Chuck Freilich's recent op-ed in Haaretz attacking J Street reflects a deep debate in the global Jewish community: Should Jews who live outside Israel, especially American Jews, set aside their own judgment and fall in line behind the policies and decisions of Israel's elected leadership?
According to Freilich, public disagreement doesn't represent acceptable policy debate. It is evidence of confusion, naivety, or lack of commitment.
Most American Jews reject that premise outright. In survey after survey, more than 90 percent say it is entirely possible to be pro-Israel while opposing specific policies or actions of the Israeli government. That is not a marginal view. It is the mainstream position of the community.
A demand for support of Israel's every government decision in order to be in the "pro-Israel tent" imposes a loyalty test that most American Jews do not accept.
One of us served in senior positions in the U.S. national security community and can say with certainty that the issue here is not whether the Iranian regime poses a threat. It does. The issue is whether the current war advances a realistic strategic objective.
Military action undertaken without a clear and achievable endgame has a long history in the Middle East, and that history should make policymakers cautious. The Iraq War also began with promises of a decisive strategic outcome, but instead strengthened Iran, destabilized the region, and left the U.S. deeply entangled. Asking whether we are repeating that pattern is not irresponsible. It is necessary.
The other one of us spent decades in Israel's diplomatic service and believes that Israel's security has never depended on military strength alone. It has depended on alliances – first and foremost with the United States – and on the enduring connection between Israel and the Jewish diaspora.
Suggesting that American Jews should simply take their cues on questions of American policy from the government of another country is not only unrealistic; it risks feeding dangerous tropes about divided loyalties. American Jews should approach these questions as American citizens whose interests are directly affected by the decisions of their own government, even as they feel deep ties to Israel and genuine concern for its security. It is natural that this perspective will sometimes lead to different conclusions than those reached by Israelis who live with different risks and responsibilities.
J Street was founded because many American Jews believe their pro-Israel views are not reflected by organizations that define support for Israel as support for whatever government happens to be in power. Our position has always been that backing Israel's long-term security and democratic character sometimes means supporting government policy and sometimes means opposing it. That is not hostility. It is engagement.
On Iran, Freilich argues that J Street's primary objection was that the war lacked a mandate from the international community – and that approval from Russia and China was therefore required. That is a bad-faith, borderline false interpretation. What J Street actually said at the start of the war was that President Trump was "starting this war with no clear plan for achieving his goal; without a comprehensive discussion with the American public about the risks and alternatives; and illegally, without first seeking authorization from Congress or a mandate from the international community."
Almost a month into this war, which has produced chaos across the Middle East, disrupted global oil markets, and triggered a major escalation on Israel's northern border this warning has proved prescient.
Our position has been consistent. Iran's nuclear ambitions, missile program, and support for regional proxies pose real dangers that must be addressed. The seriousness of these threats demands serious strategy. If military action could realistically end Iran's nuclear program or produce a more stable regional balance, we might support it. But in this case, launching a war without clear and attainable objectives risks leaving both the United States and Israel worse off – strategically, diplomatically, and politically.
This perspective is shaped by past American experiences in Middle East conflicts, which in turn influence both broader public opinion and the views of American Jews. While there is no credible polling yet on how American Jews feel about this war, more than 90 percent of Democrats oppose it – and roughly 70 percent of American Jews vote Democratic. That basic math suggests real misgivings. Past polling on the war in Gaza, where 60 percent of American Jews said Israel had committed war crimes, further underscores the likelihood of mixed views.
Frelich argues, however, that American Jews should fall in line behind a war initiated by an American president because 91 percent of Israeli Jews supported it at the outset.
Freilich writes that diaspora Jews should "support the state, not a specific policy." We agree: We support the State of Israel and oppose this government's policy. However, in this case Freilich's interpretation of supporting the state means demanding essentially unquestioning support for an American and Israeli decision to go to war even when that policy is controversial, risky, and counter to the values of many American Jews. That is not support of the state. That is blind support for a policy.
That does not define a sustainable relationship between the world's two largest Jewish communities. That relationship has been – and must be – a two-way street. If Israelis expect American Jews to continue to work to sustain broad bipartisan support for Israel, to remain engaged, to contribute, and to pass that connection on to the next generation, then our views must be treated as part of the conversation – not as an irritant to be dismissed.
Israel was founded as the nation-state of the Jewish people, not only of those who live within its borders. The relationship between Israel and the diaspora has always included disagreement, argument, and mutual influence. That has never weakened Israel. On the contrary, it has helped sustain a broad base of support in the U.S. that has been one of Israel's greatest strategic assets.
American Jews can be pro-Israel and still oppose this war. They can believe the Iranian regime is dangerous and still question whether this conflict makes Israel or the United States safer. And they can reject the idea that loyalty requires silence.
Insisting that there is only one legitimate pro-Israel position does not strengthen Israel. Ultimately, it isolates the country from the very people whose support it will continue to need.
Ilan Goldenberg is Senior Vice President and Chief Policy Officer at J Street. He previously worked at the White House, State Department, Pentagon, and Senate on Middle East policy. Nadav Tamir is the Executive Director of J Street Israel