Three weeks into the Israeli-US war on Iran, fundamental questions remain about the causes, purpose and urgency of the confrontation. US officials have alleged that Iran was marching towards a nuclear weapon, with lead negotiator Steve Witkoff accusing Iranian negotiators of boasting about Tehran’s purported ability to assemble an atomic arsenal.
Another declared casus belli is alleged Iranian plans for a preemptive strike on Israel, which Washington says would have pulled in the United States anyway. President Donald Trump has further muddied the waters by stating that the war was launched “because we have good allies there,” specifically naming Israel.
The picture has additionally been blurred by the apparent progress in nuclear negotiations between Iranian and US officials in February, multiple Arab and Iranian political and security sources in the region have told Amwaj.media.
Apart from Oman as host and mediator, two other actors played important but quiet roles in promoting a peaceful solution behind the scenes. In the aftermath of the failure of the negotiations and outbreak of war, regional sources are expressing consternation about the chain of events that led to the current situation—and deep concern about the prospects for a lasting end to the confrontation.
Reviving diplomacy
Following Trump’s return to the White House last year, Iranian and US negotiators held five rounds of negotiations to finally hammer out differences over the future of Iran’s nuclear program. Those talks collapsed in June 2025, when Israel launched a surprise military offensive against Iran. After ten days of fighting, the US joined the bombing campaign, striking three key Iranian nuclear sites before a ceasefire was declared. To Iranian decision makers, two parallel dynamics were evident: Trump had used diplomacy as deception, yet was averse to entering the war until confident that involvement would carry minimal risks.
For the subsequent eight months, Iran refused any meetings with US officials. Tehran derided the purpose of talks when it had been attacked in the middle of negotiations—and rejected demands by an emboldened Trump which, in the view of Iran, would amount to full capitulation. The cost of standing firm was deemed to be less.
But in February this year, a renewed push for diplomacy gained steam. Iranian and US officials agreed to gather in Muscat to end a nuclear crisis that had dragged on for over two decades. But while Oman once again played, another Gulf Arab state came to play a quiet but decisive role.
On the eve of the initial talks in Muscat, a Qatari delegation traveled to Tehran to help facilitate Iran-US alignment on the agenda. “Iran announced its readiness to participate in that round of negotiations only after the United States finally accepted two key issues,” a high-ranking Iranian political source told Amwaj.media, “First, that negotiations would be limited solely to the nuclear issue and that it would abandon its demand to negotiate about missiles and regional matters. Second, that it would abandon its longstanding demand for ‘zero enrichment’ and accept a level of uranium enrichment in Iran.” According to the source, Oman and Qatar were among “various intermediaries” which “explicitly conveyed” American acceptance of those parameters.
Headed by a senior official close to Qatar’s royal family, the Arab delegation shortly returned to Doha, where Witkoff and Trump’s son-in-law and advisor Jared Kushner were waiting. The same Qatari official accompanied Kushner and Witkoff on the private jet that took the US negotiators to Muscat, and was present alongside the Omani hosts throughout the talks, a regional security source explained to Amwaj.media.
“There was a long handshake,” said a senior Iranian political source with knowledge of the first face-to-face meeting between Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi and Kushner. What followed was a frank exchange. Araghchi told his US counterparts, “I am completely serious and have full authority [to strike a deal]. I even have the authority to remain here for two weeks to finish the work. But I do not see you as serious, and we do not trust you.” Witkoff is said to have insisted that he and Kushner were also serious about negotiating a deal, allegedly hinting at acceptance of Iranian uranium enrichment for the first time.
Another issue was Iran’s stockpile of uranium enriched to 60% purity, which the US side rapidly wanted addressed—and which Iran was ready to dilute. The senior Iranian political source said Araghchi clarified the precise amount of such material in Iran’s possession, 440.9 kg (972 lbs) as verified by UN inspectors, and explained that it could be used to theoretically make about ten bombs if enriched further to weapons-grade. Witkoff has in recent days suggested that Araghchi’s statement was a boast, if not a threat. But the senior Iranian source disputed that characterization, insisting that the intent was solely to emphasize the significance of the concession Tehran was ready to make.
Informed Iranian political sources familiar with the talks additionally highlighted that the lack of nuclear expertise on the part of Kushner and Witkoff, in addition to the absence of a technical team, caused consternation in the negotiations. According to the senior source, “Araghchi on several occasions explained the stages of nuclear fuel production and the difference between an enrichment facility and a reactor to Witkoff, yet the US negotiator still believed that the Tehran Research Reactor was an enrichment facility producing radio-medicines.”
However, Kushner’s presence is said to have added one key dimension compared to previous rounds of negotiations—including the diplomacy which led to the 2015 Iran nuclear deal. Trump’s advisor is said to have expressed a belief in the need for an “economic complement” to any potential accord, similar to the Russia-Ukraine talks. When the meeting concluded, the senior Iranian source told Amwaj.media, “Witkoff said they had never had such a positive session before. They said they would speak with Trump and obtain his authorization to continue negotiations.” The following day, the authorization from the Oval Office was conveyed to Iran through mediators.
Tangle in Geneva
Taking stock of the talks in Oman, and mindful of concerns about the need for a stronger technical expertise in the negotiations, Qatar pitched two ideas to Iran in early February: moving the negotiations to Switzerland, arguing that meetings could more easily be held; and, the involvement of UK National Security Advisor Jonathan Powell, citing his knowledge of the technical dimensions to the nuclear issue and good rapport with Witkoff. The Iranians agreed to both suggestions.
Senior officials in Doha conveyed Tehran’s green light to Powell, thereby initiating a British-Qatari partnership in support of the Iran-US dialogue. In practice, the collaboration entailed a Qatari presence in the room along with the Omani hosts, and coordination with Powell on the circulation of ideas to break the deadlock—some of which were shared with negotiators both before and after sessions.
The UK national security advisor is said to have traveled to Geneva on Feb. 16, the day before the second round of negotiations. “Powell met with both Araghchi and Witkoff,” a second Iranian political source with knowledge of the negotiations told Amwaj.media, “He was fully briefed by Witkoff and happy about the progress that had been made in Oman. He even gave Iran some good advice to allow the talks to proceed better.” According to the first senior Iranian source, Powell “brought along some recommendations” in a private meeting with Iran’s foreign minister. The encounter took place at a hotel in Geneva in the evening prior to the Iran-US talks.
When Kushner and Witkoff met with Araghchi on Feb. 17, they raised a new demand: the three enrichment facilities that the US bombed in June 2025—Fordow, Isfahan and Natanz—had to be dismantled and replaced by a new enrichment center above ground. The Iranian negotiators objected, saying that it was obvious that the US aim was to retain the option to easily destroy such a facility.
Kushner and Witkoff denied any such motives, charging that the goal was to enable verification of nuclear activities by inspectors. “The Americans were told that they must be realistic: that they cannot achieve through military attack what they can obtain through negotiations,” the first senior Iranian political source explained to Amwaj.media, “The US side was also told that in terms of inspections and verification, it makes no difference whether a facility is underground or above ground.” This is while Witkoff is said to have insisted that the latter does, in fact, make a difference.
In the view of the Iranians, the US stance conveyed unfamiliarity with the technical dimensions to what was being discussed. To make their point, Araghchi and his delegation brought International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) chief Rafael Grossi into the room to ask him whether inspections of subterranean sites are any different. According to the senior Iranian source, Grossi responded that it makes no difference if a facility is above or below ground, provided that there is full access. This purportedly left Witkoff visibly irritated.
To shift the mood in the room, the Iranians then presented a proposal to ensure no accumulation of enriched uranium, arguing that such a setup would render the building of a nuclear bomb impossible. The essence of the proposal was that if a method could be found to prevent stockpiling of enriched uranium gas, then it no longer matters how many centrifuges exist, what type they may be, where facilities are located or whether they are above ground or subterranean. The proposal outlined that arrangements could be made so that enriched uranium is sent directly to a fuel fabrication plant and converted into fuel plates and rods in accordance with the practical needs of Iran. The document also pledged that all stages of such a process would occur under the full supervision and verification of the IAEA.
In further discussions, six “guiding principles” for a deal were agreed by both sides, and it was decided that at the next meeting, a preliminary agreement would be drafted—or, as Kushner and Witkoff called it, a draft “contract.” Those principles were: fuel production, non-accumulation of enriched uranium, full verification, sanctions relief, economic cooperation and peaceful coexistence. At the end of the session, Witkoff said Trump would be informed that the meeting had been useful.
Final round of talks
Iranian and US negotiators reconvened in Switzerland on Feb. 26 for what came to be the final round of talks. Ahead of the session, the US delegation had through several intermediaries conveyed that Trump had no intention of initiating another attack on Iran. However, given the increased American military deployments in the region, the meeting began with Araghchi highlighting the stakes.
“This meeting may be our last…if we do not succeed today, we will each return and do what we believe we must do,” the Iranian chief diplomat is said to have told Kushner and Witkoff, “You may launch an attack, and we will exercise our legitimate right of defense. No one will win in that situation, and afterward you will have to return to this very negotiating table—and it is not even certain that anyone will still want to negotiate with you.”
According to the first senior Iranian political source, Kushner and Witkoff stated that they had come to Geneva with the goal of reaching an agreement and were ready to stay as long as necessary. The Iranians noted that the two men came alone, without any technical experts. Yet, unlike previous meetings, the session is said to have been long and serious, and went into details.
At the request of the US, Iran presented a detailed proposal that included a timeline for implementation. The document addressed the scale and dimensions of enrichment in Iran, the dilution of stockpiled uranium, the fate of attacked enrichment facilities, the location of future enrichment and the renunciation of nuclear weapons and economic cooperation. In return, the United States was asked for security guarantees, “respecting Iran’s right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy” and sanctions relief.
Witkoff is said to have requested that Iran halt uranium enrichment for five years, with Araghchi responding that he could argue internally for a three-year halt—although he would first need to return to Tehran and put his neck on the line. The Islamic Republic has not formally agreed to any suspension of enrichment for over 20 years, even as it has come under the most stringent sanctions regime in the world as well as military strikes by two nuclear-armed countries. Importantly, the Iranians also interpreted alleged US acquiescence to the production of fuel plates for the Tehran Research Reactor as effectively agreeing to 20% enrichment.
After the morning session ended, Powell—the UK national security advisor—is said to have met with Araghchi and other members of the foreign minister’s delegation. The gathering was held where the Iranians resided for the duration of the talks, and saw Powell share “some technical proposals,” according to the second Iranian political source. As for the Qataris, they were along with the Omanis present in the actual sessions.
As negotiations resumed in the afternoon, the second Iranian political source charged, Witkoff demanded a seven-year freeze on enrichment. Further complicating the situation, a third senior Iranian source told Amwaj.media that after an apparent call to Trump towards the end of the afternoon session, Witkoff increased the duration to ten years. At that point, a visibly angry Araghchi retorted, “I am familiar with this American-style negotiation tactic, when you always shift the goalposts.” The second political source disputed Witkoff’s recent public assertion that the Iranian foreign minister “shouted,” insisting that Araghchi was angry but firm in his tone.
Despite the clearly heated exchange, there was movement on other fronts, leading the two sides to agree to leave outstanding questions for after technical talks in Vienna that were scheduled to be held in the following days.
The notion that progress had been made appears to have been shared by others in the room. Addressing the topic of how to convey the situation in the public realm, the US delegation, according to the first Iranian political source, said it would relay positive news to the White House. Both sides also agreed that Oman’s foreign minister, acting as mediator, would tell the media that the negotiations had made “significant progress.” The Omani chief diplomat drafted a tweet with that wording and read it out loud, with both the Iranian and US delegations approving it.
The mood in the room is said to have been relaxed, and as the negotiators were preparing to leave, with the anticipation of a possibly final round of negotiations the following week, Kushner and Witkoff showed the Iranians their shoes. With smiles on their faces, according to the first senior political source, the two men said Trump had bought what was on their feet—on sale from Florsheim.
The sense of a deal having been within reach has also been expressed by the Arab interlocutors. “We were positive about the outcome and looked forward to the technical discussions in Vienna,” a senior regional security source told Amwaj.media, “Witkoff also assured the Arab mediators that they should not worry about a military attack at all, and that there was no plan for such action.”
Separately, the Guardian has reported that “the UK team were surprised by what the Iranians put on the table,” citing a former official, “It was not a complete deal, but it was progress and was unlikely to be the Iranians’ final offer. The British team expected the next round of negotiations to go ahead on the basis of the progress in Geneva.”
Less than 48 hours later, Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, was killed in an Israeli airstrike on his Tehran residence, along with top Iranian military and security officials who had gathered in the compound. A full-scale Israeli-US war on Iran had been launched.