Open Questions | Taiwan is a complicated issue, but the way out is simple: ex-PLA colonel Zhou Bo
Commentator and former senior colonel on Beijing’s row with Japan, lessons from the Ukraine war and why playing global policeman is a trap
With the independence-leaning Democratic Progressive Party still in power in Taiwan and intensifying US arms purchases, how viable is peaceful reunification at this stage? What specific “red lines” or thresholds of “external interference”, in your view, would compel Beijing to consider non-peaceful means?
Now we’re talking about Taiwan, which is a billion-dollar issue. Of course, it looks very complicated. But for me, the way out is very simple: how to avoid a war in the Taiwan Strait?
The answer is to let Beijing believe peaceful reunification is still possible. If it believes peaceful reunification is possible, it will have confidence rather than impatience.
As China grows stronger, it could go in two different directions. One is that greater strength brings more confidence in eventual peaceful reunification because Taiwan will not move away, and time is on the side of mainland China. But it might also grow impatient and consider using force, especially if provoked. These are two very different directions.
The best way to understand the Taiwan issue is to put yourself in Beijing’s shoes. China today is strong and powerful. How could it allow part of its territory to remain separated forever? That wish for reunification is natural. The only question is whether it happens peacefully or through war.
Is there any specific red line for China to consider using non-peaceful means?
I believe both China and the United States have strategic ambiguities. It is not only the US that has ambiguity. China does too. China has not specified a deadline. But the difference lies in the nature of these ambiguities. American strategic ambiguity, in my opinion, is like a fig leaf covering America’s declining strength. In contrast, China’s ambiguity grows alongside its rising strength. That is the difference.
With Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s hawkish stance and closer ties to the US, do you see Japan as a rising strategic threat to China and regional stability, a “strategic pawn” of Washington, as you’ve previously suggested, or an opportunity to test Tokyo’s diplomatic flexibility?
Takaichi’s statement is politically motivated and aimed at a domestic audience. Although she mentioned that a “Taiwan contingency” involving Chinese warships and other armed actions “could constitute a survival-threatening situation” for Japan, she has actually walked back somewhat in changing her tone when facing domestic and overseas protests.
I think she should have learned a lesson even if she refuses to make an apology. Japanese leaders to come definitely will be more cautious. In fact, before Takaichi took office, both Japan and Australia refused to answer questions from US Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth about whether they would fight alongside America. They avoid hypothetical questions, leaving the decision to governments at the time. And they have good reason: if America’s strategy is strategic ambiguity, why should its allies adopt a policy of clarity?
But there is a realistic problem of Japan joining the United States should there be a conflict in the Taiwan Strait. Legally, Japan must provide logistical support to the US, such as allowing American forces to use Japanese bases. But whether Japan would actually fight shoulder to shoulder with the US is a big question.
Does China see Japan as a rising strategic threat, as Japan sees China as a threat?
How would you advise Chinese policymakers to leverage the apparent US openness to G2-style strategic stability, and what risks do you see in embracing or rejecting such Washington-defined frameworks?
[The G2] was former US president [Barack] Obama’s idea, which was proposed to the Chinese side but politely declined. I think it is absolutely true that in the world today, China and the United States are certainly the dominant powers.
But we should not be too hooked on this concept because the world is moving towards multipolarisation, a conclusion actually drawn by the Munich Security Conference. Apparently, this goes beyond a bipolar structure. Even US Secretary of State Marco Rubio was talking about how it is not normal to have unipolarity.
Are you suggesting China should not accept this G2 framework?
Of course we should not accept this. First of all, this is not a fact. Secondly, you alienate yourself from other countries or even from your friends.
Is genuine bilateral detente possible? Or are cycles of confrontation and negotiation the new normal?
If you talk about detente, it certainly reminds people of those days between the United States and the Soviet Union. The first question is: has the tension between China and the United States reached a breaking point where they have to sit down and talk about the relationship, which was described as detente? During the Cold War, the US-Soviet relationship was balanced by terror that was reflected in almost equal numbers of nuclear warheads.
This background is certainly not found today, at least not in terms of nuclear parity. The United States has more than 5,000 warheads, while China, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute or the Pentagon, had about 600 by the end of last year.
But if you talk about relative peace or easing tensions, this could happen from time to time. The current relationship is very different from the Cold War, which was between two enemies with almost no economic interaction. Today, because we are so tightly bound together, we can definitely see a relaxation of tensions here and there, out of necessity.
And this presents another picture: from time to time, we will definitely see easing of tensions, just like what we have seen most recently, because the threats such as tariffs from the United States cannot materialise. Therefore, the United States has had to downplay its tone.
This kind of easing of tensions could itself be seen as a form of small detente. Maybe we will have this kind of small detente from time to time in spite of turbulence and competition.
You have rejected the idea that the current US–China rivalry is a “new Cold War” and emphasised China’s restraint. But with greater tech decoupling and the US expanding military cooperation in Asia, is there a risk that restraint could be misread as weakness?
I reject this idea of a new Cold War because we can only know whether we had a cold war when we look back. During the Cold War, people were actually preparing every day for a hot war. Only after the dissolution of the Soviet Union did people look back with relief and say, “OK, what we have experienced was the Cold War.”
But even a fortune-teller cannot tell the future. When we look into the future of China-US relations, we don’t even know if there will be a hot war. So how can you say that it is just a new cold war? Peace has to be earned.
What about China’s restraint?
China may seem not as restrained as before, but China won’t become unnecessarily provocative. Because even in describing this relationship, China went through a long period of time insisting on cooperation, while the US insisted it was one of competition. So, what is it? It is one of competition because a bilateral relationship is framed, shaped and determined by the stronger party. If the United States believes this is competition, it is useless to insist it must be cooperation. That is why China had to take a deep breath and said we have to dare to fight. That is just like dropping a glove on the ground and saying, “OK, if this is what you want, come on.”
This relationship is a mixture of both competition and cooperation. The only question is the ratio. For the United States, I definitely believe they think competition will prevail over cooperation. But for China, we hope there can be more cooperation.
Cooperation in the years to come may not prevail over competition, but it might increase. Even US President Donald Trump is asking China to help here and there – in Ukraine, in the Red Sea and on many other issues. During his first term, you could hardly hear of any areas of cooperation. The only area was probably climate change. This is obvious because if we do not cooperate, we shall all die. Now you can see how many areas the US has asked for cooperation.
In your recent book Should the World Fear China? you distinguish influence from a “sphere of influence”. How can China project global influence without formal alliances, especially as it positions itself as a “stabiliser” rather than a challenger in world affairs while the US renews traditional alliance structures?
Most people confuse these two terms, as if they are the same thing. They aren’t.
My basic argument is that even if China wanted to establish spheres of influence, it would be impossible.
Where would it be easiest to establish such a sphere? Of course, around your periphery. But look at northeast Asia: Japan certainly would not listen to China, nor would North Korea really listen to China, especially on denuclearisation. In Southeast Asia, often described as China’s backyard, quite a few countries are claimants in the South China Sea, and several are American allies. So how can you take it for granted that this is your backyard, your sphere of influence?
The second point is that it is not necessary, precisely because China’s influence is already global. China doesn’t need to establish a sphere of influence if it doesn’t have the ambition to police the whole world. If you do have that ambition, then you need spheres of influence, which require alliances and allies. And allies are not necessarily easy to deal with. They are like cats, very difficult to herd.
You go to help, like a Good Samaritan, as said in the Bible, and nobody disagrees. But if you send troops here and there, killing people under different pretexts, who remembers all those bloody excuses?
Sometimes I think about this: the United States probably has more clever people than any other country. But how could they make such terrible mistakes, one after another, from the Vietnam war to Iraq to Afghanistan? Even they themselves have criticised these wars.
Then how would China project its global influence?
But the other side of the coin is that no war will last forever. There might come a time when China could play a bigger role in a ceasefire or armistice, or in providing security guarantees with other powers or in taking the lead in sending peacekeepers if the warring parties agree.
Is China ready to lead reforms in global governance institutions like the UN Security Council?
That’s a very good question because I can almost see two sides of the same coin. On the one hand, China describes itself as a developing country, which is certainly true if wealth is divided by population.
Yet China is also regarded by many countries as a superpower or a leader of the Global South, though China itself only describes its role as a natural member of the Global South. Look at the four global initiatives China has put forward. Few other countries have proposed these global initiatives. They represent China’s world views. These initiatives are really big.
So, I think even if China would not call itself a leader, it is in fact taken by many countries as a leader. That is China’s position in the world.
But China is preparing for that role, right?
If you mean China wants to become another world policeman, that is certainly not what China wants. Why should China do that?
What makes China different from the United States is that China is not a religious country, [not] missionary in nature. Chinese traditional culture starts with the individual: you educate yourself, then move into society, accomplish more and be good to others. That mentality is totally different.
But still, you see in the UN, China is paying more and more. The gap between Chinese and American contributions in the regular budget is not that great, just two per cent. Sometimes I even wonder if China’s GDP were to surpass that of the US, could there be a day when China says, “OK, we will make the largest financial contribution to the United Nations.”
Since the United States is not very interested in the UN, other countries may want a stronger China to take the lead. Could there be a time when all other countries welcome such a role for China? That is something I am thinking about.
Looking ahead, what would a truly multipolar world look like from China’s perspective and what role should the PLA play in securing that vision?
A multipolar world may not necessarily look very orderly because it also means more challenges in global management. If it is unipolar, that is the easiest. If it is bipolar, it is still easier than managing a multipolar world.
I have attended many conferences, and I know how difficult it is, for example, at the Asean Regional Forum, for 27 countries to agree on one thing. In a multipolar world, the only way out is, as the Chinese government has proposed, let’s discuss and work on these issues together. That is the only way forward.
For the PLA, I have already explained what it has been doing overseas – basically humanitarian missions – and this is still my hope for a stronger PLA. What makes the PLA’s role different is that while all militaries focus on sovereignty and territorial integrity, China is unique because, even as a major power, it is still a country divided. So, the PLA has a responsibility to help reunify the country. At the same time, China is also a major power, so it has international obligations overseas and must protect its ever-growing overseas interests.
For me, the PLA has three responsibilities: national reunification, safeguarding China’s overseas interests and shouldering China’s international responsibilities as a major power. Three in one.
But even in the future, I hope the PLA overseas will focus only on humanitarian operations, not missions where you have to kill people with a lot of excuses. This would make the PLA different.
Former Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping said at the UN General Assembly in 1974 that “if one day China should change her colour and turn into a superpower, if she too should play the tyrant in the world and everywhere subject others to her bullying, aggression and exploitation, the people of the world should identify her as social-imperialism, expose it, oppose it and work together with the Chinese people to overthrow it”.
I think when Chinese leaders say China will not become a hegemon, even if it is developed, they are sincere. This comes from Chinese culture and from the fact that China’s rise in the last four decades has indeed been peaceful. Whether unprecedented or not, it is at least extremely rare in human history.
In the context of hybrid great-power competition, what responsibilities should China assume in shaping the rules of emerging domains such as AI governance and space security?
When people talked about strategic stability during the Cold War, it basically meant those two countries had equal numbers of nuclear warheads. But nowadays, between China and the United States, we don’t have equilibrium or parity in nuclear warheads. However, China and the United States are almost equally developed in AI. That is my argument: in the future, only China and the US could dominate battlefields because we are the two countries best at AI. We haven’t heard of serious AI developments in Japan or Europe.
That is why I wrote in my essay that in the future international arms market there will be just two countries that can sell advanced weapons: the United States, whose weapons are expensive but combat-tested, and allies must buy them for political correctness; and China, whose systems are equally good – as seen in air combat between India and Pakistan – but more affordable. In the future, you sell a system rather than just a few combat platforms.
I’m glad you mentioned space because we live on Earth and very few people look up at the sky daily. But in fact, space is becoming more contested, congested and lucrative. China is moving very fast in space exploration. Just imagine you are sitting here and can control a probe operating on the far side of the moon. That is what China has achieved, something no one else has done so far.
Outer space means many business opportunities, but it could also become a new area for an arms race. That is why I coined the term “mutually assured vulnerability in space”.
During the Cold War, we had mutually assured destruction. But in outer space, all countries are vulnerable because we share the same orbits. The US, China, Russia and India have all shown they are capable of destroying satellites. But attacks could generate thousands of pieces of debris, depending on the size of the satellite, and this debris could endanger all satellites in the same orbit. That is why I say mutually assured vulnerability. Everyone is vulnerable.
But if you build a Golden Dome, other countries will try to penetrate it. A war in space, in my conclusion, would be part of a nuclear war or the prelude to one.
Because if you decide to attack an enemy’s satellite, that means you have taken a deep breath. That doesn’t look like a small conflict. It’s an all-out war, a pre-emptive strike. I hope that never happens. That is why China and Russia proposed no placement of weapons in space.
As the Ukraine conflict drags on in its third year with Nato’s aid faltering, how should China position itself? China doesn’t want Russia to lose the war, right?
It’s not up to China to wish for which side wins or loses. Although we cannot yet see clearly how this war will end, I believe two outcomes are already on the horizon.
First, Nato’s expansion in Europe has basically reached its limit. It already has 32 members, and three countries are on the waiting list: Georgia, Ukraine and Bosnia and Herzegovina. The first two are at war, or have been at war, precisely because they want to join Nato. Bosnia and Herzegovina wouldn’t add too much weight to Nato. I think Nato’s expansion in Europe has almost come to an end.
Second, no matter what happens, I think after this war Russia will consolidate a much reduced sphere of influence. Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the West has ignored Russia’s interests, turning a deaf ear to its protests while continuing to move eastward. This time, the West has run into something solid. Of course, Russia, with huge sacrifices, could consolidate its own sphere of influence. But it has been weakened by the war, which is why I say it will be a much reduced sphere of influence.
What lessons does China draw from the Ukraine war in terms of military modernisation and strategic deterrence?
Looking at the protracted nature of the war in Ukraine, what lessons can China draw to avoid escalation into a protracted conflict in the Taiwan Strait?
We must increase the number of nuclear weapons. That is my conclusion. In a conventional war, we have all the advantages of fighting on our home turf. Precisely because of this, some voices in the US have raised the idea of using nuclear weapons in the Taiwan Strait, fearing defeat in a conventional war. America’s undersecretary of defence for policy, Elbridge Colby, for example, has spoken about this in the past. Why would Americans raise such ideas? Is it probably because China’s nuclear arsenal is not yet large enough?
Look at the war in Ukraine. Russia’s most obvious strength is its nuclear arsenal. Because its conventional forces have struggled, it has repeatedly hinted at the possible use of nuclear weapons. Last year, for example, Russia occupied only about 1 per cent of new territory. Why talk about nuclear weapons? Because they are uncertain of victory through conventional warfare, so they make thinly veiled threats.
China has not made such threats. I don’t believe China would use nuclear weapons in the Taiwan Strait because Taiwanese people are our compatriots. How could we use such weapons against our own people, especially when we have pledged never to be the first to use nuclear weapons? That is impossible.
But we must be prepared in case the United States makes such an adventure. If we have enough nuclear warheads, then the US would never dare to consider such a scenario. The question, of course, is how many we need. I would say increase them to the point where the US would never, ever think of using nuclear weapons against China first.
Elsewhere, US-Philippines ties are deepening, and Vietnam is expanding its offshore oil deals. Is confrontation in the South China Sea inevitable or are there credible off-ramps?
On tensions between China and the Philippines, I think precisely because China’s military is overwhelming, we can generally keep the situation under control. They may try to make trouble and sometimes succeed in creating incidents, but overall, our strength is sufficient to stabilise the situation. So, between China and any other Asean countries, I don’t believe conflict is highly likely.
The real danger is between China and the United States – the risk of a collision, whether between aircraft or ships, as occurred in 2001 [involving a US Navy EP-3 reconnaissance plane near Hainan province]. That likelihood remains and is still very high. The Pentagon has reported that in the past two years Chinese forces carried out more than 180 intercepts of US aircraft. If those statistics are reliable, it would mean roughly one interception every four days. That is alarming.
Is Asean capable of mediating and managing South China Sea tensions effectively?
No, they can’t. Because quite a few of them are claimants themselves in the South China Sea with their own interests. They simply cannot speak with one voice. This is also reflected in the ongoing code of conduct negotiations. Why has it taken longer than expected? Because these countries cannot agree among themselves. So how can they mediate? They are part of the disputes.
Let’s turn now to the Korean peninsula. America’s approval of South Korea’s nuclear-powered submarines and North Korea’s accelerating nuclear programme have pushed northeast Asia towards a new nuclear arms race. How does China interpret and respond to South Korea’s internal push for nuclear armament and North Korea’s adventurism, especially given Beijing’s waning leverage over Pyongyang?
First of all, in South Korea, public polls suggest that about 70 per cent of the people would support developing nuclear weapons. But I think this also depends on how the questions are framed. If you ask, “If we have nuclear weapons, where would we conduct the first nuclear test?”, given South Korea’s population density, where could it be done? Then ask, “What if China strongly opposes this, perhaps with sanctions, how would we deal with that?” And finally, “What if the United States says, ‘Since you can protect yourself, I may withdraw my troops from South Korea’?” If all these questions were asked, I am very confident the approval rate would drop drastically.
I think if Trump really conducts a nuclear test, it would trigger chain reactions. First, Russia would do it. This is not speculation; both Russian President Vladimir Putin and Kremlin spokesmen have said so. If the US does it, Russia would follow. Then North Korea would likely do it. After that, Pakistan might do it, and if Pakistan does, India would too.
How should China manage tensions on the Korean peninsula? What steps should China take to manage escalation and recalibrate its own nuclear posture to maintain deterrence superiority?
It is very difficult for us to manage the situation on the Korean peninsula. I think what North Korea wants is to become a “normal” nuclearised country. They want to be seen as normal, but with nuclear weapons. Yet with nuclear weapons, you are not a normal country. According to the UN and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, you are not a normal country. And the UN still maintains sanctions on North Korea. Sometimes I believe North Korea’s provocations are just meant to draw attention.
Trump was very busy talking to the North Koreans, but former US president Joe Biden seemed to have a new strategy. The Biden administration’s approach was, “OK, I don’t care what you’re doing.” So, to remind the US government that North Korea is still there, they fire missiles from time to time or even send soldiers to fight alongside Russians in Ukraine.
Do you think North Korea’s nuclear brinkmanship puts China in an unfavourable position considering Beijing’s dilemma over Pyongyang?
China certainly cannot be said to be happy with North Korea’s nuclear programme. Otherwise, why would China have joined other countries in the six-party talks? But it is impossible for China to put everything under control, especially when it is beyond our own borders.
Where do you see the biggest challenges for China’s interests outside its immediate neighbourhood?
It depends on what kind of interests you are talking about. Economically, China’s presence is already ubiquitous. Chinese products, investments and trade are found everywhere around the world.
But if we take the Belt and Road Initiative as an example, it raises important questions. How can we ensure the security of vital international sea lanes in the Indian Ocean? Consider the key straits: Bab al-Mandeb, Hormuz and Malacca. That is why our navy has been operating there since the end of 2008.
Another challenge is how to protect Chinese workers abroad who are found in many parts of the world, especially around the rimland of the Indian Ocean and across Africa. This is a huge task for the PLA.
That is why, in my understanding, China needs a large navy. Resolving the Taiwan issue is not only the navy’s job. Even with many ships, the Taiwan problem cannot be solved by naval power alone. The real explanation is that China has global interests and global obligations, which require a larger navy. That is why we must build one.
Will America’s accelerating retreat from global policing allow China to fill the vacuum in those regions?
No, that is wrong because I don’t believe there are vacuums. I think they are traps.
The first question is whether the Americans can really leave those regions. I have doubts. Could the United States truly leave the Middle East or Europe? Even if it wanted to, it could not. So, there are not many vacuums for China to fill.
And since China has no ambition to become a world policeman and its economic activity is already everywhere, why would China try to fill these so-called vacuums?