Why has Beijing turned down the heat in the Taiwan Strait in the second half of 2025?
PLA warplanes and ships have been less active around the island in the second half of the year, Taiwanese data shows
In the past five years, People’s Liberation Army activity near Taiwan has been seen by many observers as a key indicator of when and whether a conflict that may involve the world’s two most powerful militaries could erupt.
Over that period, Chinese military drills have been getting larger and edging closer to the island. They include what the PLA has described as increasingly “combat-oriented” exercises that more closely resemble what might happen in the event of a real blockade or war.
Admiral Samuel Paparo, head of US Indo-Pacific Command, warned last year that such manoeuvres amounted to “rehearsals” for an armed assault.
Meanwhile, Taiwanese analysts have warned that the PLA is also practising a switch “from training to war”, raising concerns that such drills could turn into a sudden attack on the island.
Mainland China has also turned up the heat by sending increasing numbers of warplanes, ships and coastguard vessels on regular manoeuvres around the Taiwan Strait.
Beijing has said that its manoeuvres in the area are meant to deter pro-independence politicians, and many analysts believe that the intensity of its military activities – which increased after William Lai Ching-te was sworn in as the island’s leader last year – reflects its thinking regarding the island.
In the 11 months to November this year, the number of warplanes flying near the island rose slightly by 5.8 per cent from the same period last year, according to the South China Morning Post’s analysis of data from Taiwan’s defence ministry.
But since July, the PLA has turned down the pressure with a significant drop-off in aerial activity and has not held a large-scale exercise – a trend that may reflect the wider backdrop of events, including an easing of tensions with the United States and Lai’s political woes at home.
Between July and November, Taiwan counted a total of 2,209 sorties by PLA aircraft near the island, a drop of 14 per cent compared with the same period last year.
The absence of any large-scale drill also means that this year is the first time since 2022 that there has been only one exercise of this kind.
However, the number of coastguard ships operating around the island was significantly higher than the same period last year, with no signs of activity dropping off in the second half.
These vessels would play a key role in the event of a blockade.
Analysts said such trends reflected Beijing’s wider political and strategic thinking as well as its response to events.
While they agreed that the immediate risks of a full-blown war were low, they said Beijing was increasingly preparing for a blockade of the island.
“Our actions will be determined by the evolving situation in Taiwan, including Lai’s provocative moves, as well as the activities of external countries,” said Fu Qianshao, an analyst and former member of the PLA Air Force.
Sorties by warplanes had become routine and now constituted “a comprehensive set of training measures”, Fu added.
Taiwan has reported daily PLA activity around the island since late 2020. In August 2022, a visit by then US House speaker Nancy Pelosi triggered a large-scale military exercise around the island.
Since then, Beijing has intensified the pressure despite its repeated insistence that it favours peaceful reunification.
Beijing views Taiwan as part of China to be reunited by force if necessary. Most countries, including the US, do not recognise it as an independent state, but Washington opposes any attempt to take the self-ruled island by force and is legally bound to provide arms to help it defend itself.
Spikes in PLA activity usually follow perceived provocations from Taipei, such as statements viewed by Beijing as leaning towards independence.
Between January and November this year, a total of 4,976 PLA aircraft sorties were detected around Taiwan, compared with 4,703 over the same period last year, the Post’s analysis found.
This year, 3,508 of these flights crossed the median line, the unofficial boundary that splits the 180km (112-mile) Taiwan Strait, accounting for just over 70 per cent of operations, compared with around 60 per cent last year.
The decline in operations in the latter part of the year included July and August, typically one of the peak periods for PLA exercises. But this year the number of sorties detected crossing the median line in those months dropped by nearly 15 per cent from the same period in 2024.
The sharpest drop, 40 per cent, was recorded in October, with 222 operations recorded compared with 370 last year.
Chang Ching, an analyst at Taiwan’s Society for Strategic Studies, said the figures released by Taipei were partly for local voters and may not give the full picture.
“We must assume that certain activities might go undetected. All such statistics should be treated with caution,” he added.
Mainland analysts have also said some stealth aircraft may be able to escape detection.
Taiwan started to release information about the PLA’s activities near the island in 2020, but it remains unclear whether Taiwan discloses all information, a possible tactic to keep Beijing in the dark about its detection capabilities.
Lyle Goldstein, director of the China Initiative at Brown University, said the drop may have been the result of Washington reportedly stopping Lai from making a transit in the US and the Taiwanese leader’s humiliation at home after he backed a failed attempt to unseat opposition lawmakers.
Lai also suffered a political blow for failing to recall any one of the 32 opposition politicians targeted in a months-long recall campaign.
“It’s quite conceivable that these two events combined to boost China’s confidence and thus cause it to pull back on military pressure, at least to a small extent,” Goldstein said.
October also saw the meeting between Chinese President Xi Jinping and US President Donald Trump in Busan, South Korea, where, breaking decades of precedent, there was no mention of Taiwan in the statements issued after the summit.
Earlier that month, Lai delivered a speech on the Double Tenth public holiday, the anniversary of the revolution that led to the founding of the Republic of China, traditionally a major political set piece.
The US has also grown quieter on the number of transits made by its warships in the Taiwan Strait, a move some analysts believe is designed to dampen down tensions with Beijing. Such transits were announced regularly while Joe Biden was US president.
There have only been three confirmed operations of this type since Trump returned to the White House earlier this year. In each case, this confirmation was in response to media questions and no statements were released by the US military.
Chang said a second large-scale PLA exercise was unlikely this year.
“Beijing’s diplomatic charm offensive since 2025 has been effective, so there is no need to disrupt the positive atmosphere,” he said.
“With Trump expected to visit China in April, Beijing may avoid actions that provoke negative US public opinion and disrupt the broader strategic environment.”
Beijing is trying for a kind of ‘Goldilocks’ solution here: not too big and not too small, in order to maintain high pressure, but not spark a backlash
Goldstein said it was “significant” that 70 per cent of this year’s sorties had crossed the median line.
“In general, I think the PLA is stepping up the pressure, as it sees this as quite an effective tool in the overall political landscaping – particularly for messaging elite audiences in both Taipei and Washington, but also Tokyo, Seoul etc,” he said.
“My guess is that Beijing is trying for a kind of ‘Goldilocks’ solution here: not too big and not too small, in order to maintain high pressure, but not spark a backlash, since it sees current trends as generally favourable.”
Shi Yinhong, an international relations professor at Renmin University, said financial reasons may partially explain the recent reduction in aerial sorties as the mainland economy continues to face headwinds.
PLA cost controls were included in the Communist Party’s proposals for the next five-year plan released in October.
There is also an ongoing anti-corruption campaign targeting the PLA’s top brass, which has brought down several generals with extensive experience in Fujian, the province facing the Taiwan Strait.
But analysts said the anti-corruption campaign was likely to have a limited impact on operations around Taiwan.
“I doubt that corruption issues are playing into this,” Goldstein said.
Chang agreed, saying the removal of top commanders was unlikely to affect PLA exercises, adding that it already trained for situations where units were understaffed.
Compared with navy and air force operations, the use of the coastguard is a more recent phenomenon and became more frequent after it joined the May 2024 drills, training alongside PLA warships.
Taipei said it had detected 259 official vessels from the mainland – a category that includes both coastguard and scientific exploration ships – near Taiwan in the first 11 months of this year.
Taiwan only started releasing data on these ships in July last year, and recorded 84 ships in the area up to the end of November – a figure that rose to 134 once December’s total was included. The vast majority of the vessels detected were coastguard ships.
This year it recorded 107 ships between July and November, a 27 per cent increase on the same period last year.
Meanwhile, a total of 2,358 PLA vessels were detected up to November, compared with 2,271 over the same period last year – a modest increase compared with the increased use of coastguard vessels.
However, some analysts have argued that the use of the coastguard is less provocative than the navy and could be used to keep up the pressure without escalating matters.
“Taiwan is an internal matter. It is natural for our coastguard to enforce the law in the surrounding waters and their presence will inevitably increase,” Fu said.
“In any future blockade, the coastguard cannot be underestimated, as it is backed by the powerful PLA.”
Goldstein said the increased use of coastguards may reflect Beijing’s wish to use even more forces to pressure Taiwan, but it may also indicate it is increasingly leaning towards a blockade.