned, calling the charges “a political, unjustified prosecution.”
Trump is placing a large bet on Netanyahu, a troublesome ally with whom Trump sparred at the end of his first term. Trump is far more popular than Netanyahu in Israel, and his ability to bring about the Gaza ceasefire and the return of the hostages increased that popularity exponentially. Nearly half of Israelis believe that the United States has greater influence on their country’s security decisions than their own government, according to a poll released by the Israel Democracy Institute on Tuesday.
As a result, Trump’s interventions on behalf of Netanyahu—even if some of the rhetoric has no immediate practical effect—should not be dismissed as frivolous or inconsequential. With Israeli elections looming next year, Trump’s support for Netanyahu could prove to be the Israeli equivalent of the “October surprise” that persuades a skeptical Israeli electorate that they should vote Netanyahu back into office if for no other reason than to retain the support of a very popular U.S. president.
The point is Trump has leverage over Netanyahu, and unlike his predecessors, he is not afraid to use it. So whether Trump will be prepared to press Netanyahu even more in pursuit of phase two of the twenty-point plan—a regional peace initiative that will involve extremely hard decisions for Netanyahu and his coalition related to the Palestinians and Israel’s control over the West Bank—is an open question.
The other change underway relates to the level and constancy of the American public’s support for Israel. Netanyahu’s pursuit of “destroying” Hamas has begun to undermine the previously untouchable support of the United States for almost anything Israel has chosen to do. The unprecedented level of support that former President Joe Biden delivered to Israel during the war was not enough for Netanyahu, who criticized Biden and all but endorsed Trump. Although the national electoral impact of Netanyahu’s endorsement did not materially alter the approximately 70 percent support that American Jews gave to the Democrats in the 2024 election, anger over Gaza and American policy contributed to Trump’s squeaking out electoral victories in several critical swing states.
Today, votes in Congress on arms sales to Israel are no longer slam dunks. A growing number of Democratic legislators and even some Republicans are voting against more military aid. At a minimum, some unhappy Democrats want to see strict guidelines on the utilization of American arms. The pictures of vast destruction of housing and infrastructure in Gaza, and the videos of Palestinians families wandering back and forth under Israeli instructions in search of food and shelter, have become too much for many traditional Israel supporters in Congress and in the public at large.
Both the short- and long-term implications of these two developments are impressive. Phase one of the Gaza ceasefire is holding, albeit shakily, and maintaining the ceasefire will require very active U.S. diplomacy, including from Trump himself. Although Trump has given Netanyahu the go-ahead to respond to new Hamas attacks, he undoubtedly will handcuff Netanyahu’s ability to proactively move against Hamas as it tries to reconstitute its political power in Gaza. Netanyahu wants to see both requirements on Hamas—disarmament and removal from power—implemented before Israel undertakes any further withdrawals. But Trump might find it necessary to allow Hamas some political breathing space if phase one of the ceasefire is to lead to a phase two. The United States, through its newly created Civil-Military Coordination Center in Israel, has also taken over the facilitation of humanitarian assistance to Gaza from the Israelis.
One unexpected development in this scenario is the decision by the administration to put forth an ambitious United Nations Security Council resolution to authorize the multinational stabilization force—defined as an enforcement force, not as peacekeepers—and a governance role for at least two years. Israel has never wanted the UN Security Council involved in its national policy, and the United States has almost always deferred to Israeli wishes. This time may be different, though even with a UN mandate, composing such a force from Arab and Muslim states—especially while Hamas remains armed and Israel maintains the right to respond to Hamas provocations—will be challenging. One early test of Trump’s ability to get the stabilization force off the ground involves Türkiye: Israel seems adamant about keeping Türkiye out, while Trump is enamored with President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who has influence with Hamas.
What this all means in practice is that Trump is calling many of the shots on issues related to Israel, defining the trajectory of U.S.-Israeli relations. Unlike either Clinton or Biden, Trump has an instrumental approach to Israel, and he is not constrained by deep emotional attachment to Israel. He also faces fewer political constraints, given the degree of his control over the Republican Party.
Netanyahu’s disdain for the Democrats is also a factor among Israel’s American Jewish supporters—recall his going around then president Barack Obama in 2015 to address Congress to oppose the Iran nuclear deal. Netanyahu built his political career on the belief that he knew how to deal with Washington. Today, however, his own actions and policies—in particular the extreme Cabinet that he is now burdened with—have created a situation where he is a supplicant and an object of Trump’s political and diplomatic whims.
Netanyahu is learning that abandoning the Democrats and bipartisanship and throwing in his lot with a mercurial president may exact a substantial price in Israeli freedom of action. Netanyahu needs Trump’s support to win the next election. He needed Trump to achieve success in the twelve-day war against Iran. The question is whether Netanyahu can continue to defer to Trump when the second phase of the peace deal materializes.
Everything in life comes with a price, and that goes for foreign policy as well. The Trump-Netanyahu minuet dances along for the moment, but at some point, Israel’s account will come due. It will surely involve curbs on its freedom of action in Gaza and possible elsewhere. And it will come with reduced support among American Jews for an Israeli policy that runs counter to important U.S. values and interests. For now, Netanyahu may feel secure, but the bill has not yet been delivered.