‘Win without fight’: how China fast-tracked the J-36, left US years behind in sixth-gen jet race
Experience and skill in building stealth fighter jets is crucial to get the competitive edge on rivals, says lead designer Yang Shuifeng
This is an open message from Yang Shuifeng, a lead designer of China’s cutting-edge stealth fighters.
“The experience and capability of the research and development team cannot start from zero,” Yang, senior engineer and director of the performance research division at the Chengdu Aircraft Design Institute’s overall design department, wrote in a paper published in the peer-reviewed Journal of Systems Engineering and Electronics on November 28.
According to Yang and his co-authors, institutions with established “design capability, development infrastructure and production facilities” and deep familiarity with foundational industrial systems – such as relevant chips, materials, components and standard parts – can provide the scientific planning, process management, performance evaluation and oversight needed to “rapidly mobilise human, material and financial resources” and drive programmes forward at speed.
China and the US are the two leading countries developing sixth-generation fighters.
The Post has contacted Boeing for comment.
By the end of 2024, its sixth-generation heavy stealth fighter – widely known as J-36 – was spotted undergoing intensive flight tests by the People’s Liberation Army Air Force, with rapid upgrades and iterations seen in recent months.
Meanwhile, Shenyang Aircraft Corporation (SAC), manufacturer of the J-35 stealth fighter, has been conducting extensive flight testing on its own sixth-generation lightweight stealth fighter, the J-50.
In contrast, US sixth-generation fighter development has progressed slowly. The NGAD programme, launched in 2014, remains largely on paper. The US military hopes Boeing can deliver a first flight by 2028.
US media reports attribute NGAD’s sluggish progress not only to technical challenges and the decline of American manufacturing but also to a series of management failures – persistent budget overruns, an inability to adapt to emerging military technologies and underestimating rivals, especially China. A too ambitious “do-everything-perfectly” mindset has also led to a plane that does too little well.
Yang’s team, in their paper, explain how China has avoided these management pitfalls.
When faced with budget overruns, Chinese engineers and scientists strive to revise aircraft designs and streamline R&D and manufacturing processes to reduce total costs rather than shifting the financial burden onto taxpayers.
More importantly, at the end of each year, project teams conduct a thorough review and “clear” any overruns, ensuring problems are not carried forward into the next fiscal cycle. These measures have prevented the kind of compounding, snowballing cost overruns seen across the Pacific.
For technological uncertainties, the Chinese team adopted a dual approach: they prepared for worst-case scenarios by setting high-performance benchmarks aimed at future warfare, while also staying grounded in reality – deliberately dropping secondary requirements to achieve breakthroughs in core capabilities.
Additionally, they maintained close coordination with China’s fast-evolving and dynamic manufacturing sector, actively embraced new technologies and integrated the latest innovations into weapon systems.
Yang likens the stealth fighter race to aerial combat between pilots. Each cycle consisted of detecting the target, processing information, making decisions and executing attacks. The side that completed this loop faster can launch more attacks within the same time frame and defeat its opponent.
To the Chinese, the idea of a programme like NGAD lingering in design debates for a decade is pointless.
“Equipment is meant to be used,” Yang and his team wrote.
Once formally delivered to users, the aircraft’s combat capabilities can be rapidly verified, applied and used in real-world operational scenarios. Post-delivery trials also allow developers to receive direct user feedback, enabling further optimisation and improvement of the aircraft.
“Once R&D, production and verification are complete, the aircraft should be quickly delivered to users and put into service,” Yang wrote. “If it remains sealed within the development unit for too long, it hampers functional refinement, performance enhancement and requirement fulfilment.”
Optimisation in aircraft development is endless, according to the Chinese engineers.
Passive optimisation comes from test results and field use – identifying issues that required modifications, upgrades or even software updates and hardware replacements within certain production batches.
Active optimisation arises from new R&D demands, evolving combat doctrines, and emerging aerospace technologies – allowing aircraft to reach new states and acquire new capabilities.
“After 10 or even dozens of iterative improvements, the platform, systems, propulsion and armaments of the first and last variants may differ greatly – but their performance and combat effectiveness could see generational leaps,” Yang wrote.
According to a report by China Aviation News in June 2020, Yang travelled to Beijing during pandemic lockdowns to make a significant contribution to securing national approval for new fighter programmes.
“Rapid development aims to deliver combat capability swiftly,” Yang wrote. “In military competition and preparation, it allows us to make the first move, seize the initiative and possibly achieve victory without fighting.”
But, he adds: “This necessarily breaks existing R&D systems and processes – it represents a fundamental reshaping of traditional equipment development models.”