Southern Separatists make their move in Yemen
Summary: in a bold strike a UAE-backed separatist movement has seized control of the two large governorates that constitute the eastern half of the country and in doing so have delivered a devastating blow to the Internationally Recognised Government.
We thank our regular contributor Helen Lackner for today’s article. An expert on Yemen, Helen also works as a freelance rural development consultant with a particular interest in water, among other environmental issues. SAQI Books has published the paperback edition with new material of her Yemen In Crisis, now subtitled Devastating Conflict, Fragile Hope. It is a seminal study of the war, what lies behind it and what needs to happen for it to finally end. Her latest book Yemen: Poverty and Conflict was published by Routledge in 2022. You can find Helen’s most recent Arab Digest podcast Yemen, Israel and the UAE here.
The Southern Transitional Council [STC] takeover of Yemen’s two eastern governorates is a major development in the civil war, now well into its 11th year as well as a significant indicator of the deterioration of Saudi-Emirati relations. The lightening seizure of Hadhramaut and al Mahra governorates underscores the fragility of the Internationally Recognised Government [IRG], reversing recent improvements in governance, including success in controlling the exchange rate of the Yemeni riyal in IRG controlled areas.
For the past three years, the fundamental conflict between two main factions in the IRG was most visible in Hadhramaut. This governorate, the largest geographically in Yemen despite hosting only about 8% of the country’s population has a substantial share of Yemen’s very small oil reserves and is comparatively wealthy thanks to investments and support from Saudi companies owned by descendants of Hadhrami migrants. It also has a rigid ascribed social structure with a strict hierarchy in which sada [descendants of the prophet, elsewhere known as Hashemites or ashraf] have considerable influence alongside the senior tribes and the larger traders. Returning from exile after the 1990 unification, thanks to allying with the former Saleh regime, sada dispossessed the lower status people who had benefited from the socialist regime, leading many of the latter to support the Islamist Islah party as it believes in equality of all before Allah, opposing inherited status discrimination.
In the last instance, in 2022, of agreement between Saudis and Emiratis they jointly established the eight-man Presidential Leadership Council (PLC); it is evenly divided between Saudi and Emirati supporters. The two factions have been in increasingly aggressive competition since then with different regional influence and interests within Yemen. The domestic and regional elements cannot be neatly separated. However within southern separatist factions, the STC has been dominant thanks to political, diplomatic and military support from the UAE.
This year, the situation in Hadhramaut gradually worsened as deputy governor and head of the Hadhrami Tribal Alliance, Amr bin Habrish created the Hadhramaut Protection Force and increased its size and strength. The force prevented oil supply from reaching the power stations in Aden and elsewhere, playing a role (alongside corruption and technical issues) in causing lengthy power outages. Aden went days without any power and often has cuts of 20 hours/day. Although nominally ruled by the IRG, Aden and other major southern towns and cities are actually managed by the STC, hence it is the target of popular dissatisfaction about power cuts, rising prices, delayed salaries, lack of jobs and more. STC repression is severe and freedom of _expression_ under its rule absent. Frustration at the economic situation - for which the STC is widely blamed - is widespread.
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The Southern Transitional Council’s rapid military seizure of Hadhramaut and al Mahra governorates reflects a deepening rift between Saudi Arabia and the UAE, further destabilising Yemen’s internationally recognised government
Why now?
Dissatisfaction in Aden, the fuel crisis, financial constraints all encouraged STC action, at a time when the UAE-Saudi rivalry was also intensifying. UAE leaders were displeased at the Saudi request for US intervention in Sudan’s civil war by Mohammed bin Salman during his recent visit to Washington which came at a time of increased international outrage at the genocidal actions [even in US official descriptions] of the Emirati- backed Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in Darfur. It may be that the STC takeover of the two governorates was a retaliatory measure encouraged by Abu Dhabi.
Between them, these various factors came to a head. With UAE support, the STC leadership launched an offensive against Hadhramaut and al Mahra in the first week of December. STC forces rapidly took control of most of the military installations in Hadhramaut and al Mahra, leaving IRG-aligned forces to retreat to near the Saudi border. The Hadhramaut Protection Force dispersed. Saudi Arabia withdrew its military from Aden and other locations, as well as pulling civilians including hospital staff out. It has also flown military aircraft threatening STC forces and massed troops on its southern border.
STC forces, whose main base is a small area north of Aden, have made extremely insulting statements against Hadhramis, something which will not reconcile them to people they have despised for decades. The killing of officers and troops and accusations of disappearances and removal of wounded from hospitals will merely consolidate hatred for these ‘invaders.’ While the STC has been ill-treating and expelling ‘northerners’ from Hadhramaut, Hadhramis considered them at least as foreign as Yemenis from other areas. In al Mahra, a senior notable held a banquet for northern forces, reminding the world that ‘the military and security leaders from the northern governorates… have lived among us for many years and from whom we have received nothing but kindness’. Oman which borders al Mahra has also openly objected to the raising of the southern separatist flag on Yemeni border posts as it recognises the Republic of Yemen, not the STC.
Sponsoring ‘mass’ demonstrations calling for independence, the STC announced it would recognise Israel and join the Abraham accords, a move clearly aligning it with UAE policy and also designed to achieve US and other western acceptance for its actions. However the STC leadership had not thought through the negative consequences of such a proclamation. Most states, including China, the US, UK, France, and the EU have declared their support for the territorial integrity of Yemen, and support for the IRG president. As of 15 December, the IMF suspended its activities in Yemen, likely to be followed by others, particularly the World Bank, leaving the STC at the sole mercy of the UAE. This at a time when the UN Secretary General reminded the world that 19.5 million Yemenis are in need of humanitarian assistance
President Al Alimi and Prime Minister Salem bin Brik, lacking protection in Aden, decamped to Riyadh where the president met ambassadors; he has now ordered all ministers to leave Aden [difficult due to STC pressure] and has warned of a deterioration of living conditions. Al Alimi and the Saudis are demanding the withdrawal of STC forces from the positions they have taken in the Hadhramaut interior and al Mahra, to be replaced by the National Shield Forces established in 2023. Despite the depth and urgency of the crisis, Al Alimi only met Saudi Defence Minister Khaled bin Salman on 17 December. Khaled has called for US mediation. Given the priorities of the Trump administration, it is unlikely that such an intervention would do much for Yemenis. However as Saudi-Emirati rivalry intensifies Trump may find himself in the uncomfortable position of having to choose between one ruling Gulf family and the other. Undoubtedly Israel will be pushing for Washington to back the UAE. The president’s dilemma is that that would infuriate Mohammed bin Salman.
Much is left to be decided but in the midst of multiple world crises and end of year disinterest, the UN Secretary General waited until 17 December to make a weak statement calling for ‘all parties to exercise maximum restraint … This includes regional stakeholders’. Meanwhile, as usual, it is the people of Yemen who suffer the consequences.
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