4 December 2025 by Larry C. Johnson
The image at the head of this article — courtesy of Donbass News — destroys the narrative perpetuated by a horde of Western-establishment military analysts. Western analysts, particularly from think tanks like the Institute for the Study of War (ISW), the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), and the Carnegie Endowment, have consistently described Russia’s advances as incremental, grinding, and far from operationally decisive. These assessments emphasize high costs in manpower and equipment relative to the limited territory gained, often framing the conflict as a war of attrition rather than rapid conquest. Below are key quotes from 2024–2025 reports and interviews, focused on the post-2022 invasion phase.
ISW, a U.S.-based neoconservative outfit founded by the sister-in-law of Robert Kagan , regularly highlights Russia’s “creeping” and “footpace” advances, noting they fall short of mechanized warfare norms.
Kofman, a senior fellow specializing in Russian military strategy, describes Russia’s progress as “lackluster” and incremental, despite advantages in manpower.
RUSI analyses, often co-authored by experts like Samuel Cranny-Evans, project Russia’s limitations through 2025–2026.
The RUSI quote did not age well. Let’s put the 701 square kilometers in one month in perspective… Gaza is half that size. Israel, despite every military advantage, has failed to defeat Hamas, which is only armed by light weapons (e.g., rifles and RPGs) after 25 months of fighting. That’s quite an indictment of the relative incompetence of the Israeli army. Compare that to Russia, who in just one month, fighting against a peer military force that is funded and supplied by the United States and NATO, has conquered an area twice the size of Gaza.
What is the name of the clown at RUSI who predicted that, “Russia is unlikely to achieve significant gains in 2025?” As I have written previously, I think the main reason for Russia’s slow advances in 2023 and 2024 was an issue of trained manpower… Russia’s only major mobilization of reservists was in September 2022. Since then it has relied on conscription and contract soldiers to fill out the ranks. In February 2022, Russia’s Ground Forces numbered roughly 280,000–300,000 active personnel… Today that number stands, according to Russian sources, at 1.5 million. That is the main reason that Russia is now able to carry out major offensive operations along eight axes of attack.
The other glaring failure of Western analysts is their claim that Russia is suffering massive casualties. They are not. Body exchanges (repatriation of deceased soldiers’ remains) between Russia and Ukraine since January 2025 are conducted irregularly, often mediated by third parties like the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) or as part of broader prisoner-of-war (POW) deals. These swaps are asymmetric, with Russia typically returning far more Ukrainian bodies (reflecting control over more battlefields and higher Ukrainian losses in contested areas) than Ukraine returns Russian ones. In other words, Russia is advancing and Ukraine is retreating.
Based on consolidated reports from Russian, Ukrainian, and international sources as of December 4, 2025, Russia has returned 13,300 Ukrainian bodies to Ukraine while Ukraine delivered the remains of 350 Russian bodies to Russian authorities during 2025… That is a ratio of 38 dead Ukrainians for one dead Russian soldier. That metric alone reveals the dire situation confronting the Ukrainian military and, if the war continues, it will get much worse for the Ukrainians.