Six Days In, What Do We Know About Trump's Iran War
A predictable question I—and many others following the war Israel and the United States launched against Iran on February 28—have been asked is: How long will it last? My standard response has been that I don’t know and that anybody who claims to know shouldn’t be believed. But we needn’t engage in predictions to draw a few conclusions about this war based on what we have learned so far.
This Isn’t a War of Necessity
To begin with, the war’s aims remain unclear—and the more the Trump administration, especially the president, tries to clarify them, the murkier they become.
At times officials suggest regime change is the goal, but later insist that it is not the real objective. At other times the claim is that the war was launched to ensure Iran never builds a nuclear weapon—never mind that in 2019 President Trump, encouraged and cheered on by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, tore up the 2015 US-Iran nuclear deal that was signed during Barack Obama’s presidency and closed off both a uranium and plutonium path to an Iranian nuclear weapon.
More recently, this argument has persisted despite far-reaching Iranian concessions. Oman’s foreign minister, who mediated the talks in Geneva between Iran and the US, confirmed that Iran was willing to reduce uranium enrichment below 3.67 percent stipulated in the 2015 agreement. Tehran was also prepared to forego the stockpiling of enriched uranium, which went well beyond the 300-kg limit allowed in the deal it reached with Obama. Trump nevertheless ended the Geneva talks and, following Israel’s initial strikes on Iran, went to war.
Yet another rationale for the war—offered by Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Senator Tom Cotton (R-AK)–is that Israel faced an “existential threat” (Cotton’s words) and was going to attack unilaterally. In this telling, Iran would inevitably have attacked the United States, leaving Trump with no choice but to strike Iran first. Framing the motive for the war as self-defense makes no sense. The idea that Iran was preparing to destroy Israel—and had the capability to do so—beggars belief. Israel wasn’t forced to start a war with Iran to protect itself from disaster; nor would it have done so without a green light from Trump. Moreover, it was the United States that deployed vast air and naval forces close to its adversary’s borders.
We’ve also been told that the cruelty of Iran’s government necessitated its removal—a close cousin of the regime change argument, this time decked out in the attire of idealism. This explanation is risible coming from two leaders who oversaw a war in Gaza that killed tens of thousands of civilians, reduced the territory to 60 million tons of rubble, and triggered widespread hunger and disease. (Hamas’s brutal attack against Israel on October 7, 2023 is no excuse for Israel’s grotesquely disproportionate reaction or for the support Biden and Trump provided it.)
What is clear is that the justifications for this war shift from day to day—and are spurious.
“Regime Change” May Prove to Be Pipe Dream
Another thing we know is that the war will likely drag on despite the overwhelming military superiority of Israel and the United States. This is not going to be a “one and done” operation like Donald Trump’s raid on Venezuela, and Trump has acknowledged as much, saying that it could last for weeks, perhaps longer.
The Islamic Republic has not collapsed despite punishing attacks by Israel and the United States on the Islamic Revolutionary Guard (IRGC), the paramilitary Basij, intelligence services, and ballistic missile and air defense sites. The killing of Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, has not precipitated “regime change.” Nor has the death of senior political and military leaders. Drawing lessons from the earlier war with the United States and Israel in June, Iran’s leaders designated successors for officials likely to be targeted.
This includes Khamenei, whose shoes will likely be filled by his son, Mujtaba, once Iran’s Assembly of Experts makes a formal decision. Mujtaba, 56 years old, was already an influential figure. Israel has already intimated that he, like his father, is in its sights. But even his death would not trigger the collapse of the Iranian state.
We also know that there are as yet no signs that the Islamic Republic’s institutions are coming apart or that there have been defections from its senior ranks. Ali Larijani, Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, has emerged as the new leader. President Masoud Pezeshkian is, if not a figurehead, then someone who’s not in the driver’s seat. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard has stood by Iran and continues to fight. The Basij, a volunteer paramilitary force—the estimates of size range from half a million to 13-plus million—and the police have done the same.
Moreover, the efforts of the US and Israel to foment rebellion have not worked. As soon as the war began, President Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu appealed to the Iranian people to rise up and overthrow their government. Trump later announced that the IRGC would be rewarded with a full amnesty if it laid down their arms.
Trump and Netanyahu made these statements because they understand what several studies have shown: regime change cannot be achieved by warplanes and missile strikes—opposition on the ground that precipitated the cracking and collapse of a government’s institutions is required. Not only has the Islamic Republic’s institutional structure demonstrated staying power, aside from the jubilation in many Iranian cities that followed the killing of Khamenei—who symbolized the Islamic Republic and was far and away its important leader—there have been no demonstrations such as occurred in January.
There are at least two explanations for this. One explanation is the Iranian leadership’s pitiless crackdown in January, which killed thousands. People who revile the regime may be unwilling to risk their lives again until they see signs that the governing institutions are teetering. Trump hung them out to dry after he urged them to topple the regime in January and they may, understandably, be unwilling to trust him again. They may also be reluctant to take to the streets while their country is under full-on attack. Iranians can be dissidents who loathe the regime and patriots at the same time.
The administration now appears to be exploring a fallback strategy for regime change. Trump has realized that the Islamic Republic is not in a death spiral and his latest effort to create opposition on the grounds seems to be the arming of groups with a long history of fighting the Iranian state—the Kurds for example. But it remains unclear whether these groups can mount a campaign powerful enough to topple the state while also winning broad public support.
If Trump can’t achieve regime change, in what sense can he claim that the war was a strategic success? No one doubts that the United States has vastly more firepower than Iran does and can therefore do enormous damage to that country, but if the Islamic Republic remains standing at the end of the war or falls and what follows is upheaval a la Libya after the 2011 intervention by the United States and its coalition partners—who were mainly NATO allies, how would that amount to a strategic success.
Comparing the military balance between adversaries can tell us which side can kill more people and destroy more things, but as the United States wars in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan should remind us, that exercise is not always a reliable predictor of strategic success. And war is ultimately a means to achieve political ends, not an end in itself.
Iran Seeks to End the War by Expanding It
We know that the failure—at least so far—of Trump’s and Netanyahu’s regime change gambit is important because the war has turned into a test of endurance. The US and Israel are targeting a panoply of Iran’s institutions and military sites. They have launched at least 2,000 strikes and killed 1,000-plus civilians, including 181 children. In response, Iran is using drones and ballistic missiles to hit American forces as well as sites in Israel. Iran has also been systematically taking aim at American military bases and at the ports and oil and natural gas plants of Gulf Arab states aligned with the US. Tehran wants to show these governments that they will pay an increasing price if they continue serving as platforms for American military operations.
Iran’s drone and missile attacks against major US bases in the region are a major part of this strategy. The largest American airbase in the Middle East, Al-Udeid in Qatar, has been hit, as have Manama, in Bahrain, the headquarters of the Fifth Fleet, Prince Sultan airbase in Saudi Arabia, and a US command center in Port Shuaiba, Kuwait. (The last of these attacks killed six American soldiers.) Iran’s targets have also included the US consulate in Dubai and a CIA station inside the American embassy in Saudi Arabia.
Iran has also struck the Gulf states’ oil refineries, loading sites and liquefied natural gas (LNG) plants. Saudi Aramco temporarily halted operations at its Ras Tanura refinery loading center following Iranian drone strikes. Qatar shut down two of its LNG plants–Ras Laffan and Mesaieed–for the same reasons and they aren’t up and running yet. And debris from a downed drone caused a big fire at the United Arab Emirates’ Fujairah oil terminal.
Trump says that the United States has abundant reserves of ordnance, but press reports indicate that shipments to Ukraine (under President Joe Biden) and Israel (under Biden and Trump) have reduced stocks, especially missile interceptors. This much is certain: the sheer intensity of US strikes across what is a vast country and the need to defend against continuing Iranian missile and drone attacks is using up a lot of bombs, missiles, and air defense launchers—rapidly. Trump contends that Iran will run out of missile launchers and is also being “decimated,” but Tehran’s continuing attacks suggest that it can continue its strikes.
Iran has some 2,000 ballistic missiles—they differ in range and speed—and has fired 500 so far. It also has estimated 80,000 Shahed drones of various types and has launched 2,000 of them.
The cost exchange ratio between a Shahed and an American Patriot missile interceptor is 1:60 and 1:150 depending on the model of the drone. Moreover, using them to destroy incoming drones will reduce the number available for use against ballistic missiles. The United States also faces the challenge of resupplying its forces from thousands of miles away while Gulf states’ ports and airfields are under attack. Gen. Dan Caine, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said on Wednesday that Iran’s ballistic missile launches have decreased by 86 percent since the war began. But that leaves open the question of whether Iran’s missile stocks are being depleted rapidly or whether it is conserving them by relying more on drones because that’s more cost-effective and also reduces the rate at which its missile inventory is drawn down.
The war has become a contest over which side will run out of munitions first.
There’s No Global Energy Crisis—Yet
For a (very) short time the war was confined to Iran, but it quickly expanded and now covers Iran’s Persian Gulf neighbors. Furthermore, its shockwaves are being felt in the world beyond, notably in energy markets and at gas stations.
Supertanker traffic in the Strait of Hormuz—a narrow passage linking the Persian Gulf to the Arabian Sea—has come to a standstill, trapping some of them at Persian Gulf oil-loading ports. The only ships plying the Strait now are bulk carriers and medium-size tankers. The latter venture out at night, with their transponders turned off to avoid detection by Iran’s drones and missiles. About 30 percent of the world’s oil exports (20 million barrels) and a fifth of its exports of liquefied natural gas (LNG) pass through the Strait. On average, 138 tankers and ships carrying LNG or cargo travel through it daily in both directions.
The war has boosted insurance rates for tankers and some insurers have used their contract-based option to stop coverage altogether. But insurance rate hikes—which have only a marginal effect on oil prices—are not the main reason for the halting of tanker traffic in the Strait; it’s the fear of putting the supertankers, massive targets, and their crews at risk.
The stoppage of tanker traffic hasn’t just cut the flow of oil to global markets; it has prevented tankers from loading up on oil. That puts increasing pressure on oil-producing countries’ land-based storage sites. Once storage facilities are topped up, these countries will have to cut production. Saudi Arabia can bypass the Strait by diverting 5 million barrels a day through its 746-mile-long East-West pipeline which runs overland from the Abqaiq oilfields in the Kingdom’s Eastern Province to the Red Sea port of Yanbu. But tankers can’t be relocated to Yanbu quickly.
Moreover, once the East-West pipeline is at full capacity—Saudi Arabia’s daily oil production is twice the volume that the pipeline can handle—the Kingdom will have to contemplate cutting production if its storage facilities, which can hold some 100 million barrels, reach full capacity and supertankers are still unable to sail through the Strait and into the Persian Gulf.
The same applies to the United Arab Emirates, which can use the Habshan-Fujairah pipeline that also bypasses the Strait and can transport 1.8 million barrels a day from the Habshan oilfield to Fujairah on the Gulf of Oman. Other Gulf oil-producing countries, which have nowhere near the 100-million-barrel storage capacity Saudi Arabia does, will face the same choice—and sooner, especially Iraq, which has already started big production cuts at its largest oilfields, Rumaila and West Qurna 2.
Between February 27—the day before the war began—and March 5, the price of the benchmark Brent crude rose by 15.3 percent. But the increase has been manageable so far because there is plenty of production worldwide and large consumers such as China have significant reserves in storage. Yet if the war continues with no end in sight prices could increase further. That could stoke inflation and force central banks to delay interest-rate cuts or even increase them. Rate hikes would hurt manufacturers and consumers alike while raising the cost of investment.
So, on the oil front, no full-blown crisis—yet—though the average price of gas at American pumps increased earlier this week by around 10 cents to $3.11 a gallon, the largest uptick in four years. Oil prices subsequently fell a bit amidst rumors that Iran and the US would meet to explore a ceasefire. But if that doesn’t happen prices will move upward again, unless Trump delivers on his pledge that the US Navy will escort supertankers through the Strait of Hormuz.
The consequences for liquid natural gas (LNG) prices have been much more pronounced because of the interruption of supply from Qatar, which ranks third worldwide in exports, with a capacity of 77 million tons and accounts for 20 percent of global LNG exports. (The US occupied first place with 102 million metric tons, Australia second with 82 million metric tons.) Iranian drone strikes on Qatar’s LNG stations (where gas is cooled to -260° for liquefaction) at Ras Laffan and Mesaieed, forced their closure, and European gas prices jumped by as much as 50 percent before settling lower.
In Northeast Asia, an important destination for Qatari LNG shipments, prices reached the highest point in a year. Natural gas prices in Europe have climbed from € 30 per MWh to € 52.84 per MWh (a 76 percent increase) but not nearly as steeply as they did after the supply of Russian natural gas was disrupted following Putin’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Plus, the biggest importers of Qatari LNG—China, followed by India—can switch to coal for power generation. Still, as with oil, future LNG prices will depend on the length of this war. Qatar may get its LNG plants up and running again, but Iran can target them—again.
As the Economist warned on March 3 in a piece entitled “The Nightmare Iran Energy Scenario is Becoming Reality,” the optimism about energy prices based on the assumption that the war would end in a matter of days is now being reconsidered. The explosion on a tanker off Kuwait’s coast, the resulting oil spill and the apparent departure of “a small craft” from the scene will keep nerves jangled.
The War Has Placed Further Strains on NATO
NATO provides another example of the war’s broader geopolitical reverberations. Despite Trump’s contempt for America’s NATO allies, all of them, save Norway and Spain, voiced support for, or muted reservations about, Washington’s war on Iran. Having, appropriately, denounced Russia’s war in Ukraine as a violation of international law and norms and engaged in pearl-clutching in the face of Trump’s disregard for both, America’s allies reflexively supported the blatantly illegal Israeli and American attack on Iran. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, who was in Washington this week to meet with Trump, even blessedregime change in Iran, after having said before he left Germany to travel to the US that this was the time to stand with the US and Israel, not to lecture them about international law.
Still, the war has raised the temperature within an alliance whose future is already being questioned. Even though British Prime Minister Keir Starmer made the RAF’s bases at Fairford and Diego Garcia available to American bombers, albeit for defensive purposes, Trump still criticized him for taking too long to permit the use of the latter–“This is not Churchill that we’re dealing with”–and also for not participating in the initial strikes on Iran. Starmer shot back, saying that the UK would not join a war unless it was legal and based on “a viable thought-through plan” and opposed regime change by invoking the lessons of the 2003 Iraq war. Trump also threatened to end all trade—yes, all of it—with Spain for the same reason, leading Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez, who has already criticized Trump’s attack on Venezuela, to reaffirm Spain’s view that the war violated international law. No matter how it ends, this war will worsen trans-Atlantic relations generally, and accelerate Europe’s already evident pursuit of strategic autonomy.