Exclusive: Douglas Macgregor on The Coming Air and Missile War with IranShould the war come, the Trump White House may need an off-ramp...
Col. Douglas Macgregor USA (Ret.) is a decorated combat veteran with a PhD in international relations from the University of Virginia. He served as senior advisor to the acting Secretary of Defense during the first Trump Administration. President Trump has assembled the largest concentration of U.S. Air and Naval power in the Middle East since Iraq was attacked in 2003. Dan Grazier, a retired Marine officer and senior fellow at the Stimson Center notes that there are now nearly 100 aerial refuelers in the Middle East in addition to the carrier strike groups and fighter aircraft suggesting a much larger operation of longer duration. To experienced eyes, the composition of the attacking force suggests one strategic purpose: A level of destruction designed to induce the disintegration of the Iranian State and its society. Is “disintegration” with the use of standoff attack an attainable political military objective? Will Iran fall to pieces like a “House of Cards” under the crushing weight of U.S. and Israeli air and missile attack? The answers are unclear, but the political and military leaders who start air and missile wars are usually convinced that the application of massive firepower from a distance will be stunningly effective. The reason is simple: In the frenzy of analytical targeting focused on precision strikes against the opponent’s critical nodes, systems, weapons and key political and military leaders become true believers. In a world where ground forces mean casualties, the promise of victory through air and missile power is warmly welcomed. In time, the planning process itself seems so thorough and professional that it galvanizes resistance to diplomacy. The limitations of standoff attack and gaps in the planner’s knowledge about the opposing force, as well as its allies are often missed or glossed over. The President, the Secretary of War and their senior military advisors become convinced that the air and missile campaign will compel the opponent to submit to Washington’s demands. Presidents rarely concern themselves with the details of military operations and Washington’s political class rarely acknowledges the limits of military power. It is the capability to strike another state from the air or the sea with impunity is nearly always preferable to diplomacy. Few, if any decision makers ask what happened the last time an air and missile campaign was tried. If they do, planners are inclined to tell decision makers that new technology and greater quantities of explosive will achieve success. But except for the Israeli Air Force’s 1967 preemptive air strikes against Egypt’s air force, no air and missile campaign has attained truly decisive results. In January 1999 when President Bill Clinton asked his inner circle of civilian and military advisors how long the Kosovo Air Campaign would last, the President was told, “3 or 4 days, a week or two weeks at most.” It turned out that the Kosovo Air Campaign conducted against the Serbian State lasted for 78 days.* Serbia’s vintage 1970s air defenses proved far more resilient than expected. Thanks to the innovative use of radar technology, Serbian Air Defense Officers were able to target and shoot-down a Lockheed F-117 Stealth Aircraft. Serbian air defenses were never degraded below 83%. Despite intensive bombing, the air and missile campaign did not compel the Serbian Army to withdraw from Kosovo. It was Strobe Talbott, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State who flew to Moscow and convinced the Russian leadership to end Moscow’s support for the Serbs. Without Moscow’s assistance with fuel, food, and medicine, Belgrade concluded the Serbian population would not survive the Balkan Winter. The only certainty in today’s preparations for war with Iran is that the air and naval forces assembled in the Middle East will destroy a large portion of Iran’s critical infrastructure, armed forces and scientific-industrial base. How much damage Iran will do to U.S. Forces and their bases is harder to forecast. Perhaps the more important action is how Washington will end the air and missile war against Iran. Will the air and missile campaign terminate when Iran capitulates to Washington’s stated demands? Or will the campaign end when Washington runs out of missiles and Israel is a smoking ruin? In his landmark book, All Wars Must End, Dr. Fred Ickle wrote, “States must apply the same discipline to planning exits as they do to planning tactical attacks.” The reluctance to confront the question of conflict termination is understandable, but it’s necessary. Iran’s massive missile clusters are widely dispersed, and many are underground. If U.S. air and missile power cannot smother Iran’s vast missile arsenal in a series of punishing strikes over many weeks and Iran overwhelms Israeli air and missile defenses, the White House will need an offramp. *From November 1997 to December 1999 Macgregor served as the chief of strategic planning and director of the Joint Operations Center, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers, Europe.
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