[Salon] Ukraine: Letting the people who live there decide



FM: John Whitbeck

Current reporting (https://www.nytimes.com/2025/12/11/world/europe/trump-ukraine-european-leaders.html) suggests that the territorial issue standing in the way of ending the war in Ukraine has now boiled down solely to the fate of the portion of Donetsk oblast which is not yet under Russian control, with Russia apparently willing to drop its sovereignty claim to the portions of Zaporizhzhia and Kherson oblasts which it does not yet control and to withdraw its forces from all portions of internationally recognized Ukrainian territory which Russia has not formally annexed and, hence, does not consider, in accordance with its own constitution, to be Russian territory.

It should also be clear to all concerned -- although it is not yet -- that the pursuit of "legally binding" security "guarantees" is simply a quest for face-saving eyewash and, unless it is proposed that such "guarantees" take the form of NATO forces on Ukrainian territory, the very possibility which provoked this war, is essentially meaningless in a world in which states regularly violate formal legal obligations whenever they conflict with the perceived interests of the moment (https://www.counterpunch.org/2025/11/26/the-article-5-illusion). The nature of any ostensible security "guarantee"-- indeed, even Ukraine's "right" to join NATO -- should not alone be permitted to prolong this war.

Presented Zelensky suggested yesterday that ceding internationally recognized Ukrainian territory would require a referendum. While he had in mind a referendum of all Ukrainians on ceding any internationally recognized Ukrainian territory, the democratic concept of letting the people decide has now been introduced and could be constructively adapted.

In this context, I am taking the liberty of supplementing my message of December 10 with a retransmission (below) of my message of November 22.

NOTE: The issue of Ukraine's "right" to join NATO, which, since Ukrainian membership would require the unanimous consent of all existing member states, has never been a realistic possibility, reminds me of a classic scene in the great film Monty Python's Life of Brian in which the governing board of the People's Front of Judea confronts the conundrum of the desire of Stan/Loretta, a male member of the board aspring to be a woman, to bear children and finally passes a resolution affirming Stan/Loretta's "right", notwithstanding his/her acknowledged absence of a womb, to bear children. Ukraine's formal "right" to join NATO can be viewed similarly but, having played a major role in provoking this war and still being viewed as a serious issue that could prevent peace, has never been and is not now a laughing matter.

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November 22, 2025

TO: Distinguished Recipients
FM: John Whitbeck

On Thursday night, I circulated an assessment of the Trump "peace plan" for Ukraine which my distinguished recipient Anatol Lieven had written before the text of the plan became publicly available (https://responsiblestatecraft.org/trump-plan-ukraine-war).

Transmitted below is his assessment of the plan published yesterday, after the text of the plan became available.

Few would argue with Anatol's assertion that "On the Ukrainian side, the biggest and most difficult concession by far is agreeing to withdraw from the approximately 14% of the Donbas region that Ukraine still holds."

That being the case, President Zelensky, who has said that he will "propose alternatives" to the plan and has promised a "constructive search for solutions," should seriously consider proposing a democratic solution (https://www.counterpunch.org/2023/03/17/a-democratic-end-to-ukraines-war) -- a UN-organized self-determination referendum in the portion of contested Donetsk oblast that Ukraine still holds which would permit the people living there to choose whether they wish to live in Russia or in Ukraine.

Proposing such a democratic solution would constitute a "constructive search for solutions", would be instantly advantegous to Ukraine from a public perceptions standpoint and would be awkward for Russia to reject out of hand, since doing so would suggest that Russia seeks to rule over people who, if given a choice, would reject Russian rule.

Since a referendum in only the Ukrainian-controlled portion of Donetsk oblast would be likely to favor Ukraine, Russia might then counterpropose a referendum in all of Donetsk oblast in the belief that such a referendum would be likely to favor Russia -- and, if Russia did so, rejecting this alternative, which would suggest a Ukrainian belief that such a referendum would indeed favor Russia, would be awkward for Ukraine for the same reason.

In any event, if the concept of "let the people who live there decide" were to be introduced into good-faith negotiations regarding the most difficult territorial issue blocking any pathway to a lasting peace, it could, by saving face for the decision-makers on all sides (including European governments, which continue to insist that any peace must be "just and lasting"), make a lasting (and not totally unjust) peace possible.

In this context, an article on the inherent conflict between the two principles of the territorial integrity of states and the self-determination of peoples which I wrote on the day that Russia extended diplomatic recognition to the Donetsk People's Republic and the Luhansk People's Republic, the two majority-Russophone Donbas oblasts, and which was published on the day that Russia launched its "special military operation" (https://www.counterpunch.org/2022/02/24/the-territorial-integrity-of-states-vs-the-self-determination-of-peoples), ostensibly to support and protect the territorial integrity of states which it recognized, may also be relevant.


Ukraine-Russia peace plan offers best chance to end the war

This plan demands concessions from both sides. Credit: Getty


November 21, 2025 

The draft framework plan for Ukraine is at times vague and strangely worded. But it is still the best basis for a lasting peace that Ukraine, Russia and Europe are ever likely — realistically speaking — to get. All the governments involved have, understandably, so far responded cautiously to the plan, and some tough negotiations lie ahead. Nevertheless, it would be a historic tragedy if these end in failure and the war continued.

Since much of the Western media has — absurdly — described this as a “capitulation” to Russia’s “maximalist demands”, it is necessary to point out the ways in which this plan also represents Russian concessions. These are evident in comparison to Putin’s aims when he launched the invasion, but also relative to the Russian demands set out in June 2024, which still officially represent Russia’s position.

Crucially, the plan secures Russia’s formal recognition of Ukraine’s right to join the European Union, the key issue behind the Maidan revolt of 2013-14. If Ukraine and the EU can make this a reality, it would anchor Ukraine in the West far more firmly than Nato membership alone could.

In addition, while Russia had previously demanded that Russian be established as an official second national language in Ukraine, the current plan takes a more limited approach. It stipulates that Ukraine will adopt EU standards on religious tolerance and the protection of linguistic minorities, and that both countries will agree to abolish discriminatory measures while guaranteeing the rights of Ukrainian and Russian media and educational institutions.

This is a very significant concession because my Russian sources told me only last month that, given the EU’s total failure to protect Russian minority rights in the Baltic States, no EU guarantees could be taken seriously.

In the plan, Russia also abandons its previous demand that Ukraine cede the entirety of the Kherson and Zaporizhzhia provinces and receives only de facto recognition of its control over Crimea and the Donbas. Instead of the immediate suspension of sanctions, Russia receives only the vague promise that “Sanction relief will be discussed and agreed upon in phases and on a case-by-case basis.”

The provision for an amnesty for both sides has been portrayed as a concession to Russia in order to get cases against Russian leaders at the International Criminal Court dropped. However, the Wall Street Journal reports that: “A senior U.S. official said that Ukraine significantly changed one of the 28 points in the version that appeared online. In an apparent move to expose alleged corruption, the draft had called for an audit of all international aid Ukraine had received. The language was changed to say all parties will receive “full amnesty for their actions during the war”.

The Ukrainian standing armed forces are to be limited to 600,000 men, but far from being a real concession this looks like a device to save Putin’s face. Ukraine cannot possibly sustain a peacetime standing army of 600,000 men. In any future war, it would call up reserves. Moreover, in the Istanbul talks of March 2022 Ukraine was proposing a limit of 250,000 men.

On the Ukrainian side, the biggest and most difficult concession by far is agreeing to withdraw from the approximately 14% of the Donbas region that Ukraine still holds. Ukrainians have described this to me as completely impossible and said that it would risk a mutiny against it in the army.

This proposal is, however, softened by the criterion that while the area would come under Russian administrative control, it would be demilitarised and supervised by neutral peacekeepers. And above all, the Ukrainian military must ask whether it is destined to lose this territory if the war drags on, and whether it is truly worth risking US support and tens of thousands of lives in a futile attempt to hold it.

Other alleged “concessions” by Ukraine and Europe are not real concessions at all. It has long been obvious that the promise of Nato membership for Ukraine is empty, since all Nato governments have made clear that they will never go to war to defend Ukraine. Similarly, the bar on Nato troops — and hence a European “reassurance force” — in Ukraine is meaningless, because most European states have refused to take part in such a force. British officials, the chief advocates of the project, have even admitted that no British ground troops would be sent and that the whole idea depended on a US “backstop”, which Trump will not provide.

Most importantly, if Russia and Ukraine agree to this memorandum, it would bring an immediate ceasefire. Violence would end, refugees could return, and rebuilding could begin. The plan foresees a cooperative economic and security relationship between the US and Russia and halts further Nato expansion. This is the best deal both parties can hope for, and walking away now would risk throwing all of it away.


Anatol Lieven is a former war correspondent and Director of the Eurasia Program at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft in Washington DC.

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