Should the military be expected to have to say "no" to civilian authority?
By Charles Ray - February 20, 2026
In addition to setting the tradition of two terms for the American presidency, George Washington established the norm of civilian control of the military before he even became president. On March 15, 1783, the officers under his command met to discuss a possible mutiny in response to Congress’s failure to provide them with back pay and pensions for their service during the revolution. Washington wrote a nine-page speech in which he sympathized with their situation but roundly denounced the methods they proposed to remedy it. By reminding the assembled officers that he had ‘not only grown gray but almost blind in the service of my country,’ he dissuaded them from the mutiny. He enshrined the American tradition of the military accepting civilian control rather than the military controlling civilian affairs.
While presidents since Washington have never questioned the wisdom of civilian control of the military, the proper use of a nation’s military forces has been another matter, especially in domestic affairs. From the Republic’s beginnings, the dangers of a standing army as a threat to the liberty of the citizens were a concern. Prior to the enactment of the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878, the US military was frequently used to enforce domestic laws, including by George Washington, who federalized the state militia to put down the Whiskey Rebellion in Western Pennsylvania in 1794. Since the nation’s founding, the armed forces have been used for domestic law enforcement over 100 times. While the Constitution puts some limits on military involvement in civilian affairs, it does not bar federal armed forces from conducting law enforcement activities. While supported by some, such use has always been controversial, and even with the Posse Comitatus Act, there are enough exceptions, loopholes, and ambiguities, such as the Insurrection Act, which gives the president almost unlimited discretion for domestic use of the military, to render it useless in protecting against executive overreach and misuse.
While Donald Trump floated the idea of using the military against protesters during his first administration, pushback from senior military and his civilian cabinet curbed him. There’ve been no such restraints in the second administration, and he has used active military and National Guard troops in a number of controversial operations, including attacks on alleged drug boats in the Caribbean and the Pacific, and in several American cities, such as the Portland, Oregon’ Los Angeles, California; and Chicago, Illinois; he has federalized and deployed National Guard troops without consent of state governors or local authorities in ways that previous presidents didn’t do even before the Posse Comitatus Act.
Absent a Congress willing to step in and exercise its Constitutionally mandated authority regarding the use of the armed forces, even the courts are limited if the president chooses to ignore their rulings. The executive branch guardrails of cabinet officials who are willing to advise the president against such actions—as happened during his first administration—do not exist in this second administration, except for the possibility of enough senior military officers with enough professionalism and integrity to say ‘no’ if the president orders them to do something that is fralgantly and obviously unlawful. Even that is of no help for orders that fall in the gray area of legality.
But, one has to ask, why should the military be expected to have to say no to unlawful orders from the president? We should be asking, why is the president giving unlawful orders? Why is Congress not using its power of the purse to block such orders?
Using military and security forces to control and intimidate the population is right out of the authoritarian playbook. In the American system, unfortunately, it’s easier to do than one might think. A number of military lawyers in the Judge Advocate General (JAG) Corps of the Army and Air Force were fired early in the second Trump administration, with reports that the way was being paved for major changes in how military lawyers advise on the law of war. Without JAG advice on staff, senior military commanders are on shaky ground when they receive orders they believe may be unlawful. With a DOJ supporting the president’s every whim, it becomes a no-win proposition for the officer who decides to say ‘no’ to an order.
But, they really shouldn’t have to. The Congress should see to that. There is precedent. The War Powers Act of 1973, enacted over President Richard Nixon’s veto, was a response to his overreach in the Vietnam War. It reaffirmed the shared responsibility of both Congress and the President for decisions involving U.S. military forces. In that case, it involved foreign wars, but Congress has the power of the purse for domestic use of the military as well, and should exercise it.
It should not be left to the military to have to say ‘no’ to the president.