The Energy Breakup Europe Can’t Enforce
- Europe’s planned phase-out of Russian gas and LNG by 2026–27 is largely symbolic for now.
- Internal divisions (Hungary, Slovakia), structural dependency, limited alternative supply, and LNG market opacity undermine enforcement.
- Moscow is using the long 2027 timeline to adapt.
In recent weeks, the European Union has seemed to be upping the ante regarding its addiction to Russian hydrocarbons. Internal pressure and market realities seem to be forcing Brussels to close the door to Moscow, full stop. As indicated by the new agreement to phase out all Russian gas imports by 2027 and LNG by the end of 2026, European leaders reiterated that the EU is finally severing the last remaining pipelines, literal and political, that it still binds to Moscow. Even though all statements are emphatic, stating an ambitious timeline and an unmistakable intent, reality is still less positive than the media is presenting. Market data and political realities show that the expected divorce is less a clean break than another step on the long road of a protracted separation. Taking the latter position, both parties continue to live in the same house. Facts show that the total end of Russian oil and gas exports to Europe is, despite the rhetoric, far from reality, raising concerns about the true level of energy independence.
Brussels’s latest decisions should have marked a historic turn. By adopting on December 3rd a phased ban on Russian natural gas, requiring LNG imports to cease by late 2026 and pipeline gas by 2027, Brussels wanted to show a clean break. For most, however, the package is just a new and logical extension of the earlier oil embargoes. All with a full intent to deprive Moscow of revenues that fuel its war on Ukraine, but again, it entailed a list of loopholes that already weaken it fully. As stated within hours of the EU announcement, pro-Russian member state Hungary said that it will challenge the regulation at the European Court of Justice. Budapest, currently perceived as a pro-Putin channel, claims that energy security falls squarely within national sovereignty. The Orban government also stated that Brussels had overstepped its own capabilities. Orban’s European friends, such as Slovakia, have also indicated that they are very unhappy or even totally opposed to it all. These disagreements create frustration and disappointment among EU members, complicating unified action on energy independence.
While maybe the most straightforward explanation for the lack of success is to blame dissent, the package is weakened much more by other issues. The EU regulation itself is already perforated with exemptions and emergency clauses, all showing ample opportunity or outright allowing Russian gas to continue flowing, especially in case of a tight supply situation or if a member country faces disruptions. Looking at markets, these contingencies are not to be regarded as theoretical, but clear facts of everyday life. Winter demand spikes, LNG price volatility, or infrastructure outages could quickly trigger derogations that stretch into months. Again, new regulations are clearly taking the position Europe has been in before. As seen before, Europe’s temporary allowances have a habit of becoming structural features. The primary example of this is the Druzhba pipeline, which has received the exception since 2022. When the EU banned Russian crude, the pipeline was exempted, allowing Hungary and Slovakia to fill the gap so enthusiastically that their imports climbed above pre-war levels. This dynamic highlights how enforcement remains fragile and vulnerable to political and market pressures.
At the same time, Russian energy supplies continue to reach Europe despite new legislation that neither regulates nor halts them. As reported in the media, roughly 16 BCM of Russian pipeline gas reached European customers via Turkstream throughout 2025. Most of these volumes target Hungary and several Balkan states. Even though these figures are just a fraction of the 175–180 BCM Russia supplied before the Ukraine invasion, they are still a substantial volume in a region where alternatives remain scarce. Russia is clearly using Turkey’s willingness to serve as the transit and blending hub, as Ankara takes advantage of discounted Russian gas, with total flows entering under so-called “non-Russian” origin certificates. Again, it is shown that reality is much more complex to change for Brussels than politicians recognize. Brussels can tighten paperwork; it cannot easily police the molecular pathways inside a multi-source, multi-directional pipeline system.
When looking at LNG, the picture is even more ambiguous. Moscow’s LNG exports have dipped only marginally this year, showing a decline of just 2% year-on-year. This situation should worry Brussels, as Putin’s LNG volumes are still at 28.4 million tons between January and November. Brussels’s proposed LNG ban may eventually stem these flows, but Moscow still holds powerful cards. Russia can still use existing contracts, market demand, and the ability to re-route cargoes through global terminals to buffer any near-term negative impact on its pipeline gas situation. As reported, Russia’s November shipments increased by 10% from a year earlier, aided by fresh capacity from Arctic LNG 2. Even if the EU is willing to ban direct imports, the shadiness of the global LNG markets will still mitigate overall effects. It is still unclear how European member countries will try to block indirect LNG inflows, which are purchased by traders outside the EU and resold into European terminals. The current success of the global LNG market, which is liquid and offers options for origin masking, is now the primary constraint on achieving a very successful EU sanctions regime, or even on enforcing it fully.
While natural gas or LNG is on the minds of most, oil is, however, a much more complicated story. At present, it is clear that oil is ostensibly further along in the sanctions ladder, while Europe’s exposure is complicated to say the least. At present, the EU and G7 partners are considering abandoning the price cap regime in favor of outright bans on maritime services for Russian oil. Theoretically, this could cut off the shipping capacity Moscow needs to move its barrels. Primary targets here are clearly India and China. When talking, however, to shipping analysts worldwide, all state that Moscow has been able to build an extensive “shadow fleet” of ageing tankers, obscure ownership arrangements, and non-Western insurers, which are mainly based in the UAE, Hong Kong, or smaller jurisdictions. All these vessels operate outside of the G7’s enforcement reach. Analysts also reiterated that these vessels are often involved in ship-to-ship transfers in opaque waters such as the Laconian Gulf or off the Canaries. Looking at this situation, it is clear that even if a maritime services ban would raise friction costs, it would not block Russia’s oil. The role of some G7 partners is also not yet clear, based on the news and vibes coming out of Washington.
Devil’s advocates could argue that Europe is, in practice, sustaining Russia’s energy trade. Whether intentional or not, Europe’s role should not be underestimated. Despite a long list of sanctions, European companies still import large volumes of refined fuels from India and Turkey—fuels that are, in many cases, produced from Russian crude.
Brussels’ attempt to curb this “laundering” of Russian oil by requiring certificates of origin from 2026 is unlikely to solve the problem. Oil is fungible, refineries can obscure feedstock origins with ease, and intermediaries have every incentive to disguise where the crude came from. Without intrusive audits of Indian and Turkish refineries—which the EU has no appetite for—this workaround will continue.
All of this highlights a stark reality: Europe can legislate against Russian molecules, but Moscow can still sell them. The EU may sharply reduce its direct purchases of Russian oil and gas, but indirect flows, exemptions, political disputes, and third-country supply chains will keep Russia embedded in Europe’s energy system for years. Putin knows this.
In fact, the current situation benefits the Kremlin more than Europe. The gradual phase-out gives Moscow exactly what it needs: time. Russia is already deepening its energy ties with China and India, which now absorb most of its crude. Brussels has also handed Moscow breathing room to expand LNG production—most notably via Arctic LNG 2—and to grow its shadow fleet and alternative financial systems insulated from Western sanctions. For Moscow, the EU’s 2027 deadline is a transition period, not a cut-off.
Meanwhile, Europe’s own energy system reinforces the dependency. Gas remains both essential and increasingly difficult to source affordably. Norway is near peak output, Algeria is unreliable, and Azerbaijan cannot scale indefinitely. Europe has shifted its hopes to LNG, but even here Qatar has warned of possible shortages later in the decade. Rising Asian demand could tighten markets further. In such a landscape, Russian molecules—legal or laundered—retain undeniable strategic appeal. Some EU members will lobby, quietly or openly, for flexibility.
The deeper risk is that Brussels begins believing its own narrative. Public claims of “ending dependence” mask a private reality of continued reliance. This self-deception could lead to underinvestment in new infrastructure, failure to secure long-term alternatives, or overuse of emergency clauses that quietly keep Russian flows alive. Such inconsistencies erode both strategy and credibility. A sanctions regime that claims to choke off Russian revenue while allowing leaks only strengthens the Kremlin.
Europe has indeed reduced its exposure to Russian energy. Russian exports to the bloc are now a fraction of pre-war levels, and political will for further action is growing. Yet the gap between ambition and reality remains wide. Until that gap is closed, a complete end to Russian hydrocarbons remains an aspiration—not an accomplished fact.
If Europe truly intends to break free, it needs a fundamentally different energy system from the one built over decades. Deadlines alone cannot change geology, markets, or trade routes. Moscow will exploit every loophole, every weak link, every transit hub, and every blended barrel to maintain access to Europe’s demand.
Energy divorces are not declared—they are enforced. And enforcement, with all its messy technical and political challenges, is precisely where Europe still has a long way to go.
By Cyril Widdershoven for Oilprice.com