by Emmanuel Leroy
To try to get a clearer picture of the real situation of the Russian Federation in its war against the Anglo-Saxon West and contrary to the propagandists of both sides, I propose an overview of the military, economic and societal situation.
Having the opportunity to travel frequently in Russia, and not just in the capital, and being able to exchange regularly with many people involved in political or economic life, I can offer you a real glimpse of the situation as Russians experience it today, far removed from the fantasies of some so-called experts.
On the military level
While in 2022 the Russian army, with approximately 950,000 personnel across all its branches (land, air, and sea), could only muster a maximum of 300,000 ground troops, thanks to its recruitment policy and partial mobilization, it is now able to deploy between 700,000 and 800,000 troops across the entire front. This represents a fivefold increase in strength compared to the initial phase in February 2022, when Russia launched a preemptive strike with fewer than 150,000 troops to prevent an imminent assault by Kyiv's troops against the Donbas. At that time, the estimated strength of the Ukrainian army was around 300,000 soldiers, primarily stationed in eastern Ukraine. After reaching a record 900,000 troops on the ground in 2023, Kyiv's operational forces today are estimated to number around 500,000 at most, with at least three-quarters being territorial units with relatively poor combat capabilities. Added to this are extreme recruitment difficulties, where Zelensky's allies struggle to muster—often through violence—only about 20,000 additional troops each month, barely enough to cover his actual monthly losses on the front.
Some sources give a ratio of definitive losses (dead and missing) between Russian and Ukrainian forces that is between 1 to 3 and 1 to 5. This difference is explained by several factors, on the one hand the air superiority of the Russian army which uses this advantage to eliminate concentrations of enemy troops with the help of glide bombs of the type FAB of 250 kg to 3 t. which are particularly deadly, on the other hand by the domination of the Russians in the field of artillery (cannons, howitzers and missiles) which again gives an undeniable advantage to Moscow in its war against NATO and its Ukrainian proxy.
In the field of drone warfare, however, after a period of relative Ukrainian dominance in 2023, we are now seeing a relative parity between the two sides. Some Ukrainian sources even report Russian superiority, particularly with fiber-optic drones, in certain sectors of the front. To understand how much the arrival of drones has changed the nature of this conflict, it's important to remember that 70 to 75% of casualties are due to these flying machines, compared to 25 to 30% for all other weapons used on the ground. It should be noted that the Russian army officially announced this week the creation of a new branch of its armed forces: the Unmanned Systems Force.
Beyond the emergence of drones in this 3st-century war, it's crucial to understand that the concept of "fog of war" has virtually disappeared, and large troop concentrations prior to a "surprise" offensive are now utterly impossible. For both sides, this is akin to playing poker with their cards face up, as satellite data combined with real-time drone observation, practically 24/24, of the front lines and operational rear areas, allows for an anticipation of movements that, at least for this particular conflict, prevents any large-scale offensive in either direction. I say "at least for this particular conflict" because it's clear that for NATO strategists, as for those of the Russian Federation, the future "live" war will have been preceded by a war in space, where each side will have tried to blind the other by destroying its observation satellites. But we're not there yet.
For now, we are still in this hybrid war where both adversaries are still playing with one hand tied behind their back and are careful, both of them, not to show all their capabilities and all their technologies while waiting for the ultimate battle.
In this context, Russia has shown since the beginning of the Special Military Operation, and contrary to the hopes of economic or military collapse trumpeted by figures like Bruno Le Maire and Xavier Tytelman, that it is not only capable of resisting but even of prevailing. Indeed, since the clear failure of the counter-offensive in the summer of 2023, which broke at the Surovikin Line, and especially since the failed Kursk operation in August 2024, where NATO expended its last resources and its best brigades in an attempt to secure victory, the "1000 cuts" strategy employed by the Russian army is proving its effectiveness, and the last strongholds in the Donbas still held by the Kyiv regime are falling one after another, thus paving the way to reach the Dnieper River in the coming months.
And again, I want to emphasize, this was not a war between Ukraine and Russia, but the prelude to a war between Russia and NATO, in which the latter has shown its limitations and will ultimately be forced to acknowledge its defeat. The entire art of Russian diplomacy will be to make the West swallow this bitter pill without humiliating it too much, knowing full well that as long as the West remains undefeated, we will simply have to wait for the next war that will then engulf all of Europe, or what remains of it.
On the economic plan
Despite the $300 billion in Russian assets frozen in the West since March 2022, the Russian economy has demonstrated a surprising resilience to Western sanctions (despite nearly 27,000 sanctions imposed on Russia since 2014). There are several reasons for this: First, Russia is an immensely wealthy country, and its GDP of approximately $2.4 trillion (equivalent to that of Spain, as the idiots claim) is by no means a true reflection of reality. In February 2022, Russian public debt stood at $278 billion, or 18% of the debt-to-GDP ratio. This can be compared to the €3.4 trillion (115% of GDP in 2025) of debt held by France and its financial elite, whom the world envies. Furthermore, 80% of Russia's debt was domestic and therefore denominated in rubles, reducing its vulnerability to currency fluctuations. The system was designed to withstand shocks, with the additional establishment of a sovereign wealth fund estimated at USD 175 billion in 2022.
In summary, in February 2022, Russian debt was low and well-managed, with a focus on stability. Western sanctions policies, which partially isolated Russia financially, particularly through its near-complete exclusion from the SWIFT system, succeeded in increasing the debt to approximately USD 290 billion by the end of 2024.
In fact, Russian productivity (across all sectors) is perhaps operating at 50% of its theoretical maximum capacity, and its industry is perfectly self-sufficient in the area of military production, except perhaps for certain electronic components where support from China, and a few other countries, is welcome. In practice, unlike the West, which for purely mercantile reasons deliberately sabotaged its military-industrial complex as early as the 70s by excessively relocating production to low-wage countries, the Russian Federation, even under Yeltsin, nevertheless managed—despite the looting and plundering—to preserve the Soviet military production capacity, particularly in the key areas of shell, missile, and armored vehicle production. This greatly surprised the "strategists" on European television talk shows, who were convinced of the collapse of the Russian war economy in the first months of the conflict.
For those who remain hooked on GDP figures, here is the latest available data (from Russian and Western sources) for the period 2022-2025:
- 2022: -2,1% (recession due to initial sanctions and the fall in energy exports).
- 2023: +3,6% (rebound thanks to the reorientation towards Asia, the increase in military spending and oil prices and the creation of the "phantom fleet").
- 2024: +4,1% (growth supported by the defense industry and public investments + rise of the "ghost fleet" with more than 1000 tankers and super tankers crisscrossing the world's oceans).
- 2025: +0,6% (IMF estimate for the full year, with a slowdown observed: +1,4% in Q1 and +1,1% in Q2, due to inflation, lower oil prices, strengthened sanctions and sluggish global growth; projections such as those of the Russian Ministry of Economy revise to 1,0%, while the Central Bank of Russia estimates it between 0,5-1,5%).
For a country that has been in a state of virtual war with NATO for almost four years, these are rather satisfactory figures that few European countries could boast. In concrete terms, Western sanctions have led Russia to accelerate the deglobalization process and increase its self-sufficiency in a growing number of key sectors, such as agri-food, machine tools, robotics, special alloys, and many others. While the country is not yet completely self-sufficient, it is probably one of the closest, possessing within its borders all the raw materials necessary (including rare earth elements) for a 4st-century post-industrial economy.
On a societal level
In this respect, the most striking contrast lies in observing everyday life in Russia outside the front lines. Whether in the major cities of the west, in the Urals, or as far away as Siberia and the Far East, it would be impossible for a traveler to imagine that this country is at war. Shops are overflowing with goods, public services are functioning, the safety of the inhabitants is assured, and nowhere does one sense the oppression of a country under duress.
Families go out to restaurants, to the cinema, visit parks or museums, and everything proceeds as if the country were living normally. And therein lies the most astonishing paradox: every day, dozens of Russian soldiers die on the front lines to restore peace on the borders of the Empire and push back NATO to the 1994 front, yet this war must proceed as if it doesn't affect civilian society, because war today is not only the conquest of territory, it is also, and above all, the conquest of minds, especially now that digital technology has invaded our lives. Vladimir Putin and the Kremlin strategists have clearly learned the lessons of 1917 and want to relive the dark years of the last century at no cost. They know perfectly well that victory on the ground can easily be stolen from them by the undermining work of the 5th column and their Western sponsors, and that is why they pay very close attention to the morale of the home front and the well-being of the population.
That being said, it would be absurd to claim that sanctions have no impact on Russian society. Repeated NATO strikes against Russian refineries and threats of sanctions against countries that continue to buy Russian oil and gas are having an effect. This, combined with the price of Brent crude oil hovering around $60 a barrel, has led to a substantial increase in energy costs for households in Russia, but without any real restrictions on fuel distribution. The "gas station" nation has sufficient reserves to meet its basic needs without having to draw on its strategic reserves.
High inflation (between 5,9% and 13,75% between 2022 and 2025 according to ROSSTAT statistics), with an overall annual average of 8% to 10%, also contributes to a negative impact on household budgets, even though Russian banks are paying interest on bank accounts to limit the decline in purchasing power. To counter inflationary risks and defend the ruble, the Central Bank of Russia implemented a very aggressive interest rate policy in 2022, which peaked in October 2024 at 21%. Many Russian analysts described this as a suicidal policy for the Russian economy. Since then, rates have fallen back to 16,5% in November 2025, a level clearly insufficient, according to economist Sergey Glaziev, to revive productive activity in the Russian Federation.
Now, there is also a factor that completely escapes Western analysts: the formidable capacity of the Russian people to adapt to difficult living conditions. Accustomed for millennia to living in a particularly harsh climate, Russians have developed a capacity to survive extreme conditions that no European will ever achieve, and which will undoubtedly allow them to withstand any sanctions package that Macron, Starmer, Merz, and von der Leyen could ever conceive.
Unlike Europe, which is rapidly transforming before our eyes into a new USSR where freedoms are crumbling one after another, the Russian Federation in 2025 remains a haven of liberty where life is sweet and pleasant for those who know how to enjoy it. Today, €1000 will get you 93,600 rubles in a Russian bank, enough for a pleasant week in Moscow or Saint Petersburg (hotels, restaurants, museums, etc.), and with the same amount, you can live comfortably in the Urals or the Caucasus for two or three weeks. Hurry and take advantage of it, because at the rate things are going, the EU will rebuild an iron curtain from which it will become increasingly difficult to escape.
source: The Francophone Saker