The
draft framework plan for
Ukraine is at times
vague and strangely
worded. But it is still
the best basis for a
lasting peace that
Ukraine, Russia and
Europe are ever likely —
realistically speaking —
to get. All the
governments involved
have, understandably, so
far responded cautiously to
the plan, and some tough
negotiations lie ahead.
Nevertheless, it would
be a historic tragedy if
these end in failure and
the war continued.
Since
much of the Western
media has — absurdly — described this
as a “capitulation” to
Russia’s “maximalist
demands”, it is
necessary to point out
the ways in which this
plan also represents
Russian concessions.
These are evident in
comparison to Putin’s
aims when he launched
the invasion, but also
relative to the Russian demands set
out in June 2024, which
still officially
represent Russia’s
position.
Crucially,
the plan secures
Russia’s formal
recognition of Ukraine’s
right to join the
European Union, the key
issue behind the Maidan
revolt of 2013-14. If
Ukraine and the EU can
make this a reality, it
would anchor Ukraine in
the West far more firmly
than Nato membership
alone could.
In
addition, while Russia
had previously demanded
that Russian be
established as an
official second national
language in Ukraine, the
current plan takes a
more limited approach.
It stipulates that
Ukraine will adopt EU
standards on religious
tolerance and the
protection of linguistic
minorities, and that
both countries will
agree to abolish
discriminatory measures
while guaranteeing the
rights of Ukrainian and
Russian media and
educational
institutions.
This
is a very significant
concession because my
Russian sources told me
only last month that,
given the EU’s total
failure to protect
Russian minority rights
in the Baltic States, no
EU guarantees could be
taken seriously.
In
the plan, Russia also
abandons its previous
demand that Ukraine cede
the entirety of the
Kherson and Zaporizhzhia
provinces and receives
only de facto
recognition of its
control over Crimea and
the Donbas. Instead of
the immediate suspension
of sanctions, Russia
receives only the vague
promise that “Sanction
relief will be discussed
and agreed upon in
phases and on a
case-by-case basis.”
The
provision for an amnesty
for both sides has been
portrayed as a
concession to Russia in
order to get cases
against Russian leaders
at the International
Criminal Court dropped.
However, the Wall Street Journal reports that:
“A senior U.S. official
said that Ukraine
significantly changed
one of the 28 points in
the version that
appeared online. In an
apparent move to expose
alleged corruption, the
draft had called for an
audit of all
international aid
Ukraine had received.
The language was changed
to say all parties will
receive “full amnesty
for their actions during
the war”.
The
Ukrainian standing armed
forces are to be limited
to 600,000 men, but far
from being a real
concession this looks
like a device to save
Putin’s face. Ukraine
cannot possibly sustain
a peacetime standing
army of 600,000 men. In
any future war, it would
call up reserves.
Moreover, in the
Istanbul talks of March
2022 Ukraine was
proposing a limit of
250,000 men.
On
the Ukrainian side, the
biggest and most
difficult concession by
far is agreeing to
withdraw from the
approximately 14% of the
Donbas region that
Ukraine still holds.
Ukrainians have
described this to me as
completely impossible
and said that it would
risk a mutiny against it
in the army.
This
proposal is, however,
softened by the
criterion that while the
area would come under
Russian administrative
control, it would be
demilitarised and
supervised by neutral
peacekeepers. And above
all, the Ukrainian
military must ask
whether it is destined
to lose this territory
if the war drags on, and
whether it is truly
worth risking US support
and tens of thousands of
lives in a futile
attempt to hold it.
Other
alleged “concessions” by
Ukraine and Europe are
not real concessions at
all. It has long been
obvious that the promise
of Nato membership for
Ukraine is empty, since
all Nato governments
have made clear that
they will never go to
war to defend Ukraine.
Similarly, the bar on
Nato troops — and hence
a European “reassurance
force” — in Ukraine is
meaningless, because
most European states
have refused to
take part in such a
force. British
officials, the chief
advocates of the
project, have even admitted that
no British ground troops
would be sent and that
the whole idea depended
on a US “backstop”,
which Trump will not
provide.
Most
importantly, if Russia
and Ukraine agree to
this memorandum, it
would bring an immediate
ceasefire. Violence
would end, refugees
could return, and
rebuilding could begin.
The plan foresees a
cooperative economic and
security relationship
between the US and
Russia and halts further
Nato expansion. This is
the best deal both
parties can hope for,
and walking away now
would risk throwing all
of it away.
Anatol Lieven is a former war
correspondent and
Director of the
Eurasia Program at
the Quincy
Institute for
Responsible
Statecraft in
Washington DC.