India, under Prime Minister Narendra Modi, has spent the last decade telling the world a story about itself: that it is the Indo-Pacific’s decisive power, a civilisational state rising to challenge China and a natural partner of the United States in leading the “free world”. Modi has invested enormous political capital into choreographed diasporic spectacles, G20 extravagance and the belief that a new US-India alignment is both historic and inevitable. Yet Washington’s National Security Strategy, released in November, gives India barely a passing mention. In a blueprint that reorders American foreign policy priorities, India appears only as a supporting actor, sometimes even as a problem for the US president to fix.
The harsh truth is that India is not central to the strategic worldview expressed in America’s National Security Strategy. It is not viewed as critical to US security, nor does it satisfy the political or economic criteria that now guide American policy. Europe occupies centre stage as a civilisational ally whose identity the US claims must be saved; West Asia is celebrated as a theatre of personal US diplomatic victories; China is the defining adversary shaping every military and economic calculation.
India, meanwhile, is mentioned primarily as a party to be managed, especially in conflicts with its neighbours. The document boasts that Trump “negotiated peace… between Pakistan and India” as one in a list of eight conflicts solved through his personal diplomacy. India is not portrayed as the world’s next great power, but as one more dispute-prone state requiring American intervention.
Even when India appears in the Asia section, it is framed narrowly as a tool to help Washington counter China, not as an indispensable strategic pillar. The National Security Strategy states that the United States will continue quadrilateral cooperation with Australia, Japan, and India to encourage New Delhi to contribute more to Indo-Pacific security. There is no suggestion that India’s independent rise is essential to the global balance of power. Instead, India is one among many potential contributors to a US-led anti-China architecture. Strategic autonomy, Modi’s core principle, is not admired; it is tolerated only so long as it does not get in the way of American priorities.
New Delhi’s assumption that geopolitical flattery from Washington was equivalent to mutual dependence has been exposed as wishful thinking. India has never been indispensable to US defense guarantees. The American vision for the Indo-Pacific, articulated clearly in this National Security Strategy, revolves around maritime chokepoints, naval bases and high-end technological advantage. India brings none of these to the table at scale.
The US requires carriers in the First Island Chain, deterrence over Taiwan and control of shipping routes through the South China Sea, a region through which one-third of global shipping passes annually and where China’s dominance could harm the US economy. India cannot contribute meaningfully to any of these core missions. Its naval modernisation lags behind its rhetoric and its reluctance to sign defence-access agreements makes it a difficult partner in any coordinated regional strategy.
Modi’s government has often acted as if symbolic politics, addressing joint sessions of the US Congress, stadium rallies with American presidents, lavish diaspora events, could substitute for the structural requirements of a real alliance. Instead of reforming its defence sector, India continues to depend heavily on Russian systems. Instead of liberalising its economy to attract stable foreign investment, it engages in blatant cronyism and erratic protectionism.
Instead of strengthening democratic institutions to align with Western values, it increasingly undermines judicial independence, journalistic freedom, and minority protections. These trends erode India’s credibility as a partner in any project presented as defending liberty or international order.
The National Security Strategy lays out clear filters for determining American foreign priorities: the purpose of foreign policy is the protection of core national interests. By that measure, India fails the test. The United States is not obligated to secure India’s borders. It does not depend on Indian manufacturing for critical supply chains. It does not rely on Indian markets to sustain its economic dominance. And unlike Japan, South Korea or Germany, India does not host US forces or integrate its military planning with NATO-like frameworks.
Washington’s cooling enthusiasm also reflects ideological divergence. The National Security Strategy speaks of a mission to rescue Europe from civilisational erasure driven by immigration and declining birthrates, arguing that Europe must regain its cultural self-confidence. The ideological energy of this foreign policy is invested not in defending global democracy but in defending what Trump believes, Western cultural identity.
India, multireligious, multilinguistic, post-colonial cannot be made part of this imagined civilisational West. Even Modi’s Hindu-nationalist politics, which some of Trump’s political allies celebrate domestically, does not translate into strategic centrality. It only confirms that India has its own civilisational anxieties and priorities, which rarely align neatly with Washington’s.
Furthermore, Trump’s worldview sees immigration as a national security threat. India, once a major source of high-skilled immigration the US actively prized, no longer sits naturally inside America’s strategic self-image. A Modi government lobbying for more visas is increasingly at odds with a United States that portrays foreign workers as undermining American jobs and cultural cohesion.
Even where India has tried to align with US interests, by signing the Logistics Exchange Memorandum Of Agreement for cooperation between the armed forces of the two countries, banning Chinese apps, joining the Quad, engaging in military exercises, its commitment remains narrow and reversible. Modi proudly hosts Russian President Vladimir Putin, refuses to criticise Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, hesitates to participate in sanctions, and prioritises cheap Russian oil over Western geopolitical concerns. This reinforces the perception in Washington that India seeks maximum gain with minimal strategic risk.
The National Security Strategy emphasises fairness and burden-sharing: allies must assume primary responsibility for their regions rather than expect the US to prop up the entire world order like Atlas. India’s reluctance to shoulder security risk beyond its immediate borders, places it outside the new burden-sharing club.
There is also a more uncomfortable truth: India is not important for what Washington needs. American strategy under Trump is driven by solvable emergencies and transactional gains. Europe faces what the National Security Strategy calls an existential struggle over identity. West Asia offers deliverable diplomatic wins that the document celebrates repeatedly, calling the region a place of partnership, friendship, and investment. China is the paramount threat. India is still unimportant and too complicated to do Washington’s bidding.
Modi’s so-called foreign policy successes, therefore, have been misinterpreted and misreported at home. What India viewed as recognition of its inevitable rise was, for Washington, a temporary convenience shaped by China’s ascent and America’s need for symbolic support in its rhetoric around the Indo-Pacific. The new National Security Strategy makes clear that the United States is reorganising the world into a civilisational West, a militarised Asia defined by China and a transactional West Asia. India fits fully into none of these categories.
What this moment demands is humility in New Delhi. India’s rise is not assured because speeches in Washington are warm or because American presidents attend Namaste Trump rallies and call Modi on his 75th birthday. Power must be built by capability, trust, and alignment, not pageantry and self-congratulation. A foreign policy that avoids commitments may preserve flexibility, but it also guarantees marginality.
For a nation that aspires to shape the future world order, being a footnote in America’s strategic vision should serve as a wake-up call.
Ashok Swain is a professor of peace and conflict research at Uppsala University, Sweden.