By Recognizing Somaliland, Israel Steps Into a Complex Labyrinth of Regional Rivalries - Israel News
At a festive ceremony in Ankara on December 17, a far-reaching agreement was signed between OYAK, the Turkish army's pension fund, and the government of Somalia. The fund's capital totals around $30 billion, and it runs roughly 130 Turkish companies around the world.
Under the agreement, it will be a partner in a Somali-Turkish fishing company, Somturk, that will hold exclusive rights to fishing off Somalia's coast. Somturk will be responsible for managing the industry and issuing fishing licenses.
Officially, the goal of forming the joint company and giving it an exclusive franchise is to impose order on the chaotic fishing industry and streamline its operations. But the signing ceremony was attended by Turkey's defense minister, Yaşar Güler, and its military chief of staff, Selçuk Bayraktaroğlu.
What do those two officials have to do with fishing for the tuna and sardines that can be found abundantly near Somalia's coast? Not much. But they have a lot to say about Turkey's deep ties with Somalia.
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan visited Somalia in 2011 and gave it generous humanitarian aid. Since then, Turkey has struck deep roots in the country – not just at sea, but also on land and even in the air.
The largest Turkish military base outside Turkey, as well as the largest Turkish embassy, are both located in Somalia. Some 15,000 Somali soldiers have been trained by the Turks at that base since 2017, and Somali officers have undergone advanced training in Turkey.
Thousands of Somali children study at schools set up by Turkey. Turkish companies run the Somali port of Mogadishu and the country's international airport. And recently, Turkey set up a base in Somalia for testing the Tayfun ballistic missiles it makes. It also plans to use this base to experiment with launching missiles into space.
Somalia has thus become a kind of Turkish protectorate, and Ankara has been using its investments and military aid for diplomatic purposes as well, serving as a bridgehead to other African countries.
Turkey has spearheaded an aggressive policy that views Somaliland as an inseparable part of Somalia. But Somaliland has been effectively independent since it broke away from Somalia in the early 1990s, and even though no country had recognized it until this weekend, it has become a magnet for other countries in the region because of its control over a long stretch of coastline on the Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden.
Ethiopia, which lost its access to the sea after Eritrea gained independence from it in 1993, found an alternative access route through Somaliland's port of Berbera. In 2024, an agreement was signed under which Ethiopia would lease a stretch of coast near the port and be allowed to build a naval base there in exchange for recognizing Somaliland.
But Turkey, on Somalia's behalf, sought to block this move, which threatened Somalia's sovereignty, and in late 2024, it proposed a compromise under which Somalia would instead give Ethiopia access to the port of Mogadishu.
The United Arab Emirates is also involved in the complicated web of relationships between Ethiopia, Somalia and Turkey. It invested $440 million in developing the port of Berbera via its giant conglomerate DP (which also bid to buy the port of Haifa). It also established a military base in Somaliland and has invested in various branches of industry and commerce in the unrecognized country.
For Abu Dhabi, Somaliland is a vital strategic outpost, and its importance only grew following the UAE's failure to win the right to operate the port of Djibouti. But it isn't the only such outpost.
Abu Dhabi has surrounded itself with a strategic belt that also includes the Socotra archipelago in the Indian Ocean and the port of Aden. Socotra, which is part of Yemen, is controlled by the Southern Transitional Council, headed by Aidarous al-Zubaidi. That organization is part of the Presidential Leadership Council, which runs large swaths of Yemeni territory that are not under Houthi control.
The Southern Transitional Council, which receives funding and political support from the UAE, seeks to reestablish South Yemen as an independent country. That conflicts with the goal espoused by Saudi Arabia, America and most other countries, which is to preserve Yemen as a united country.
Nor is this the only country in which the UAE has adopted an independent policy. In Sudan, Abu Dhabi supports the Rapid Support Forces – the murderous separatist group led by Mohammed Hamdan Dagalo that has been fighting the recognized government headed by Gen. Abdel-Fattah Burhan. In contrast, Egypt and Saudi Arabia support the recognized government.
Israel's role in the UAE's strategic system is non-negligible. According to foreign reports, Abu Dhabi allowed Israel to set up a military base on a key island in the Socotra archipelago, and it may be doing even more than that. A year ago, the Middle East Monitor reported that the UAE was negotiating with Somaliland over allowing Israel to set up a military base in that country in exchange for Israeli recognition of its independence.
The UAE itself hasn't yet recognized Somaliland, but that hasn't stopped it from establishing military bases there or running its port.
Israel's military participation in the strategic network the UAE is building around Yemen and the Horn of Africa could put both countries on a collision course with other states in the region, first and foremost, Turkey. Ankara is also vying for control of the African countries that border the Gulf of Aden and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait.
It's not clear whether Israel's recognition of Somaliland was a condition for an Israeli military presence there. However, the timing of its announcement is undoubtedly not unconnected to the three-way summit convened earlier this month to form a "strategic alliance" between Israel, Greece and Cyprus. Nor is it unconnected to Israel's desire to poke Turkey in the eye.
It's interesting, though not surprising, that even as Erdogan was railing at Israel and criticizing its "colonialist" ambitions in Africa, he didn't have a bad word to say about the UAE and its military partnership with Israel in Somaliland. Back in 2020, Erdogan threatened to sever relations with Abu Dhabi after it signed a normalization agreement with Israel. But now, he needs the UAE's financial services.
The UAE has set up a $10 billion investment fund in Turkey. Moreover, back in 2023, it promised to invest more than $50 billion in Turkey (a commitment that has yet to be met). To date, it has invested around $6 billion in Turkish companies, while bilateral trade between the two countries has climbed to over $40 billion. And the Emiratis aren't done giving.
Egypt has also joined Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar in condemning Israel's "unilateral step," which they say infringes on Somalia's sovereignty. But Egypt's position stems from different considerations. In 2024, it signed a large-scale military cooperation agreement with Somalia that includes training its soldiers and investing in its military infrastructure.
The move was in response to Ethiopia's talks with Somalia to use the port of Mogadishu, instead of Berbera in Somaliland, in an effort to stem the influence of Ethiopia, a bitter rival of Egypt, in the Horn of Africa.
In contrast, the Saudi condemnation is rooted in its traditional position that supports Somalia's unity. But it seems that beyond merely opposing Israel's move, Saudi Arabia sees the recognition as yet another "project" by the United Arab Emirates, which is building its own proxies in Africa through separatist frameworks such as the Rapid Support Forces in Sudan, the Transitional Council in Yemen, and unrecognized Somaliland.
Israeli officials are already rushing to attach great importance to its recognition of Somaliland, because of its potential to become a "forward base" for the war against the Houthis in Yemen. But it should be remembered that the United Arab Emirates, the bridesmaid of relations between Somaliland and Israel, seeks to ensure freedom of navigation in the Red Sea and surround itself with controlling outposts in the Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden.
The UAE is in no hurry to renew the war against the Houthis. It withdrew from the Yemen war in 2019, effectively collapsing the Arab-American coalition. It then removed the Houthi threat by renewing diplomatic relations with Iran. Abu Dhabi agrees with Egypt and Saudi Arabia that renewing attacks on the Houthis would cause a violent response against targets in their countries.
A possible result is that Israel might have a military presence in the Horn of Africa, but find itself constrained by the United Arab Emirates' policies and its regional commitments to its neighbors. None of this, of course, should stop Israelis from beginning to plan flights to and vacations at Somaliland's wonderful beaches.
For Somaliland, the big prize was and remains U.S. recognition of its independence, and it cannot be ruled out that part of the "deal" with Israel includes a promise that recognition by U.S. President Donald Trump will follow. But Trump has so far turned a cold shoulder, scoffing, "Does anyone even know what Somaliland is?"
Rather insulting, and largely inaccurate, as the Somaliland president announced in May that high-level U.S. military delegations had been visiting the territory. Even Project 2025, the Heritage Foundation's 2023 blueprint to fundamentally reform the U.S. government, advised recognizing Somaliland as a counter to the U.S.'s loss of influence in Djibouti.