Just hours before his visit to France to discuss Iran’s nuclear file, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi warned:
“International relations face unprecedented crises due to militant unilateralism. Repeated violations of international law – including ongoing conflicts in West Asia – reflect the backing of the United States and the tolerance of certain European states.”
This underscores Tehran’s defiant stance as it moves in its nuclear diplomacy. Just three months after Israeli-US airstrikes targeted Iranian nuclear sites, Tehran signed a significant security agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). It did not last long.
The so-called Cairo Agreement, signed in September and brokered by Egypt, was meant to defuse tensions. Yet that same month, the western-backed IAEA was warned against “any hostile action against Iran – including the reinstatement of cancelled UN Security Council resolutions” in which case the deal would become “null and void.”
Of note, Iran–IAEA relations had been deteriorating since June during the 12-day US-Israeli war on Iran. The IAEA and its director general, Rafael Grossi, refused to condemn the attacks on Iranian civilians and nuclear facilities, and the targeted assassinations of nuclear scientists and senior military officers.
The IAEA’s refusal to condemn the US-Israeli violations made Iranians furious. They accused Grossi of paving the ground for the strikes and being Israel’s footman. The Islamic Republic formally lodged a protest with the UN Secretary General and the Security Council against Grossi, arguing he breached the IAEA’s neutrality.
Resistance to western coercion
The Iranian parliament – or Majlis – raised the bar by ratifying legislation that suspended cooperation between Tehran and the international nuclear watchdog. The law was passed immediately after the war ended on 25 June.
It declared Grossi and his inspectors “persona non grata” and forbade them from travelling to Iran or visiting Iranian nuclear facilities. The law stipulated that the suspension will continue so long as the security and safety of Iranian nuclear installations and scientists have not been guaranteed.
Nevertheless, the Egyptian-mediated Cairo Agreement appeared to thaw the standoff, if temporarily. It was signed in the presence of Iranian Foreign Minister Araghchi and Grossi, and ambiguously framed as a deal on “implementing the Safeguards Agreement.”
Few details were made public then; while the IAEA called it a deal on “practical modalities and implementation of the Safeguards Agreement”, the Iranian side insisted it was “a new regime of cooperation.”
State news agency, IRNA, elaborated, “the agency will not engage in monitoring activities provided Iran has not carried out environmental and nuclear safety measures at its bombed facilities.” IRNA referred to the Supreme National Security Council as the sole body that “could greenlight the IAEA monitoring missions inside Iran, case by case.”
Iran’s diplomatic maneuvering, including the deal with the IAEA, was obviously part of the broader strategy to prevent the UK, France, and Germany from activating the snapback mechanism, in the 2015 nuclear deal between Iran and the five permanent members of the Security Council plus Germany.
The European Troika (E3), who were clearly dissatisfied with the Cairo Agreement,reiterated “Tehran needs to allow inspections of sensitive sites and address its stockpile of highly enriched uranium.”
Snapback triggers collapse
A threat to terminate the Cairo Agreement actually came three days after it was clinched, when Iran’s Foreign Ministry warned that “launching the snapback mechanism would put the ongoing cooperation between Iran and the IAEA at risk.” Nevertheless, the UK, France, and Germany moved ahead with the snapback activation.
Araghchi’s first reaction noted that “in regards to the E3’s move, the Cairo agreement has lost its functionality.” Iranians had also vowed to halt cooperation with the IAEA. However, they did not fulfill that threat and collaborated in silence.
The IAEA inspectors visited some Iranian nuclear sites in early November. However, they were not given access to the US-bombed Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan facilities.
Even this tactical compliance failed to shield Tehran from a new IAEA censure. On 20 November, the agency’s Board of Governors passed a US-E3-backed resolutionignoring Iran’s cooperation and demanding immediate access to all affected sites and data.
It was the straw that broke the camel's back. Iran condemned the move as “illegal, unjustifiable, irresponsible, and a stain on the image of its sponsors.”
Araghchi on his X account posted, “like the diplomacy which was assaulted by Israel and the US in June, the Cairo Agreement has been killed by the US and the E3.”
For the second time, Iran’s top diplomat announced the termination of the Cairo Agreement, “given that the E3 and the US seek escalation, they know full well that the official termination of the Cairo Agreement is the direct outcome of their provocations.”
Iran’s representative to the IAEA, Reza Nadjafi, told reporters that “If the US claims success in destroying Iran’s Natanz and Fordow facilities, then what is left for inspections?” and further warned, “any decision (by the IAEA) has its own consequences.”
Back to confrontation
By applying pressure through the IAEA, the E3 and the US seek to coerce Iran into opening the doors of its bombed nuclear sites to the IAEA inspectors, to hand over the 400 kilograms of uranium enriched to 60 percent, which the US believes is still intact,and “to eliminate Iran’s ability to convert that fuel into a nuclear weapon.”
The collapse of the Cairo Agreement marks a return to the kind of standoff that defined US–Iran relations from 2005 to 2013, when Iran's nuclear file was sent to the UN Security Council, and sanctions were imposed under Chapter VII.
Some skeptics believe US President Donald Trump's administration would not only take Iran to the Security Council but would also cite the chapter in question, which sanctions the use of military force against any country deemed a threat to global peace.
While Iran signed the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in hopes of avoiding that scenario, the US's unilateral withdrawal under Donald Trump's first term in 2018 and the E3’s failure to meet their obligations rendered the agreement toothless.
June’s US-Israeli bombing campaign against Iranian nuclear infrastructure confirmed for Tehran that western powers have no intention of engaging in diplomacy in good faith.
Toward a new strategy
According to IRNA, which echoes the official line of the Iranian government, “Iran feels that the goodwill gestures it has shown towards the IAEA and the United States, have drawn further hostility. Therefore, maybe now it is the time to change course and revise its strategy and the rule of engagement with international bodies, including the IAEA.”
Some observers believe Iran’s first step to map out a new strategy is pursuing the policy of “nuclear ambiguity, remaining silent regarding the whereabouts of the stockpile of the highly-enriched uranium and quietly halting the implementation of the [Nuclear] Non-Proliferation Treaty, without officially admitting it.”
In the latest development, the chairman of the Parliament’s National Security Committee has vowed that “Iran will sturdily pursue its nuclear achievements.” Ibrahim Azizi has cautioned the US and Europe that “Iran has changed its behavior post June attacks and they’d better not try Iran’s patience.”
That posture is hardening. In September, over 70 Iranian lawmakers urged the Supreme National Security Council to reconsider Iran’s defense doctrine – including its long-standing religious prohibition on nuclear weapons.
They argue that the regional and international order has changed irreversibly since Israel and the US jointly bombed the Iranian nuclear facilities. While citing Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s 2010 fatwa banning nuclear weapons, they assert that in Shia jurisprudence, such rulings may evolve when conditions change – especially when the survival of the Islamic Republic is at stake.
Iran is also working to immunize itself against any escalation at the UN Security Council. Here, it banks on the veto power of Russia and China to neutralize any western effort to reimpose sanctions.
The collapse of the Cairo Agreement marks a turning point in Tehran’s nuclear diplomacy. It is a conclusion drawn from years of unmet commitments and military escalation that western multilateralism has exhausted its credibility.
The views expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect those of The Cradle.