The Only Way to Contain Iran is the One We Abandoned
This persistent reality raises a difficult but unavoidable question for foreign policymakers: what should be done now differently to control the military risks associated with Iran’s nuclear program?
Iran is one of the most sanctioned countries in the world, alongside Russia. The country has been subjected to all kinds of comprehensive and targeted sanctions, including the prohibition of international deals, the blockade of international banking or financing, arms and oil embargoes, nuclear limitations, targeted sanctions on the regime’s key people, and more. All of them were intended to shift Tehran’s regime behavior, particularly in curbing its nuclear ambitions and reshaping its military intentions. Yet, sanctions alone have not produced any real shift in their nuclear program.
In fact, far from declining, Iran’s nuclear program has overcome sanctions and advanced. According to a 2025 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report, its uranium enrichment levels have increased to 60%; the number of centrifuges has increased to approximately 18,000; and the breakout time to convert their total amount of uranium into weapon-grade has been reduced to just three or four weeks, giving them the capacity to produce 9 nuclear weapons. International research shows that these sanctions have indeed strengthened some parts of Tehran’s regime, such as imposing anti-Western propaganda, benefiting from illegal markets, and creating a more dependent relationship between Iran’s most vulnerable people and the regime.
This persistent reality raises a difficult but unavoidable question for foreign policymakers: what should be done now differently to control the military risks associated with Iran’s nuclear program? The answer may not lie in inventing a new strategy but in revisiting one that already existed and had positive results: the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).
Nuclear diplomacy and the risks of repeating past mistakes
The JCPOA was the most complete nuclear agreement that has ever existed between Iran and Western powers, with the main purpose of building international control over Iran’s nuclear program. It was negotiated after years of talks and diplomacy with P5 + Germany and was inspired by the same control measures that other non-proliferation treaties have, such as the U.S.-Russia New START. The JCPOA imposed limits on uranium enrichment to avoid military purposes, reduced the centrifuge capacity, and more importantly granted the IAEA an unprecedented inspection and control capacity. Under the agreement, the IAEA could monitor in real time the compliance of these measures, visit Iran’s nuclear facilities, and get access to once-sensitive nuclear data of Tehran. Despite opposition from some U.S., Iranian, and Israeli policymakers, there was international consensus about its potential. In return for this control, Iran would receive sanctions relief.
After the JCPOA entered into force in January 2016, neutral verification by the IAEA showed that Iran was complying with its obligations in the years following. Nonetheless, in 2018, President Trump withdrew the U.S. from the agreement, saying that the JCPOA failed to address Iran’s missile ranges and the financing of terrorist organizations, disrupting a fragile but functioning architecture of arms control. Predictably, years after the withdrawal, Iran started to reactivate their nuclear program, reaching concerning capacities. This was a foreign policy mistake.
In international conflict resolution, strategic clarity over the desired goal is more important than trying to solve everything at once. That is, when everything is treated as a priority, negotiations rarely produce deep or lasting agreements: the idea to bring multiple negotiation topics that are unrelated, such as the financing of terrorist groups or the Iranian human rights situation, topics also important but not that related to the nuclear program, only creates undesired points of disagreement that bring noise and overload a nuclear negotiation.
Therefore, if the objective is still nuclear control, today’s situation could probably be repeating the same mistake that happened in 2018: the U.S. is trying to reach agreement over multiple areas of Iran’s regime rather than focusing strictly on its dangerous nuclear program. The instinct to negotiate everything at once is politically understandable but strategically flawed, and the idea to impose sanctions or military pressure, although necessary to a certain degree, will not have any further result if delivered alone without diplomacy and a comprehensive agreement.
Today’s situation and current U.S.-Iran nuclear talks
Today, the landscape could be more dangerous than before. Iran continues to develop missile capabilities while financing armed groups in the Middle East and suppressing protests with violence, with approximately 6,000+ protesters dead according to independent sources. Recent attacks on sensitive nuclear facilities such as Natanz and the presence of the U.S. Abraham Lincoln aircraft carrier underscore how quickly the shadow conflict can escalate into direct confrontation. Each strike may delay technical progress, but as explained, it also deepens mistrust and reinforces Tehran’s political capacity to continue its nuclear program. History shows us that facilities can be damaged, but Iran’s nuclear ambitions cannot be bombed away that easily. It requires diplomatic capacity.
Renewed conversations between Washington and Tehran are emerging. Efforts to impose nuclear control should be done strategically. Iran’s regional posture, terrorist support, or human rights concerns, which are undeniably important issues, risk overloading the negotiating table and collapsing progress before it begins. In order to support the brave Iranian people, those issues require parallel forums and distinct strategic approaches.
If the international community is serious about controlling the global risks posed by Iran’s nuclear program, the lesson is not that diplomacy or the JCPOA failed: it is that abandoning structured diplomacy and agreements carries consequences far harder to reverse than to prevent. A renewed comprehensive agreement, or a possible “JCPOA 2,” anchored in rigorous inspections and multilateral oversight, would probably not solve every dimension of Iran’s behavior. But it would address the most existential regional and global threat first: the possibility of nuclear weaponization in one of the world’s most conflictive regions.
Santiago Osorio holds a master’s in public policy from the University of the Andes and has worked with governments, international organizations, and civil society on policy advocacy and institutional reforms in multiple development issues. He has contributed to legislative and policy processes across Latin America and abroad, especially in peace-building and human rights. Topics covered include international security, global governance, conflict and peace, international law, nuclear disarmament, and human rights.