With the authorization of an international administration and stabilization force for Gaza, U.N. Security Council Resolution 2803 marks a historic endorsement of the U.S.-led plan to reinforce the ceasefire and rebuild the territory after two years of horrific conflict. But volatility on the ground, alongside a lack of clarity over how the resolution aims to overhaul the political and security reality in Gaza, threatens to turn this laudable effort into yet another untenable plan to resolve one of the world’s most intractable and increasingly destructive conflicts.
The U.S.-drafted resolution establishes an important point of international law by authorizing an international administration for a period of two years, alongside an international stabilization force to deploy “under unified command” and in coordination with Israel and Egypt. The references to Palestinian self-determination and an eventual state under certain conditions are notable for the Trump administration, given its previous reluctance to openly endorse such an outcome. But for most countries, it is the bare minimum given the overwhelming international consensus in favor of the creation of a Palestinian state alongside Israel. The text also enjoyed broad regional support, including from the Palestinian Authority. But with regard to mobilizing international engagement in the form of troops or financing, a lack of clarity on the political horizon, as well as more practical issues — such as who is expected to participate in the international administration and force — will give some nations pause.
The last time the Security Council came close to pronouncing on Gaza’s legal character was in 2009, two years after Hamas’ violent takeover of the territory, through Resolution 1860. That resolution stressed that “the Gaza Strip constitutes an integral part of the territory occupied in 1967 and will be a part of the Palestinian state.” It also made reference to the responsibilities of the Palestinian Authority and Israel for ensuring the flow of humanitarian and development assistance as well as the movement of people and goods in and out of the territory, as agreed after Israel’s 2005 withdrawal from Gaza. It further relegated the ultimate removal of Hamas as the de facto government in Gaza to the outcome of an internal Palestinian political process, mediated by Egypt. Today, as clarified in several documents such as the NY Declaration and the current resolution, there is broad agreement that, in the wake of Oct. 7, Hamas should no longer rule Gaza. But what that actually means in practice and how to achieve it is still unclear.
Creating an International Stabilization Force
As history has shown, when it comes to forging multinational military coalitions, getting a resolution in place is one thing, actually forming and deploying a force is another, and ensuring that the troops act in accordance with the mandate is something else entirely. According to the resolution, the international stabilization force is expected to be the linchpin in the process of removing Hamas from power. It will secure Gaza’s borders, support the eventual deployment of Palestinian police forces, and protect humanitarian aid delivery, as well as oversee the decommissioning of weapons belonging to Hamas and others. But even following its authorization, significant questions concerning its composition and operations remain.
As much as the United States and its partners might want to draw on recent examples like Kosovo and Timor Leste, from a political and security perspective at least, Gaza looks more like recent debacles in places like southern Lebanon and Afghanistan.
Conditions on the Ground
Indeed, since the ceasefire came into effect, both Israel and Hamas moved quickly to consolidate their positions and effectively entrench a new security regime across the territory.
Israel has redeployed its forces to a buffer zone that comprises around 50 percent of Gaza’s territory, from which it has conducted strikes against perceived threats. This freedom of action in buffer zones corresponds with Israel’s overall security posture with regard to Lebanon and Syria since Oct. 7. Additionally, it provides a degree of confidence to the Gaza envelope communities, perhaps the most traumatized section of Israeli society given their experiences on Oct. 7, by creating a physical buffer between Israel and what remains of Hamas’ forces. None of this should be taken for granted, especially as this is an election year in Israel.
On the other hand, Hamas, in a clear show of force, spent the first days of the ceasefire both testing Israel and, perhaps most importantly, settling scores with other Palestinian factions. This was done through a series of public and less public moves such as executions and military confrontations with rival clans and others it accuses of collaborating with Israel or undermining its rule. As much as this was about reestablishing itself in Gaza, it was also a warning shot for any forces that might seek to dislodge it from power. This includes the Palestinian Security Forces loyal to Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas, which could deploy alongside the international force, as well as any would-be foreign troop contributors. The message: Hamas is far from a spent force.
The idea for a stabilization force in Gaza is not a new one. In July 2024, the United Arab Emirates, presumably in consultation with other Arab states, publicly endorsed the idea of its participation in a multinational force, but under certain conditions. The Palestinian Authority, which comprises the government of the State of Palestine — that is now recognized by 156 of 193 U.N. member states — would need to invite the force, undergo significant reforms, and be empowered by Israel to take the lead in Gaza, and the United States would need to recommit to pursuing a two-state solution. The idea of Arab and Muslim forces close to the United States and Israel, and others with ties to Hamas, like Qatar, makes tremendous sense on some level. The deterrence factor alone would, in theory, be invaluable in addition to the fact that this force would work with and seemingly on behalf of Palestinian forces.
The new resolution comes close, but not close enough, for the United Arab Emirates and other Arab states like Jordan and Saudi Arabia. While they have offered critical support to the plan, they seem to have ruled out any troop deployments according to the current mandate and are likely wary of other factors, such as Israel’s continued insistence on sidelining the Palestinian Authority, regardless of how much it undergoes reform.
But without the original cast of troop contributors, the political considerations are different. Israel will be reluctant to accept troops from adversarial countries with ties to Hamas, such as Turkey, deploying in Gaza. Reports indicate that Azerbaijan and Indonesia are ready to send troops. Even if these countries want to curry favor with Washington or have budding relations with Israel, the optics of being seen to fight for Israel or to fight against Palestinians, even if attacked, will raise serious dilemmas for any country, let alone these two Muslim majority nations.
Beyond this, there are a host of operational concerns and questions. What will be the troops’ rules of engagement? How will they be financed? How many troops will deploy? Will they deploy in the area controlled by Hamas? In the buffer currently occupied by Israel or in a smaller zone where Israel has pulled back from, but without a Hamas presence? And of course, how will Hamas react to any of this? The answers to these questions will be the difference between success and failure, as well as in large part the willingness of countries to put their troops in harm’s way to advance the plan.
Even with the resolution authorizing the stabilization force with broad powers, the concern is that the overall approach is based on a post-conflict paradigm, when the reality on the ground is anything but. Indeed, while the fighting in Gaza between Israel and Hamas has more or less stopped, the conflict itself has only become more complicated to resolve following Oct. 7 and the subsequent war. Hamas’ reaction to the resolution, rejecting the presence of any foreign military personnel inside Gaza, is also cause for concern.
Recovery and Reconstruction
If countries are reluctant to commit troops, will they be willing to finance other aspects of the plan, including Gaza’s eventual reconstruction? This is also unclear. Of course, this is not the first time that the international community has been mobilized to reconstruct Gaza’s civilian and institutional infrastructure after a war. The last time this happened was in 2014, but the scale of the devastation on the ground today bears little if any resemblance to that significant, but far smaller reconstruction bill ($4.5 billion as opposed to an estimated $70 billion, respectively). Instilling sufficient confidence that this time will be different will take unprecedented efforts. Yet it is unlikely that this resolution alone is enough to make it happen, with many countries adopting something more akin to a wait and see approach.
Bad Precedents
Although a different context, the history of the U.N. Interim Force in Lebanon following the 2006 Israel-Hizballah war is instructive. It is a cautionary tale for any international force operating in a politically uncertain environment with potential spoilers in the form of strong non-state actors. While in 2006 Israel wanted anything but a U.N. peacekeeping force along its northern frontier, the political reality on the ground left no other options. But in the case of the 2006 war, it was the rapid deployment of a significantly strengthened U.N. force in Lebanon, with thousands of mostly European troops, that helped end the war. But it was this force’s weak mandate, and its inability to confront or even report on Hizballah’s rearmament out of fear of reprisals, which foretold the inevitability of the next Israel-Hizballah confrontation. Of course, that came in the wake of the Oct. 7 attacks. But it begs the question of how forces should operate in areas where non-state actors are determined to rearm at all costs. In the end, Hizballah’s disarmament, which is now being discussed more seriously than everwithin the Lebanese body politic, will have to proceed primarily from within the Lebanese political system. It’s difficult to see things proceeding in a fundamentally different way in the Palestinian context with regard to Hamas, whose presence is, of course, not limited to Gaza.
The impact on the ground is difficult to forecast. There is certainly a scenario that many are predicting in which Gaza remains divided in two, split between zones controlled by Israel and Hamas. There could even be a modified version where a specific zone is set up with the deployment of the stabilization force alongside an accelerated push for recovery and reconstruction, enticing Gazans to move from the Hamas zone. All of these are risky and could end up exacerbating the deeply worrying limbo that most Gazans currently find themselves in, or quite possibly make it worse.
Either way, the major operations of the war are over, the living Israeli hostages are home, many Palestinian prisoners have been released, and there is sufficient pressure and political will on all sides to ensure that the ceasefire remains in place. If nothing else, this resolution is a demonstration of U.S. leadership and political will in support. This is significant. But absent a fundamental shift in the political framework from all parties and a clearer path towards a Palestinian state and the end of conflict, we might just be working towards another stopgap on the path to the next confrontation.
Jonathan Lincoln is a professor of the practice and the director at the Center for Jewish Civilization at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service. He previously spent 15 years with the United Nations working on and in the Middle East and North Africa.