On October 31, newly elected Japanese prime minister Sanae Takaichi (in office for only 10 days) had a relatively cordial meeting with Chinese president Xi Jinping on the margins of the APEC summit in South Korea. While both leaders raised longstanding bilateral concerns, they reaffirmed their determination to build a cooperative, stable, and mutually beneficial relationship between the two countries.
But the relationship began to spiral into a crisis a week later, when Takaichi, responding to questions in the Japanese Diet on November 7, said that a military conflict over Taiwan would likely constitute a “situation threatening Japan’s survival” and might prompt a Japanese military response. Beijing’s reaction has been apoplectic.
The following day, the Chinese Consul General in Osaka, Japan, posted an online message—since deleted—that has been translated as: “A filthy head that barges in without hesitation can only be cut off without a moment’s hesitation. Are you ready for that?” This was widely portrayed as a threat to decapitate Takaichi. The Chinese Foreign Ministry has since demanded that Takaichi retract her statements and “stop playing with fire on the Taiwan question” because “those who play with fire will perish by it.”
Many commentators have readily characterized all this as a typically unreasonable Chinese overreaction to a relatively benign—even if ill-advised—Japanese statement. But the shadow of much history looms over this episode. The Japanese Empire seized Taiwan from China as a war prize in 1895, and later invaded and waged an especially brutal war against China from 1937 to 1945. Chinese Foreign Ministry statements have compared Takaichi’s “survival-threating situation” to the rationale Imperial Japan used to justify the invasion.
Beijing has also invoked the 1943 Cairo Declaration and 1945 Potsdam Declaration—issued by Franklin Roosevelt, Winston Churchill, and then-Chinese leader Chiang Kai-shek—which declared that, at the end of World War II, “all the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese…shall be restored to the Republic of China.” Supporters of Taiwan have countered that the Communist People’s Republic of China (PRC) was not a signatory to those declarations (because it did not yet exist), and that sovereignty over Taiwan in any event was never formally transferred to another country—that process having been interrupted by the Korean War.
Yet, these arguments are legalistic and unpersuasive because it was clearly understood at the time that Taiwan would revert to “China” (under whatever regime). It has been clearly understood since then that, although Taiwan’s international legal status arguably remains “undetermined,” its sovereignty obviously has been exercised by the “Republic of China.”
More importantly, when Japan established diplomatic relations with the PRC in 1972, Tokyo affirmed that it recognized Beijing as “the sole legal government of China,” and added that Japan “fully understands and respects” Beijing’s position that “Taiwan is an inalienable part of the territory of the PRC.” This went further than Washington did when it established diplomatic relations with the PRC in 1979: whereas Tokyo “fully understands and respects” the PRC position that Taiwan is part of China, Washington simply “acknowledged” it. According to the Chinese readout of Takaichi’s meeting with Xi on October 31, the Japanese prime minister said Tokyo would “abide by its position stated in the 1972 Japan-China joint statement.”
This is why Beijing has reacted so vociferously to Takaichi’s statements in the Diet, which imply that Japan would consider the use of military force to prevent China from reclaiming Taiwan. Takaichi has thus gone further than former Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe—one of her mentors—who said (only after leaving office) that a “Taiwan emergency” would be an emergency for Japan, but never specified that Tokyo would respond with military force. Abe basically retained what is referred to in Washington as “strategic ambiguity,” whereas Takaichi crossed that line.
Of course, Chinese diplomats have also fueled the fire with their belligerent responses, no doubt inspired by the history noted above of Japanese military assaults on Chinese sovereignty and territorial integrity. The apparent threat to behead Takaichi by the Chinese Consul General in Osaka was probably a warning of harsh punishment if Japan violates Chinese sovereignty claims by interfering militarily in the Taiwan issue, rather than intended to suggest the assassination of Takaichi. He most likely was trying to invoke historical images of summary beheadings of Chinese citizens by Japanese soldiers during the Sino-Japanese War. It was inflammatory propaganda—but the historical record is there for Beijing to exploit.
It remains to be seen how and how soon this bilateral crisis will be resolved. Given the relevant historical backdrop, it will not be defused by denying any validity to Beijing’s position. Takaichi has crossed a red line, and Beijing is unlikely to give her any leeway, probably judging that a new Japanese prime minister must be made to understand Beijing’s bottom line on the Taiwan issue.
Takaichi’s statements in the Diet are comparable to former President Joe Biden’s similar off-the-cuff remarks implying that the United States would defend Taiwan. On each occasion, the Biden administration clarified that his remarks did not reflect any change in Washington’s “one China policy.” Takaichi reportedly has affirmed that there has been no change in Japanese policy and acknowledged that she should not have addressed hypothetical scenarios. But she is almost certainly politically constrained from acceding to Beijing’s demand that she retract her statements, given the strong public reaction in Japan to the incendiary Chinese response.
And Beijing is unlikely to be as restrained with Takaichi as it was in response to Biden’s apparent violations of “strategic ambiguity,” because Biden was more of a known quantity to Chinese leaders. Washington has greater leverage with which to resist Chinese pressure, and the vivid history of the Sino-Japanese War is not present in the US case.
Tokyo and Beijing need to find an off-ramp. Neither side’s interests are served by a prolonged renewal of Sino-Japanese tensions, especially over Taiwan. Beijing has long sought to identify and exploit fault lines within the US-Japan alliance. Still, this episode will likely be counterproductive to that aim by reinforcing the perceived need for the alliance and the shared interests of Tokyo and Washington in Taiwan’s security. Chinese leaders may hope to undermine Takaichi’s domestic support and lead to her replacement as prime minister, but that too could have the opposite effect. And Beijing’s obnoxious diplomacy risks both reinforcing its image as a regional bully and eroding international sympathy for its historical victimization by Japan.
But the ball is in Takaichi’s court. She sent a senior Japanese diplomat to Beijing to de-escalate the situation, but to no avail. She may ultimately need to clarify Tokyo’s “one China” policy beyond just reaffirming its 1972 position. Indeed, she faces the same dilemma that Washington does: making its “one China” policy substantive and credible when Taiwan claims to be a “sovereign independent country” and Beijing is demanding that Washington (and Tokyo) explicitly oppose Taiwan’s “independence” and renounce a “one China, one Taiwan” policy.
However, many strategists in both Japan and the United States have been drifting toward the notion that Taiwan’s unification with the PRC—even if it were to happen peacefully—would be inimical to allied strategic interests. Takaichi is now under pressure to confront that notion, and it’s not clear how long either Tokyo or Washington can sidestep it.
Paul Heer is a non-resident senior fellow at the Chicago Council on Global Affairs. He served as National Intelligence Officer for East Asia from 2007 to 2015. He is the author of Mr. X and the Pacific: George F. Kennan and American Policy in East Asia (Cornell University Press, 2018).
Image: White House / Wikimedia Commons / Public Domain.