[Salon] On inauguration day, Chile’s new president inherits a Chinese cable scandal and US threats



On inauguration day, Chile’s new president inherits a Chinese cable scandal and US threats

The US forced Chile to cancel a Chinese undersea cable. Now the region is asking who gets to decide what infrastructure Latin America builds

Jose Antonio Kast was elected as Chile’s president in November after his Republican Party won just over 58 per cent of the vote. Photo: Reuters
Igor Patrickin Santiago

The Chilean capital Santiago awoke on Wednesday to a mixture of celebration and tension.

As the city prepared for the inauguration of its centre-right president, the new government’s first crisis was already unfolding behind the scenes: an undersea fibre-optic cable linking the South American country to Hong Kong that had enraged Washington and may prove a watershed moment in how Latin America handles critical infrastructure projects and its partnership with Beijing.

Jose Antonio Kast was elected in November with just over 58 per cent of the vote, defeating the Chilean Communist Party.

During the campaign, he adopted a strategy clearly modelled on US President Donald Trump’s playbook, promising to build a wall along the border with Bolivia to stem irregular migration and to tackle the surge in crime he sought to blame on Venezuelan refugees the country had taken in.
Yet despite his ambitions to lead a Latin American alliance of governments aligned with the United States, the president-elect now finds himself entangled in a scandal that has paralysed the country for weeks and fractured the transition preparations.
Trouble began when local media revealed that, just weeks before the end of his term, the administration of the left-wing president Gabriel Boric had quietly greenlit a fibre-optic cable initiative managed by China Mobile International connecting the country to Hong Kong.

Chance to connect a digital bridge to Asia

The idea of connecting Chile to Asia via a submarine optical cable dates back to Michelle Bachelet’s second administration, between 2014 and 2018.
At the time, the then undersecretary of Telecommunications, Pedro Huichalaf, travelled to China in 2016 to meet with Huawei executives and signed a preliminary feasibility agreement.
The aim was to transform Chile into a regional telecoms hub, capitalising on the country’s modern existing infrastructure, and to connect the region directly to the Indo-Pacific without routing digital traffic through the United States or Europe.

Jorge Heine was Chile’s ambassador to Beijing when the project was first presented to the Chinese government in January 2016.

He was adamant that the initiative was Chilean in origin, not Chinese, taking the form of a government-to-government memorandum of understanding signed with the vice-president of China’s National Development and Reform Commission.

“This was not a Chinese initiative. It was a Chilean initiative submitted to the Chinese government. Chile could be the ideal digital gateway for China into South America, if we played our cards right,” he said.

For Heine, the cable was a matter of basic commercial logic. The region’s most important trading relationship, he argued, deserved its own infrastructure.

A direct connection to Asia, he argued, was the only arrangement that matched the scale of the commercial relationship the region had already built with China and that no existing infrastructure had yet managed to reflect.

Washington, however, saw it differently.

“They said it was a security thing, that the Chinese would spy on us,” Heine pointed out.

“As if the Chinese had invented electronic spying. Electronic spying goes on all over the world with any cable, with any company.”

US$600m Chilean cable project shelved in 2020

The project envisaged an investment of US$600 million and the involvement of Chinese companies, including Huawei and HMN Tech, but was shelved in 2020, following a visit to Santiago by then-US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, who declared strong opposition to the initiative on the grounds of “espionage risks and network compromise”.
The initiative gained a new lease of life in 2024, when Santiago announced that, following a redesign, it had secured a partnership with Alphabet Inc. (Google’s parent company) to link the coastal city of Valparaiso to Australia via the so-called Humboldt Project: a 14,800km cable with a branch through French Polynesia that bypasses both China and Hong Kong.

Legislators and telecoms industry officials assumed the original idea had been buried for good. Until now.

In the second half of last year, China Mobile International formally revived its proposal for a direct cable between Chile and Hong Kong, 19,873km long, with a 30-year concession. Supporters within Boric’s government argued it would not replace Humboldt but complement it, further cementing Chile’s position as a digital hub in the South Pacific.

According to the Chilean press, Transport and Telecommunications Minister Juan Carlos Munoz signed off on the commencement of formal proceedings on January 27, just six weeks before the end of Boric’s term and the start of Kast’s administration.

The American embassy issued warnings to the government about the project’s security risks, and two days later, Munoz rescinded the decree, citing only unspecified “typographical errors”.

Washington wastes no time taking action

The reversal did not put the matter to rest. In late February, the US Secretary of State Marco Rubio issued a statement announcing visa restrictions against three Chilean government officials who “knowingly directed, authorised, funded, provided significant support to, and/or carried out activities that compromised critical telecommunications infrastructure and undermined regional security in our hemisphere”.
Without naming China directly, Rubio said the action reflected President Trump’s commitment to “protect America’s economic prosperity and national security interests in our region”.
US Secretary of State Marco Rubio issued a statement announcing visa restrictions against three Chilean government officials in late February. Photo: AFP
US Secretary of State Marco Rubio issued a statement announcing visa restrictions against three Chilean government officials in late February. Photo: AFP

Although the statement did not name the sanctioned officials, the South China Morning Post confirmed that undersecretary of Telecommunications Claudio Araya, the head of the Chilean telecoms regulator Subtel Guillermo Petersen and Minister Munoz himself were among those affected.

US Ambassador to Santiago Brandon Judd defended the move, saying he had spent two months warning Chilean ministers and officials about the risks posed by the project.

“I was very clear and frank about our concern regarding the threats not only to Chilean security but to the security of the entire region,” Judd said.

Boric acknowledged that he had personally ordered the reversal of the decree signed by Munoz after receiving what he described as “explicit” threats from Washington, including the possibility of Chile being removed from the Visa Waiver Programme.

Chile is the only South American country in the scheme which allows its citizens to enter the United States without a visa. It is a point of national pride, making the Chilean passport one of the most powerful in the region.

Chile’s government transition derailed by dispute

The American sanctions landed at the heart of a dispute between the outgoing and incoming governments. Kast and his team said they had not been given sufficient information about the project’s progress or the gravity of the stand-off with Washington.

Boric said he had informed the president-elect about the matter during a 16-minute phone call on February 18. Still, his successor said the subject had merely been “mentioned”, with no details about the imminent sanctions.

Kast declared that he no longer trusted the information provided by the outgoing government and announced he would establish a task force to audit ministerial communications and assess possible legal action against officials involved in any irregularities.

The president-elect met Boric at La Moneda Palace in the first week of March. According to local media, the encounter lasted just 22 minutes, during which Kast demanded that Boric publicly retract his account of what had been discussed in their February phone call.

Boric reportedly refused, and Kast left the palace, announcing he was dissolving the transition coordination task force.

Former Chilean President Gabriel Boric’s administration greenlit a fibre-optic cable initiative managed by China Mobile connecting the country to Hong Kong. Photo: EPA-EFE
Former Chilean President Gabriel Boric’s administration greenlit a fibre-optic cable initiative managed by China Mobile connecting the country to Hong Kong. Photo: EPA-EFE

The decision froze more than forty meetings between officials from both administrations and was described by the press as the most serious rupture between an incoming and outgoing president in decades.

A poll by the Plaza Pública Cadem institute found that 42 per cent of Chileans believed Kast’s account of what had been communicated, 33 per cent sided with Boric, and 20 per cent believed neither.

China’s embassy weighs in, and Congress reacts

The Chinese Ambassador to Santiago, Niu Qingbao, publicly defended the project. In an interview given days after the announcement of the US sanctions, he described it as “a good idea, mutually beneficial” and dismissed Washington’s claims about strategic risk as “not grounded in fact”.

“China has no interest in geopolitical competition with any country,” Niu said. “There is nothing to worry about regarding this project’s impact on national security, because there is none.”

Experts were unconvinced by the ambassador’s reassurances, however.

Juan Pablo Toro, executive director and co-founder of the Santiago-based think tank AthenaLab, argued that the project had never truly been abandoned after Chile chose Google’s Humboldt route, and that Beijing’s continued backing pointed to interests extending well beyond Chile’s own telecommunications needs.

“There is no transpacific cable connecting China directly with South American countries, so the United States has a monopoly,” Toro said, adding that a landing point on Chile’s Pacific coast would give China a foothold from which to reach the region’s larger economies, connecting onwards to Argentina and above all Brazil.
He also pointed to a less obvious prize in Chile’s longer-term infrastructure plans: a future cable link to Antarctica, which the country is already studying.

Such a connection could eventually allow scientific data from the polar territory to be transmitted at far greater speed – a prospect that, in his view, helps explain why Chinese actors remained engaged even after Santiago had already committed to a different Pacific project.

More broadly, Toro framed the cable dispute not as an isolated episode but as part of what he described as “an accumulation of decisions” by successive Chilean governments to block Chinese projects over security concerns.

In 2021, then-president Sebastian Pinera cancelled the Antipodas project, designed to export solar energy from the Atacama Desert to China via a 20,000 km submarine cable.

More recently, the government decided to stop the construction of an astronomical observatory at Cerro Ventarrones – a joint venture between the Universidad Catolica del Norte and the Chinese Academy of Sciences – after the then-US Ambassador, Bernadette Meehan, warned that the installation could be used to track satellites.

The succession of clashes with Washington has now reached Congress.

A senior legislative source told the SCMP that the China Mobile cable affair had “stirred senators from multiple parties, with calls already emerging for a legal mechanism to screen investments” in critical industries, one that could potentially offer protection against future US sanctions.

The same source said the proposal was “likely to be debated before the year was out”, though there were “questions about how to construct an independent framework capable of addressing national security concerns and geopolitical risks without deterring foreign investment in Chile”.

Why the US is worried about China’s growing influence in South America

Meanwhile, politicians have already begun to respond publicly. While Kast and Boric were meeting at the La Moneda Palace last week, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee summoned Munoz and Foreign Minister Alberto van Klaveren to account for the episode.

Munoz told senators that Chilean law sets out more than 13 stages for completing a project such as the Chinese cable. According to the minister, his authorisation represented only the beginning of that process.

Foreign Minister van Klaveren stressed “the need to always seek a balance between Chile’s two great partners, China and the United States, which are important from an economic, strategic and political standpoint” and argued that the country should uphold the principle of “technological neutrality”.

But van Klaveren also acknowledged that Chile lacked “an investment screening mechanism that incorporates national security considerations”.

“We have shortcomings in intelligence, which sometimes prevent us from properly assessing the strategic calculations that third countries may be making,” he said.

Kast’s dilemma as China and the US up ante

Experts noted that the crisis represents a turning point in Chile’s recent history and may serve as a warning to the wider region about the nature of both Chinese and American investment in critical infrastructure.

Although Kast was elected on a more radical rhetorical platform, he had been sending signals to markets and international partners that he intended to run a pragmatic administration.

Santiago is one of the few places in the region to have free trade agreements with both the United States and China. According to UN international trade statistics, Chile exports 37 per cent of all its goods to China, primarily copper, lithium, lemons and cherries, and imports a quarter of everything it consumes from the Asian country.

According to Chile’s Under-Secretariat for International Economic Relations, bilateral trade grew at an average annual rate of 7 per cent between 2020 and 2025, reaching a total of US$65.33 billion last year.

The United States, however, remains the leading source of foreign direct investment in the country, with a cumulative portfolio of US$12.5 billion.

The Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean estimates that China ranks second, with US$4.6 billion concentrated primarily in the mining sector, although a significant share of Chinese investment enters through third countries, via asset purchases, or through concessions and construction contracts that are not recorded as direct investment.

Aware of both powers’ importance to Chile’s economy, the president-elect has been careful to temper his tone.

Before flying to Miami during the weekend to attend the launch of Trump’s newly announced “Shield of the Americas” initiative, Kast told journalists that “having the best possible relations with both China and the United States is not incompatible” and pledged to “honour and respect trade relations” with both countries.

US President Donald Trump attends the “Shield of the Americas” summit in Miami, Florida, on March 7, 2026. Photo: Reuters
US President Donald Trump attends the “Shield of the Americas” summit in Miami, Florida, on March 7, 2026. Photo: Reuters
Andres Borquez, head of the Asian Studies Programme at the University of Chile, said the new president’s careful stance reflected a structural vulnerability that no government had yet confronted directly – that managing ties with Washington and Beijing by “keeping trade and security in separate compartments” might not work under an international order “increasingly strained by Trump”.

“Right now, we don’t really have a strategy to navigate this new period. It’s more strategic, with sectors that are not just connected with competitive advantage but with strategic logic,” Borquez said.

The broader challenge facing Kast, he argued, was that the pragmatic two-track approach his administration had signalled might not survive contact with a world that no longer separated economics from geopolitics.

He noted that Chile was well positioned with its “Pacific coastline, mineral wealth and digital infrastructure, making it a node in almost every transition” that matters over the next decades.

But position alone was “not a strategy and without a cross-party consensus on how to navigate great power competition”, the cable affair was unlikely to be the last crisis of its kind.

Others agreed that the cable affair was unlikely to remain an isolated episode.

Francisco Urdinez, director of the Millennium Nucleus on the Impacts of China in Latin America and the Caribbean, said the dispute had sent a message that extended well beyond Santiago.

“This is an example for other countries of what the United States is prepared to do in the coming years,” he said.

“Anyone who tries to negotiate critical infrastructure with the Chinese will cross a red line that Washington will not allow to be crossed.”

He was sceptical that formal investment screening mechanisms would resolve the tension. No government, he argued, had been willing to quantify what tighter restrictions on Chinese capital would actually cost.

Countries that had already introduced such regimes had seen Chinese investment fall sharply, with nothing to replace it.

For Urdinez, that calculus left the region facing a choice with no good options. Governments could preserve their commercial ties with China or avoid crossing Washington’s red lines. Doing both was becoming harder to imagine, he added.

“No one is willing to do that study. But someone is going to have to pay that cost.”

Igor Patrick
Igor Patrick has worked in different media outlets in Latin America, mainly covering Brics and China. In addition to his bachelor's degree in journalism (PUC Minas), he holds two master's


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