Nasser wasn’t exactly pleased at the news, even after a moment’s reflection brought to him the realisation that when President Eisenhower referred to ‘any nation controlled by International Communism’ he probably had Egypt in mind. But he did have the satisfaction any player has when he sees his opponent make a wrong move. As he told me later, the only aspect of the Eisenhower Doctrine which gave him pause was the assignment of Congressman James P. Richards to take the happy news to President Chamoun, King Hussein and the others. The choice of an emissary who could be presumed to have about as much comprehension of Arab affairs as Nasser had of pop art greatly puzzled Nasser, and made him suspect that the project had some machiavellian twist that was going over his head. ‘The genius of you Americans,’ he once told me, ‘is that you never make clear-cut stupid moves, only complicated stupid moves which make us wonder at the possibility that there may be something to them that we are missing.’ The Eisenhower Doctrine, which he assumed to be entirely Secretary Dulles’ brainchild, was to his mind one of the shrewdest mistakes ever made by a Great Power diplomat.