With the Iran crisis, the world is in a ‘jungle phase’ and Beijing should work on interventionism 2.0, government adviser says
Tehran halted cargo traffic through the narrow Strait of Hormuz, a choke point for one-fifth of global oil trade, after US-Israeli joint strikes killed Iranian supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei nearly two weeks ago.Iran has also targeted oil facilities in Gulf Arab nations in a campaign aimed at inflicting global economic pain.
With little sign of the conflict subsiding, Washington and the International Energy Agency (IEA) have been forced to agree to release emergency oil reserves to ease market turbulence.
The US Department of Energy said on Wednesday that it would release 172 million barrels from the US strategic petroleum reserve next week, with US President Donald Trump saying the move would “substantially reduce oil prices as we end this threat to America and this threat to the world”.
The IEA’s 32 members also agreed to unlock 400 million barrels, its largest ever joint release, to combat soaring prices.
Drawing parallels to the 1970s oil crises, Zheng cautioned against assuming a full repeat, noting that today’s diversified energy supplies – from the US, Russia, Latin America and the Middle East – reduced reliance on any single choke point.
He framed the current turmoil as part of a broader “state of nature”, echoing the British philosopher Thomas Hobbes’ vision of an anarchic world without rules.
Zheng argued that the international system had entered a “jungle” phase, where the old post‑Cold War order was collapsing, US unilateral military actions and sanctions showed great powers were no longer reliably constrained by rules, and a new order remained distant.
This disorder, he claimed, manifested in “big fish eating small fish” dynamics, with nations prioritising survival and self‑interest, leaving smaller and middle powers vulnerable to exploitation.
“All orders are established only after humanity suffers unbearable disasters and losses,” he said. “Therefore, we must be fully prepared mentally for the long‑term nature of establishing a new order.”
China could not afford to remain a passive observer, Zheng argued, especially with its extensive overseas interests exposed in hotspots such as Venezuela and Iran.
He defended “non-alignment” as a core identity of China’s diplomacy since the 1950s, saying that had helped prevent full-scale confrontation during the Cold War.
But the traditional doctrine of non-intervention was no longer enough and “urgently needs reflection and adjustment”.
While insisting Beijing must avoid meddling in other countries’ politics and never emulate US‑style regime change or colour revolutions, he called for an upgraded “interventionism 2.0” that would allow limited, defensive action in specific cases.
He outlined three conditions that warranted “active intervention” or “positive intervention”: when host states failed to protect Chinese assets or honour contracts; when third countries directly infringed on China’s overseas interests; and when external forces –such as terrorism, separatism, or transnational crime – threatened domestic stability.
As more Chinese businesses and people operated abroad, Beijing must actively safeguard its legitimate rights and interests, Zheng stressed, citing the US’ forceful attempt to reclaim the Panama Canal and overseas telecommunications fraud targeting Chinese citizens.
“Of course, the kind of ‘hegemonic’ and ‘robber-like’ intervention methods employed by the US are absolutely wrong and must be avoided,” he said, referring to the US abduction of former Venezuelan president Nicolas Maduro in December.
“However, we must emancipate our minds and not always rigidly emphasise ‘absolute non-intervention’. Interactions between countries naturally generate mutual influence.”
Zheng also noted that against the backdrop of “a de facto G2 structure” of US-China co-leadership, “we must maintain strategic composure and shoulder our responsibilities as a major power, both to safeguard our own interests and to protect world peace”.
“Although the United States is pushing for its own order-building, China’s role is crucial,” he said.
Beijing has adhered to the principle of non‑interference since the mid‑20th century as a defensive doctrine rooted in the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, initially designed to protect sovereignty and resist outside intervention during the Cold War.
While this approach has helped differentiate China from Western interventionism and bolster its image as a champion of the Global South, many experts have called for a more proactive posture to match the country’s growing confidence and expanding footprint in Asia, Africa and beyond.
Noting a lively debate over “constructive engagement” and “constructive intervention” in the past decade, Pang Zhongying, a professor of international relations at Sichuan University, said Zheng’s suggestions were largely aligned with Beijing’s global ambitions.
He noted China’s diplomacy has moved through distinct stages – from resisting outside interference, to insisting on non‑interference in other’s affairs, and now exploring conditional involvement in regional affairs and conflict mediation, sometimes dubbed “intervention with Chinese characteristics”.
Alongside Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative and recent four global initiatives, “we are seeing signals that China cannot simply maintain the old non‑intervention status quo; instead, it has moved towards constructive, conditional involvement, seeking a larger role in global leadership”, Pang said.
But he cautioned that Zheng’s concept of “intervention 2.0” remained too vague to be translated into concrete, actionable policy, and “oversimplifies” the complexity of China’s evolution towards global power.
“In the past few years, China’s diplomacy has become more cautious, particularly on hotspot issues like Ukraine and Iran,” Pang said.
“Such caution should not be read as a return to non‑intervention, but is better understood as tactical adjustment. In practice, China’s foreign policy combines ambitious global initiatives with pragmatic caution, reflecting a strategic choice in the new era – to play a bigger role internationally while avoiding costly military or political entanglements.”